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This paper forms part of the Treasury’s ongoing work programme investigating 
New Zealand’s economic performance.  It represents one approach to understanding 
New Zealand’s economic performance, that of reviewing theoretical and empirical 
literature on economic growth.  Other research approaches the Treasury is adopting to 
shed light on these issues include: monitoring New Zealand’s total factor productivity 
performance; learning from overseas experience; and reviewing linkages between 
specific policy issues and economic growth. 
 
The paper seeks to provide a synthesis of recent thinking about New Zealand’s 
economic growth performance by reviewing international growth literature, and the 
views of commentators analysing New Zealand’s economic performance.  
 
The synthesis suggests that there are no obvious policy options that will dramatically 
improve New Zealand’s growth performance, and this is consistent with international 
findings on the growth experience of industrialised economies.  Growth is influenced by 
much more than Government policy, even if well formulated.  Current policy settings 
seem broadly consistent with the literature’s general conclusions on requirements for 
growth.   
 
An important conclusion is that there are many potential contributors to growth.  
Typically, a small proportion of firms and industries contribute disproportionately to 
growth.  The contribution of individual firms and sectors can change quite rapidly.  
Policy formation needs to take such a vision into account. 
 
 
I wish to thank many people whose discussions have contributed to this work.  In 
particular, I wish to thank those who have commented on earlier drafts and especially 
Sarah Box, Andrew Coleman, Ron Crawford, Lesley Haines, Carl Hansen, 
Dean Hyslop, John Janssen, Benedikte Jensen, Renee Lister, Andrew Sweet, and 
John Yeabsley. 2   3
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Executive Summary 
“What is the main thing Governments must do to spur economic growth? Ah, 
well, that remains a mystery.” 
 
The Economist (1999a) 
 
The factors most likely to lead to higher rates of growth are not well understood 
internationally. In New Zealand’s case, an assessment of our past growth 
record requires judgements about the counterfactual- the alternative growth 
paths that might have occurred under different policy scenarios.   Looking to the 
future, judgements about New Zealand’s potential growth performance involve 
identifying remaining constraints to raising performance (whether they be 
cultural, geographical, institutional, or historical), and determining which of 
these constraints may be influenced by government policy. 
 
This paper is part of the Treasury’s ongoing work programme investigating New 
Zealand’s economic performance.  It seeks to provide a synthesis of recent 
thinking about New Zealand’s economic growth performance.  It represents one 
approach to understanding New Zealand’s economic performance, that of 
reviewing theoretical and empirical literature on economic growth.  The 
Treasury is adopting other research approaches to shed light on these issues, 
including: 
 
·  monitoring New Zealand’s total factor productivity performance [for 
example, refer Treasury Working Paper 99/3 ‘Measuring NZ’s Productivity 
Performance by Denis Lawrence and Erwin Diewert’] 
·  learning from overseas experience through country case studies [for 
example, refer Treasury Working Paper 98/1 The Irish Economy: Lessons 
for New Zealand? By Sarah Box and 00/1 Finland and New Zealand: A 
Cross Country Comparison of Economic Performance] 
·  reviewing the significance for economic performance of specific policy 
areas or issues.  This review work is incorporated into Treasury’s standard 
policy advice, but also includes more in-depth consideration of specific 
issues [for example, refer 99/6 Economic Integration and Currency Union]. 
 
The Treasury’s current work programme to address economic performance 
includes the following topics: 
 
·  The relationship between New Zealand’s national saving rate and 
economic growth; 
·  The relationship between macroeconomic policy and economic growth; 
·  The implications for economic performance of New Zealand’s small size 
and geographical distance from overseas markets; and 
·  Business dynamics. 
   7
Purpose of this paper 
The purpose of this paper is to help assess the effectiveness of the broad 
New  Zealand strategy for growth, including understanding why economic 
growth has been less than was hoped for at the outset of the major reform 
process
  in 1984 and drawing tentative conclusions from this material about 
future policy priorities.  
 
The approach taken is to first review international theoretical and empirical 
growth literature to help determine what factors might explain New Zealand’s 
performance.  The performance is then reviewed. This material is used to draw 
conclusions about what has been driving New Zealand’s growth, by reviewing 
the work of analysts who have been in a position to take a continuous overview 
of developments. Policy actions that might improve New Zealand’s growth are 
considered and further possible areas of research are suggested. 
 
In this paper, growth normally refers to the rate of growth of per capita GDP, a 
measure associated with our underlying concern, welfare.
1  If incomes can grow 
through one-off growth in income levels over time, that can also contribute to 
welfare.  In practice, the distinction between one-off growth in income levels and 
ongoing growth is difficult to draw and not always important 
 
Findings from International Growth Literature 
There is no international consensus about appropriate theoretical models. 
Neoclassical growth models suggest that accumulating factors, such as capital, 
labour and human capital, should raise output levels over time but with 
diminishing returns which in the long term mean that any burst in growth from 
additional factor accumulation will be temporary, even if leading to a higher 
income level.  Growth can be boosted persistently through exogenous factors 
such as improvements in technology.   
 
Endogenous growth models suggest that growth may be able to continue 
indefinitely, with contributions from phenomena such as technical change being 
embodied in the capital stock; human capital investments; R&D spillovers; 
economies of scale or increased specialisation in intermediate inputs. 
 
Other theorists suggest that the nature of the institutions and culture in a 
society, the role and size of Government; openness to trade; the extent of 
competition; geographical factors; macroeconomic conditions and many other 
matters may contribute to growth performance. 
 
Empirical research sheds some light on these matters.  It comes from a variety 
of sources, including case studies, historical work and particularly cross-country 
studies.  The latter suffer from data problems, omitted variables, instability in 
results with minor model variations; comparison of non-comparable countries; 
                                            
1   Definitions of key terms used in the paper are provided in section 2.   8
undue influence of outliers, difficulties in determining the direction of causality 
when relationships are found and other problems.  Despite these difficulties and 
despite a lack of overall consensus in empirical work, there are areas where 
most researchers tend to agree on the conditions associated with growth.   
Although uncertainty remains high and there is no such thing as an off the shelf 
growth formula, the following factors emerge: 
 
·  Theoretically, growth in savings and capital investment and human capital, 
should boost growth in per capita income. 
·  The role of education is somewhat ambiguous in empirical studies but it 
can make a positive contribution. 
·  Innovation, in areas such as marketing and organisation and the diffusion 
of technology, as well as R&D, is particularly important. 
·  Institutions such as the rule of law and established property rights are 
important. 
·  Cultural factors can make a difference, although they are not well 
understood. 
·  Trade openness and domestic competition appear to help growth. 
·  Geographical factors including national location and scale of population 
are important.  Being isolated from large population masses and having 
small cities does not help. 
·  Macroeconomic stability helps, although maintaining very low rates of 
inflation, under say 2% to 3% is not critical.  
·  The balance of studies tends to suggest lower Government expenditure 
and tax to GDP ratios help economic performance. However, increases or 
decreases in the size of government within the range in which New 
Zealand currently stands (ie 30 – 40 percent of GDP) is unlikely to be 
particularly important.  The quality of government expenditure and 
effectiveness of government regulation is more likely to influence 
performance. 
·  Some factors that help growth in developing countries are probably not 
particularly relevant to understanding New Zealand’s performance, given 
New Zealand conditions.  These include levels of inequality, financial 
intermediation and democracy. 
 
New Zealand’s Growth Performance 
New Zealand’s per capita GDP growth since 1987 has not been high, at 0.67% 
per annum on a peak to peak basis. The GDP boost after 1992 was 
accompanied by high population growth.
2  Some of that growth in per capita 
terms was simply making up lost ground from the 1990 to 1992 recession.   
                                            
2    OECD (1999) contains a fold-out table comparing statistics for various OECD members. 
Leaving aside an anomalous German figure, this shows only Mexico, Turkey, Luxembourg, 
Australia and Canada exceeded New Zealand’s annual population growth rate of 1.1% in the 
10 years to 1996. Although New Zealand enjoyed amongst the higher GDP volume growth 
rates over the five years to 1996 at 3.7%, countries such as Ireland, Korea and Norway 
enjoyed high GDP growth and lower population growth rates than New Zealand.   9
Allowing for increased factor payments abroad, with a measure such as GNI 
(Gross National Income), would reduce the growth further, although leaving it 
positive. 
 
The evidence of low growth may understate New Zealand’s achievements in 
welfare terms.  Welfare improvements arising from lower prices, increased 
choice, better product quality and services growth are not fully picked up in 
GDP statistics.  Measured value added before the reforms was probably 
boosted by price distortions caused by protection from foreign competition.   
Given that New Zealand has tended to have more reforms than most OECD 
countries since the 1980s, and that the benefits of reforms may tend to be 
understated in GDP measures, New Zealand’s performance may be slightly 
better than measured in its growth rate. 
 
Growth and output levels at the start of the 1980’s were boosted by 
unsustainable policies, such as Government borrowing, now mostly unwound.  
 
Encouragingly, total factor productivity and growth did improve in the 1990’s.  
However, OECD and Treasury projections do not suggest that New Zealand is 
likely to close the gap with average per capita OECD incomes.  Of course, 
matching OECD growth rates would be a worthwhile achievement and better 
than New Zealand’s historic performance. 
 
Reasons for Moderate Post Reform Performance and Major Policy Points 
There is little reason to have expected New Zealand’s recent growth 
performance to be outstandingly high, at least compared with other OECD 
countries.  The reasons are given below.  Significant, but tentative, policy points 
are included in Italics. 
 
·  Any tendency for New Zealand to converge to higher incomes could be 
expected to be weak given New Zealand incomes are still around 80% of 
OECD levels. There is no obvious, large technology gap able to be 
bridged with the transfer of technology from wealthier countries, little 
unproductive labour to transfer to a high productivity sector and no large, 
adjacent high-income area for New Zealand to integrate into. 
 
·  Distance from markets makes it more difficult to develop business 
relationships and participate in innovative activity.   
 
·  Having a small, isolated population makes it difficult to achieve economies 
of scale in many areas.  This may impact more upon New Zealand’s ability 
to close the income gap with wealthier countries than on the growth rate 
itself. 
 
·  We should be cautious in following industry policies or development 
approaches that appear to work overseas but in very different 
geographical or scale settings.   10 
·  Isolation, coupled with existing industry strengths, increases the chances 
that resource based development will be an important part of a successful 
growth strategy for New Zealand.  Resource based industries are 
generally less affected by distance from major markets. 
 
·  Isolation raises the possible pay-off of policies that help overcome the 
effects of distance and scale.  
 
·  Research and consideration should be given to policies that might reduce 
the effects of national boundaries, reducing isolation and scale effects.  
 
·  If economic growth is given a high weighting in the policy mix, supportive 
policies towards urban development could be appropriate.  
 
·  The full results of reforms are often seen as slow to emerge, given the 
deep-seated changes required in structures, attitudes and responses. 
 
·  The full benefits of New Zealand’s economic reforms since the mid-1980s 
are still probably coming through. 
 
·  New Zealand’s population growth has been fast compared to OECD 
countries in the post-war period and still relatively fast in the 1990s.   
Faster population growth tends to be associated with somewhat slower per 
capita income growth, possibly through a diminishing returns effect.  
 
·  While the proportion of people in tertiary training has increased 
substantially, skill levels are still not high by OECD standards and any pay-
off could reasonably be expected to be longer term.  
 
·  Human capital investment, including through education, seems likely to be 
a contributor to output levels and growth although the precise contribution 
is uncertain. The pay-off may not be dramatic, may vary and there may be 
diminishing returns.  Careful assessment of specific human capital 
investment opportunities is desirable.  
 
·  New Zealand generally has the sorts of institutions seen as most important 
to growth, including property rights; Courts and a developed finance 
sector. 
·  Lifestyle considerations may limit some New Zealanders’ ambition.  
 
·  Cultural issues could usefully be investigated further to see if there are 
implications for growth or opportunities for measures to promote growth 
here. 
 
·  New Zealand seems to have been investing in line with the OECD 
average. Capital has not been accumulated at a rate that would suggest 
high growth should be expected, say on the historic scale of East Asian   11 
countries.  Much capital investment has been foreign sourced, with 
positive benefits to GDP, but a lower proportionate return to New Zealand 
income levels.  Improved returns to capital since 1992 are more promising 
for growth, being consistent with improved investment quality in the post 
reform period. 
 
·  Savings have not been high, either in the past with large Government 
deficits, or more recently with low household savings.   
 
·  Increasing savings and investment rates may boost per capita income 
growth, provided average rates of return were achieved through 
generating an environment that secures suitable investment quality.   
 
·  Macroeconomic policy changes since the reforms and current settings and 
achievements have been broadly positive for growth.  
 
·  It seems plausible that several large, sustained appreciations in the real 
exchange rate have inhibited exports and import substitution. However, 
monetary policy is a difficult policy instrument to manage and inflationary 
expectations have been persistent.  
 
·  Minimising sharp real exchange rate peaks looks to be important and now 
possibly more feasible, given current inflation expectations. Avoiding net 
fiscal stimulation when the economy is strong could help this. 
 
·  New Zealand does not seem to be exceptional in its total tax take or 
expenditure. There is no clear evidence that these have a substantial 
effect on growth at present levels. 
 
·  The overall weight of analysis seems to indicate that a slightly smaller 
proportion of Government expenditure or taxation to GDP would be 
beneficial for growth, but this is not a strong conclusion. 
 
·  The predominant view amongst New Zealand analysts appears to be that 
microeconomic reforms have improved New Zealand’s growth prospects.  
A small market however produces less pressure for improvement than 
larger overseas markets. New Zealand’s competition law may have 
imposed a lesser degree of restraint on restrictive practices than some 
overseas regimes. 
 
·  Innovation is agreed to be a particularly important driver of growth.  
 
·  There is little clear evidence on industry policies.  Much of Porter’s advice 
looks realistic: improve infrastructure; focus Government research 
programs on opportunities; encourage successful clusters; and facilitate 
new business formation.  These approaches reinforce success within a   12 
well-developed set of economy wide policies, to be distinguished from 
selective interventions. 
 
·  Microeconomic reform should continue in areas where probable benefits to 
growth and static benefits can be identified. 
 
·  Investing in the “right” sectors, viewed retrospectively, does seem to be 
important.  However, we should be very wary of following models that 
suggest quick, easy pay-offs from selecting sectors likely to prosper.  
 
·  Policies towards innovation should focus on innovation its widest sense, 
not just on R&D.  
 
·  There is still much promise in resource based development as part of 
market led development.  Resource based development can involve 
sophisticated products, not just unmodified commodities moving towards 
the end of their product life cycle. It has a good productivity track record, 
there are opportunities to apply sophisticated knowledge, and New 
Zealand has strengths in the area. 
 
·  Measurement issues bedevil analysis of New Zealand’s growth 
performance. GDP does not represent national income well, does not 
reflect the per capita position and nor does it represent welfare. Services 
output is not well measured. Reforms may have resulted in output being 
understated 
 
·  Improvements in national accounts and growth measurement should 
continue. 
 
General Conclusions   
This synthesis has not suggested that there is much new, low-hanging fruit to 
be plucked in bolstering New Zealand’s growth performance.  Such a result 
should probably not be expected.  Intense policy analysis has been put into the 
reforms undertaken over the last 15 years, which have been broadly in line with 
the firmer conclusions about what sorts of conditions are most likely to generate 
growth in mainstream economic literature.   
 
An important conclusion is that there are many potential contributors to growth.  
These include investment in physical capital, human capital and innovation.   
Typically, a small proportion of firms and industries contribute disproportionately 
to growth in a large variety of ways.  The players involved can change quite 
rapidly. Policy formation needs to take such a vision into account. 
 
Even if all the basic conditions seem right, growth is not guaranteed. 
   13 
In many areas, policies now being followed seem broadly consistent with the 
requirements for growth, including both macroeconomic policy settings and 
microeconomic decision making.  
 
However, growth is influenced by much more than Government policy, even if 
that policy is well formulated.  Many choices important to growth are largely in 
the hands of individuals and firms rather than Government.  For example, the 
extent of entrepreneurial risk-taking depends on individual business decisions.  
Governments may help to create a more certain business environment, but are 
limited in their ability to influence individual firm behaviour. 
   14 
 
1.  Introduction and Conclusions 
This paper seeks to provide a synthesis of recent thinking about New Zealand’s 
economic growth performance.  It considers what that performance is, its key 
drivers, why the growth performance has been moderate and possible policy 
actions that might improve it.  The New Zealand material considered is mainly 
limited to authors who have examined broad aspects of New Zealand’s growth 
over a period of time.  These views are examined within the context of 
international theoretical and empirical literature on growth. 
 
Purpose 
The purpose of the paper is to help assess the effectiveness of the broad 
New Zealand strategy for economic growth
3 by: 
 
·  Reviewing the theoretical and empirical literature on growth, with particular 
emphasis on New Zealand writings 
·  Reviewing the growth outcomes achieved in New Zealand since the period 
of major reforms commenced in the early 1980s, both at an aggregate 
level and in terms of the main factors identified as contributors to growth 
performance in the international growth literature 
·  Understanding why economic growth has been less than was hoped for at 
the outset of the major reform process
4 
·  Drawing tentative conclusions from this material where possible about 
policy implications.
5   
 
Motivation 
With some justification, commentaries on New Zealand’s economic 
performance have long expressed concern about New Zealand’s economic 
growth rate.  Before the foreign exchange crisis of 1984 heightened 
New Zealand perceptions, Olson (1982) included a table in his analysis showing 
New Zealand to have the third lowest per capita GDP growth rate of 18 high 
income countries in the 1950s and lowest growth rate in the 1960s. It is clear 
that per capita income has slipped relative to other OECD countries over the 
last half century.
6     
 
                                            
3    Growth and other key terms such as National Income, technology and productivity are 
defined in section 2. 
4   Lawrence and Diewert (1999) for instance ask “Why has New Zealand’s recent measured 
productivity been lower than anticipated by many?” 
5   It should be noted that any conclusions drawn are incidental to the earlier analysis.  In every 
case, further work is likely to be necessary, preferably within a framework specifically 
designed to test the tentative ideas suggested here. 
6   See Figure 3.  Figures and Tables are placed near the back of the paper, ahead of the 
bibliography.   15 
Achieving higher per capita incomes is important for a raft of reasons.  These 
relate to levels of income rather than growth per se.  Higher real incomes are 
more likely to:  
 
·  satisfy New Zealanders’ aspirations  
·  meet demands for publicly provided services such as health and welfare 
support  
·  support initiatives to improve the broader New Zealand living environment 
·  allow greater scope for a more equal income distribution
7  
·  provide incentives for highly skilled individuals to remain in New Zealand 
 
Sustained, modest, compounding increments to the growth rate can potentially 
lift future income levels substantially.  A 0.5% lift in the growth rate could lift 
income levels by 10.5% after 20 years or 28.3% over 50 years. This suggests 
the desirability of focussing policy attention on factors that influence growth 
rather than on one-off, static improvements to income levels, although these are 
undoubtedly still worth pursuing.  Thus, this paper is mainly concerned with 
New Zealand’s growth rate performance rather than its performance across a 
wider range of indicators.  The vexed question of growth rates versus changes 
in levels of income is discussed further below in Part 2. 
 
This is not to say that indicators other than growth are unimportant.   
Traditionally, accounts of economic performance have been concerned with at 
least four such variables: inflation, the current account, unemployment and 
income distribution.  A reasonable case can be made that at least the first two 
of these are subsidiary targets in the pursuit of growth.  A substantial lift in 
growth is likely to bring some improvement in the latter two and at minimum, 
more opportunity to address them through Government policy.   
 
Methodology 
The methodology of this paper involves the following steps: 
 
·  Reviewing briefly recent international writings on economic growth, with a 
view to identifying the most widely agreed elements within those views 
about what drives economic growth 
 
The literature is vast and has certainly not all been reviewed.  Rather, the 
approach has been to identify reasonably comprehensive surveys written over 
the 1990s.  This included material by earlier Treasury officers concerned with 
growth, to avoid duplication as well as more current material in economic 
                                            
7  Higher overall New Zealand incomes can be seen to support greater equality in several 
ways.  Top New Zealand incomes are likely to be less strongly pulled up above lower 
incomes by high paying foreign job opportunities. Governments are probably in a stronger 
position to implement redistribution policies with a higher income base, rather than one 
where international competitiveness depends more strongly on low relative wage levels. 
Income growth also appears to be associated with lower unemployment, based on 
New Zealand’s 1990’s experience.   16 
journals.  Both theoretical and empirical literature are covered, but with a 
greater emphasis on empirical literature, in an effort to identify elements of 
consensus which relate to the international experience of growth.  Particularly 
useful surveys have included Gorringe (1990), Janssen (1995), Temple (1999) 
and Poot (1999).  There is of course no complete consensus in any area and 
many unresolved debates remain.  The judgements about consensus are 
largely those of the survey authors cited in the paper, but in unattributed cases 
represent the author’s judgement about concensus. 
 
Some limitations were made to contain the scope of the material reviewed and 
keep the size of the paper manageable.  Specific areas with only limited 
caverage for this reason include: 
 
·  Alternative approaches to measuring welfare 
·  The microeconomic foundations of growth models 
·  The effects of specific regulatory interventions on growth 
·  The effects of taxation on growth 
 
·  Identifying New Zealand material written on economic growth since 1990 
 
A limited amount of material has been written about growth directly.  Much more 
has been written about wider aspects of New Zealand’s economy, particularly 
about the details and success or otherwise of the reforms collectively or 
individually.  This material has included a great deal on New Zealand’s growth 
performance, but it is only that material, not material on the reforms themselves 
that has been the focus of this report.  Wider economic histories such as that of 
Gould (1982) and Easton (1997) are also useful in dealing with growth while 
dealing with many other issues.  Again, it is their comments on growth that are 
of interest. 
 
The subject of growth itself is so large that limitations are required on the 
paper’s scope to keep it manageable.  The boundaries for this paper exclude 
most writings prior to 1990, on the grounds that important aspects are likely to 
be summarised in writings reviewed later.  New Zealand writings with an 
overseas focus are generally excluded. Writers who take a broad view of the 
economy, rather than analysing particular industries or aspects of performance 
such as monetary, fiscal or competition policy, are the main focus. Their views 
are summarised in Appendix A.  Overseas authors without regular contact with 
New Zealand, lobby groups and non-economists are generally excluded. 
Institutional views, where the authors remain anonymous, are generally given 
less weight than the views of individuals who may be seen to have some 
independence.
8 This approach risks excluding important analysis that touches 
on growth, but equally helps by focusing on well considered, independent 
views, formed by authors with a depth of experience.   
 
                                            
8   An exception is made for Treasury post-election briefings.   17 
Inevitably, the approach has been relaxed where analysts have made important 
points, or conducted research, which New Zealand economists have barely 
touched upon.  The approach was also relaxed to include several key 
documents written around 1984, to identify thinking about growth at the outset 
of the period of major economic reforms. These included Gould (1982), 
Treasury (1984), Blyth, Hawke and Smythe (1984) and Franklin (1985).  
 
Even with all these limitations, the material reviewed was further limited by 
concentrating on more recent, wide ranging surveys or works that could be 
expected to summarise many more narrowly focused studies.  Potential source 
material was selected from the New Zealand Economic Papers, including lists 
of working papers; the NZIER’s web site; EconLit; and major overseas journal 
articles.  Searches have focused on the word “growth” and inevitably, some 
material that did not refer to growth directly in its title will have been missed.  A 
useful, comprehensive bibliography of New Zealand material is contained in 
Dalziel and Lattimore (1999), which served as a check on whether significant 
literature had been identified.   
 
·  Summarising the approach and findings  of the authors concerned 
 
The summaries of writers’ views are brief, as might be expected given the large 
amount of material traversed in the paper.  It is acknowledged that to be fair, 
analysts’ arguments need to be seen in their entirety.  Sometimes, in dealing 
with New Zealand’s growth in a broad way, the analysts themselves are likely to 
have summarised their conclusions, risking elements of their arguments being 
overlooked.  The risk should be small, as it is in the analysts’ interests to 
present the essential elements of their arguments. 
 
·  Offering comment and assessment of the arguments, with a view to 
identifying elements contributing significantly to New Zealand’s growth 
performance. 
 
The framework for assessing the arguments put forward about New Zealand’s 
growth has been to examine: 
 
·  the consistency of the views put forward with any wider international 
consensus which may be available 
·  the degree of consistency of analysis offered within New Zealand by New 
Zealand analysts.  Sometimes, however, there may be only a few analysts 
dealing with specific issues, given New Zealand’s size. Meaningful 
comment is then not possible on consistency with the New Zealand 
literature. 
·  any obvious inconsistency with New Zealand data  
·  any obvious questions about the soundness of the analytical frameworks 
used.   
 
The examination of the last two points is necessarily limited because of the 
amount of literature reviewed for this paper. The trade-off between depth and   18 
bread has been moved towards breadth.  Comments made within the New 
Zealand literature about papers reviewed have been drawn upon where these 
are available. 
 
Evaluating the many arguments encountered has required care to ensure 
different arguments, drawn from different contexts, were dealt with within the 
frameworks envisaged by the many different authors concerned.  It may help 
readers to point out that the analysis of New Zealand performance by different 
authors variously canvases the following: 
 
·  How should the outturn New Zealand experienced be measured? 
·  What is the appropriate welfare indicator? 
·  How well is any available indicator actually measured? 
·  What counterfactual should any results be measured against?  
(Some arguments revolve around what New Zealand would have 
achieved if particular policies had not been undertaken, but it is 
difficult to agree on what the alternative path would have been.) 
·  What influences drove the actual result experienced? 
·  What policies should have been followed? 
 
This paper attempts to ensure that the framework used is clear in each section 
of the paper, but readers should also be aware of the need to distinguish the 








    19 
 
2  Definitions  
Several key terms are used through out the paper. These include growth, 
national output measures such as GDP and GNI, welfare, technology and 
productivity. Their use in the paper is clarified below. 
 
Welfare 
At the heart of the paper is a concern with the welfare of New Zealanders.  This 
is a somewhat elusive concept, often left undefined in papers about economic 
growth.  In economic dictionaries, where it is also hard to find a straightforward 
definition, welfare is typically said to relate the utility of a population, with 
possible extension to include the concept of happiness (Pearce 1992).  For the 
purposes of this paper, welfare should be taken as the well-being or utility 
derived from consumption of economically valuable goods and services.  These 
need not be traded in markets.  Services provided to household members within 
the household are unlikely to be traded but add greatly to welfare.  Services 
may also be economically valuable without having a positive, explicit price.  For 
example, a Government may provide free access to parks or a reduction in 
pollution levels, which contribute to welfare. Such services could have a shadow 
price imputed to them but have no explicit, positive market price. 
 
A simple diagram representing economy-wide aggregates may help to show the 
connections between welfare and various economic aggregates: 
 
 


















The vertical arrows show the movement from more tangible concepts to less 
tangible.  Production generates income after deducting elements such as factor 
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consumption, with a deduction of savings.  Consumption leads to welfare, which 
is then one influence on happiness.  At each level, however, other influences 
affect the relationship, shown by additional horizontal arrows pointing to and 
from each box.  This makes the vertical linkages somewhat murky, especially 
with the two more intangible concepts at the top of the diagram. 
 
The diagram also illustrates the analytical steps required to evaluate economic 
performance at several levels.  Several different issues emerge, including: 
 
·  Choosing a measure, in this case, one that gets conceptually closer to 
welfare, with better measures being towards the top of the diagram 
·  Practical difficulties in attaching numbers to the definition chosen, with 
increasing difficulty in moving towards the top of the diagram.  These can 
involve both the methodology of measurement and difficulties with 
implementing the methodology. 
 
There is room for extended normative debate at this point. Just what should be 
included in a definition of welfare? Can we aggregate the welfare of individuals 
and households in a satisfactory manner to derive a concept of national 
welfare? What criteria should be used to judge whether welfare has been 
increased if there is a change in policies?   
 
To keep an already lengthy paper manageable in size, these issues will simply 
be left aside, by making some key assumptions.  First, the links from production 
to welfare are at least strong enough to be able to analyse effects on welfare on 
the assumption that production changes will influence welfare.  Secondly, at 
least in principle, growth in consumption over time is at least capable of being 
shared by all New Zealanders, through both market mechanisms and income 
redistribution policies.  Distributional aspects of welfare, although important in 
Government policy, will accordingly be left outside the scope of this paper.   
 
Economic Growth 
For this paper, economic growth means the rate of increase of a national 
income aggregate, usually GDP, as measured in national accounts between 
any two points in time.  In some instances, it might be preferable to refer to a 
trend rate of change in output, as either of the two points in time might depart 
from the trend, because of cyclical factors or one off influences such as 
droughts.  References to economic growth in this paper will normally be 
abbreviated to “growth”.   
 
Growth should preferably be measured on a per capita rather than a total basis 
to capture the effect on welfare, the ultimate concern.  For New Zealand since 
1991, however, the distinction is not always crucial, as the two have been 
sufficiently correlated to for movements to have the same sign each year. 
 
It is important to clarify the distinction between changes in income levels, which 
might be a one-off effect and ongoing changes in the rate of increase in national   21 
income. The distinction is clearly important for theoretical modelling and may 
potentially have implications when drawing conclusions from empirical work. If 
policy measures aimed at raising the growth rate have the effect of raising only 
the income level achievable, then in theory, it might be possible for the policies 
followed by a Government to raise welfare less than expected.  For example, in 
the Solow-Swan model discussed in Part 3, raising the rate of savings may 
simply raise the steady-state level of income achievable, because of diminishing 
returns to capital accumulation.  After a prolonged period of saving, the 
additional saving is matched by a higher amount of depreciation.  A temporarily 
higher growth rate while the saving exceeded depreciation gradually diminishes 
until there is a “steady state” level of income, consistent with the increased, but 
no longer growing stock of capital now available. 
 
For the most part, the paper will be concerned with changes in the economic 
growth rate, not a one-off change in levels.  However, as the ultimate concern of 
the paper is with welfare, one-off rises in income levels are also of interest as 
they can also make a large contribution to welfare.  The approach taken here 
will be to identify specifically when one-off changes to income levels are being 
referred to.  Otherwise, references to growth are to growth rates. 
 
In empirical work, the distinction may be very difficult to draw. A theoretical one-
off rise in levels caused by a particular policy may well take years to have full 
effect while changes in the structure of the economy over time may completely 
alter a theoretical growth rate that is otherwise expected to be ongoing.  Temple 
(1999), in summarising the conclusions from a review of recent empirical work, 
ultimately provides a useful perspective for policy work: 
 
“Either growth is endogenous or it is exogenous
9 and level effects are 
large.  Given the presence of large level effects, distinguishing between 
exogenous and endogenous growth models is not as pressing as it might 
seem.  The important point is that policy can have a major impact on a 
country’s level of welfare.  As pointed out earlier, the debate on whether 
policy affects the long-run growth rate or just the steady state level of 
income is almost impossible to resolve, and not much of practical 
importance will turn on it.” 
 
The main focus of the paper is on sustained growth in national income levels 
over long periods, typically twenty years or more. This generally excludes from 
analysis the spurt of growth typically achieved in the trough to peak growth 
phase of a business cycle, although growth achieved over a whole cycle is of 
interest. It also excludes a medium term, unsustainable boost to demand, even 
if it lasts over several business cycles.  It is quite possible sustain income levels 
through overseas borrowing or government guarantees to fund consumption 
and low return investments, as New Zealand did over several business cycles 
from the mid 1970’s to mid 1980’s.  Ongoing accumulation of debt for such 
                                            
9   See Part 3 for the meaning of these terms.   22 
purposes is plainly not sustainable and the resulting growth is of little interest in 
this context.   
 
The long-term focus of the paper makes it appropriate to ignore quarterly 
trends.  In fact, examining these could be positively harmful in a long term 
analysis, as it is easy to succumb to the temptation of attributing long term 
characteristics to short term fluctuations.
10 
 
National Income Measures 
The definition of national income also requires comment. Almost all 
New Zealand growth analysis has focused on GDP, the most readily available 
statistic from Statistics New Zealand (SNZ) and the focus of most international 
work on growth.  GDP measures the production of final goods and services in 
the economy and is conceptually equal to GNE, the sum of all final expenditures 
by New Zealand residents if trade is balanced.  However, it does not measure 
income available to New Zealanders, which is conceptually more relevant to the 
concerns motivating this paper.  Gross National income (GNI), formerly labelled 
as Gross National Product (GNP), is probably a better fit with the concepts of 
this paper.
11  It measures net income earned by New Zealand residents from the 
ownership of resources, whether in New Zealand or abroad.    
 
As New Zealand’s GNI has slipped significantly compared to GDP in recent 
years, with an increase in factor payments abroad, the choice of measure is a 
significant issue.
12 SNZ however does not produce real GNI data, limiting the 
usefulness of the concept.  It does produce real gross national disposable 
income (RGNDI) data, having first released the measure in December 1998 in 
SNZ (1998).  This measures the real purchasing power of national disposable 
income, taking into account changes in the terms of trade and net transfers 
received from abroad.  It is certainly a better measure of welfare, as it comes 
closer to capturing the income available for consumption purposes and is 
conceptually suitable for this paper.  However, it suffers from being little used in 
previous studies. Its use here would add further complexity to an already 
complex analysis, by including trends in transfers and the terms of trade.  The 
best approach appears to be to use GDP and acknowledge that the 
adjustments to get to RGNDI concepts also need to be taken into account in 
considering welfare.  
 
Recent trends in real GDP per capita and RGNDI per capita are shown in 
Figure 1 to illustrate the differences in the measures and that different 
measures can evolve quite differently over time. 
                                            
10  Bayliss (1994) for instance suggests that higher terms of trade have often been taken as 
permanent and attributed to Government policy.  
11   The new terminology was adopted after a revised international standard for National 
Accounts, SNA93, was adopted, to better reflect the concept as an income measure.  
12   While use of GNI produces a lower income result for New Zealand than GDP, the reverse is 
true for net creditor nations.  Use of GDP for international comparisons thus doubly 
understates the income gap between such countries and New Zealand.   23 
 
There is clearly a close relationship between per capita RGNDI and per capita 
GDP, with significant growth in both from 1992 to 1998.  The gap between them 
widened from 1993 to 1998, driven by a net increase in factor payments abroad 
from $3064 billion to $6839 billion and a 3.8% decline in the terms of trade.  
Transfers, which are net payments to New Zealand over the period, are 
relatively small although they have grown over the period. 
 
Having settled on GDP as the primary measure of economic performance, 
further limitations on its use as a measure of welfare must be acknowledged: 
 
·  GDP measurement errors
13  
·  excluding the value of unpriced activity from GDP  




These limitations are sufficient to raise questions over whether welfare is at all 
well measured by GDP or GNI.  The limitations are particularly severe in 
comparisons across long periods of time or across national borders. However, 
such measures are for most analyses the best measure likely to be available.  
Results derived from GDP comparisons also seem to be correlated with a wide 
range of other intuitively appealing indicators, including consumer goods 




Technology in this paper refers to the whole set of processes used to convert 
raw materials and factor inputs, such as capital, labour and human capital into 
outputs, which are then aggregated to constitute National Income.  This 
economic concept refers to management and organisational practices as well 
as the engineering transformation of raw materials into outputs more commonly 
seen as constituting technology in everyday usage of the term. 
 
Innovation is a term closely linked to technology.  In the paper it refers to any 




Productivity is a relative concept, referring to the to the change over time in the 
amount of output produced from a given volume of inputs.  Alternatively, a 
productivity index can be seen as the ratio of an index of output growth divided 
                                            
13  Lawrence and Diewert (1999) list a large number of measurement problems in chapter 7.  
These measurement difficulties are also discussed in more detail in Appendix B. 
14   Hazledine (1998) argues that ignoring these social capital factors has lead to a major 
misdirection of New Zealand economic policy, ultimately depressing GDP as well as welfare. 
15  World Bank (1998/99), pp 186-248 contains many indicators grouped according to country 
income levels.   24 
by an index of input growth. The most straightforward concepts involve partial 
productivity indicators that relate output to just one input, such as labour.  An 
example of a labour productivity measure could be GDP divided by employment 
measured in hours.  Total factor productivity, the measure most often referred to 
in this paper, in contrast relates output to all inputs being used.  In this case, the 
concept requires an assumption to be made about the functional form of 
production within the economy.
16   
                                            
16   Lawrence and Diewert (1999) provide a detailed survey of productivity measurement 
techniques.   25 
 
3  Theoretical Frameworks and International Empirical Work 
Many theoretical frameworks underpin the various analyses of New Zealand’s 
growth performance that will be considered in this synthesis.  Before moving to 
consider these writings, it is worth providing a sketch of some of the major 
analytical frameworks influencing analysis of growth and what appears to 
emerge from international empirical studies of what generates growth.   
 
This brief sketch can hardly do justice to the vast theoretical growth literature.  
However, it can alert us to the sorts of factors we should be looking for in 
seeking an explanation of New Zealand’s growth performance. 
 
Neoclassical Model 
The starting point for much theory and empirical work on growth in developed 




Profit maximising firms are typically assumed to use publicly available technical 
knowledge, in competitive markets to convert inputs usually labour and capital 
into output with a production function.  Often this takes the Cobb Douglas form: 
 
where Y = output, A is the level of technology, K = capital, L = labour and a is 
the capital share of factor income.   
 
The key concepts associated with this model are: 
 
·  Accumulating inputs such as capital or labour should raise output levels 
·  Accumulating inputs such as capital through saving does not benefit the 
long run growth rate of output, because of diminishing returns to input 
factors. 
·  Growth following a lift in factor accumulation, such as a lift in saving, 
occurs only during the transition towards the next equilibrium, although 
under plausible assumptions, it might take many years to complete. 
·  Achieving higher growth permanently requires an increase in the level of 
technology, determined exogenously.  Much empirical work has attempted 
to measure or explain the factors that might contribute to “technology”, 
including growth accounting work, which decomposes growth into 
contributions from factor growth and a residual, taken to represent growth 
                                            
17  Gorringe (1990) provides a useful summary of the key assumptions. Janssen (1995) also 
provides a good summary of the properties of this and other growth models. 
YA K L =
- aa 1  26 
in technology.  The relative importance of these in New Zealand is 
illustrated in the work of Treasury (1996a).
18 
·  Assuming the same level of technology is available across countries, then 
other things equal, income levels across countries should converge over 
time. Most researchers expect such convergence to be ‘conditional’ only 
i.e. found only with a model taking account of the contributions of a large 
number of other influences. 
·  The model provides little guidance as to how Governments might influence 
the long run growth rate. 
 
The major shortcoming seen with the model is that technology as the key 
contributor to growth is exogenous rather than explained within the model.  Poot 
(1999) suggests that the Solow-Swan model continues to play a prominent role 
in thinking about growth and indeed starts his own synthesis of empirical 
research on the impact of Government on long run growth by referring to the 
model.   
 
The attractions of the model have probably been reinforced by empirical 
analysis suggesting that it still has some explanatory power. For example, 
Mankiw, Romer and Weil (1992) suggest that when human capital is added as a 
factor in the model, it performs well in explaining cross-country variations in 
growth rates.  Temple  (1999) suggests it provides a simple theoretical 
framework for growth regressions but performs less well with more 
comprehensive measures of human capital than the years of secondary 
schooling originally used by its authors.  He also suggests that the models 
assumption that investment rates are exogenous is an unsatisfactory feature. 
 
For New Zealand, for the model to perform well, it would need to be extended to 
provide for external economic relationships, including possible balance of 
payments effects and terms of trade effects. 
                                            
18  For illustrative purposes, Treasury (1996a) suggests that as of March 1996, potential New 
Zealand growth could be around 3.3% pa, derived from the growth accounting equation and 
taking the following values: 
 
  GDP growth rate = 0.6 x 1.4% + 0.4 x 2.4% + 1.5% =  3.3% 
                               (labour)         (capital)        (TFP) 
 
Here, the capital share of income (a ) is 0.4. Current Treasury thinking is that these projections 
are too high, with GDP growth of 2.5%, TFP growth of around 1% and labour growth of around 
1% per annum being more appropriate.  This reflects both recent experience and coming closer 
to the period where demographics produce a slower labour force growth rate. 
   27 
 
Endogenous Growth Models 
Gorringe (1990) and Janssen (1995) provide summaries of these models.
19  In 
essence, these were developed in the 1980’s, given dissatisfaction with the 
assumption that factors influencing growth were exogenous (outside the model) 
and hence not well explained in neoclassical models. In contrast to neoclassical 
models, endogenous growth models tend to imply that various influences can 
impact upon the growth rate, not just income levels. 
 
There is tremendous variety in these models. Many insights are offered into 
growth processes, which are undoubtedly mirrored in instances of real world 
experience.  A valuable feature is often the emphasis on underlying 
microeconomic features, such as firm behaviour, providing some linkages 
between macroeconomic and microeconomic features.  It is beyond the scope 
of this paper to fully describe these models.  It is important to acknowledge, 
however, that microeconomic level behaviour is always a critical component of 
growth experience, at both the levels of industries, firms and individuals. 
 
It is also important to recognise that the dynamics of behaviour at 
microeconomic levels can be critical to growth.  This point is made forcefully by 
Harberger (1998). He points out that within industries and firms, typically only a 
small proportion of players contribute a large proportion of the growth 
experienced at any given time, while the industries contributing most strongly to 
growth frequently change within relatively short time frames.  Modelling and 
understanding these features in any sort of comprehensive and convincing way 
is a challenging task, given the diversity of activities constituting real 
economies. 
 
The features included in endogenous growth models, singly or in combination, 
according to Gorringe (1990) include: 
 
·  The embodiment of much technical change in the capital stock.  New 
generations of capital may embody superior technology.  Hence, 
increasing the amount of capital in proportion with Labour force growth 
may boost productivity. 
                                            
19   There is a vast literature on economic growth models.  It includes the following: 
 
·  Quarterly Journal of Economics, May 1991  
·  Oxford Review of Economic Policy (OXREP), Winter 1992 
·  Scandinavian Journal of Economics, December 1993 
·  Journal of Monetary Economics, December 1993 (National Policies and Economic Growth: 
A World Bank Conference) 
·  Journal of Economic Perspectives, Winter 1994.  
·  Greg Mankiw, “The Growth of Nations”, Brookings papers, Macroeconomics, 1995 
·  Nick Crafts, “Post-Neoclassical Endogenous Growth Theory: What are its Policy 
Implications?”, OXREP, Summer, 1996. 
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·  The accumulation of human capital.  Human capital investments, such as 
“learning by doing” or education may increase productivity in the labour 
force, just as embodied technical change can for capital, and permanently 
raise the output level. 
·  R&D spillovers may exist. R&D within the firm may contribute more to the 
economy wide stock of knowledge than to the firm alone.  Output levels 
may be permanently lifted through ongoing R&D investment. 
·  Increased specialisation in intermediate inputs can improve growth 
·  Factors contributing to growth may interact strongly and add to growth. 
Capital accumulation and education may together contribute more to 
growth than they would alone. 
 
Implications from these types of models include: 
 
·  There may be constant or even increasing returns to scale from the 
accumulation of particular factors.  For example, in a simple model 
considered by Poot (1999), there may be constant returns to reproducible 
capital, which is assumed to include both human capital and physical 
capital. (Physical labour or land in contrast can not be deliberately 
accumulated.) Thus, increasing capital accumulation may increase long 
run growth.  The insights from theories that emphasise economies of scale 
might well be particularly important to New Zealand, given that it is often 
difficult to achieve large-scale production here.  This is not always the 
case, as demonstrated by dairy production and processing. 
·  Appropriate Government policies may be able to boost growth. For 
instance, encouraging R&D may have such an effect.   Needless to say, it 
is one thing to create a model and quite another to test the model 
successfully, let alone draw policy implications from it. 
·  One important implication from the diversity of models and underlying 
experience they represent is that at a microeconomic level, there may be 
many different types of activities contributing to growth, in varying ways 
over time.  For policy purposes, allowing opportunities for different 
activities to make their contributions is clearly important, as is avoiding 
ruling out the likelihood of some activities contributing. 
 
According to Barro (1997), despite the early appeal of endogenous growth 
models, later analysis suggested ongoing technological progress is the only 
way to avoid diminishing returns to investment long term.  Extensions to neo-
classical frameworks to include human capital accumulation, Government 
policies, fertility decisions and diffusion of technology produce models that 
perform acceptably in explaining growth.   29 
 
Other Models and Theories 
A number of other theorists attempt to explain growth or income levels, 
sometimes with one main driving force in their models.  
 
Institutional Approaches 
Amongst these are: 
 
·  Olson (1982), who thought growth patterns reflect the development of 
entrenched interest groups over time. In stable societies, these groups 
indulge in rent seeking and come to impede innovation as an important 
driver of growth.  Olson (1996) has also argued that differences in 
institutional structures and economic policies are critical to explaining 
differences in income levels between countries.  Well defined property 
rights, third party enforcement and social cooperation are needed to 
support high income levels.  Olson sees learning and knowledge 
accumulation as both the bottom line of growth and having roots deep in 
the ethos and history of a society. 
 
·  Hall and Jones (1997) and (1999), who also emphasise institutional 
differences as explaining differences in income levels between countries.  
While technological progress may drive growth, persistent differences in 
levels of income may reflect differences in laws, institutions and policies.  
Diversion of activity away from production through theft, corruption, 
litigation and expropriation will hold production back.  The effects are 
pervasive and negative, potentially affecting capital accumulation, skill 
acquisition, invention and technology transfer, not just production 
activities.  Gorringe (1990) describes other work emphasising the 
importance of institutions, including for example the institutions 
surrounding R&D, social norms and culture, and legal and political 
institutions. 
 
·  Professor Michael Porter, whose views are summarised in Crocombe, 
Enright and Porter (1991).  Porter argues that countries can create and 
need to continuously upgrade their “competitive advantage”, as distinct 
from inherited comparative advantage, which then leads to growth.   
Competitive advantage in an industry and ultimately at national level is 
generated by 
 
·  factor conditions: having specialised pools of skills, technology and 
infrastructure 
·  home demand conditions: having sophisticated and demanding local 
clients 
·  related and supporting industries: having a critical mass of local 
suppliers of specialised inputs, such as found in specialised industrial 
clusters    30 
·  firm strategy, structure and rivalry: having capable, committed, 
competing local rivals. 
 
The Porter framework is heavily microeconomic. It has been criticised as 
having little macroeconomic content and not being rigorously derived, 
having been drawn more from the discipline of management research 
rather than using traditional economic methods, including by Philpott 
(1991) and Burnell and Sheppard (1992).  It has however had some 
influence in New Zealand, having been promoted by the New Zealand 
Trade Development Board in particular.  Porter’s work is discussed in 
more detail in section 5.13 and Appendix A of this paper. 
 
·  Authors who argue that Government has a major role in the economy.  
Poot (1999) for instance provides a survey of significant peer reviewed 
material. He reports the views of the balance of authors on the role of 
Government in growth, depending upon the Government function involved. 
Government delivery of education is most likely to be seen as positive for 
growth, while provision of public infrastructure such as roads and 
sewerage is also likely to be found to be positive for growth to varying 
degrees.  Defence spending, higher taxes and higher consumption are 
more likely to be found to have a negative influence on growth.  Poot 
comments on the robustness of this work as noted in section 5.11 of this 
paper. 
 
One illustrative example which finds negative effects from Government 
spending is Gwartney, Lawson and Holcombe (1998).  They suggest that 
Government can make a positive contribution to growth through spending 
to secure property rights, enforce contracts, provide for a stable money 
regime, basic public infrastructure and perhaps eduction.  
 
The negative effects of big government are suggested to arise from: 
 
·  workers’ incentives to invest and take risks
20 being diminished 
through the provision of welfare measures and Government 
opportunities;  
·  private investment being crowded out;  
·  diminishing returns to Government expenditure, especially in the 
provision of private goods; and  
·  Government slowing discovery and wealth creation processes, 
through taking longer to weed out mistakes and being slower to 
adjust to new technologies. 
 
                                            
20  There may be offsetting effects from larger Government eg social insurance arrangements 
may allow increased risk taking.  This may be true for business too, as for example 
suggested by Rodrik (1998), where in more open economies, Government tends to be 
larger, to act as insurer of domestic firms against external or terms of trade risk.   31 
Dalziel (1999) states that arguments for small Government do not 
represent a consensus amongst economists.  Interestingly, one of the 
authorities he quotes for this proposition, Tanzi and Schuknecht (1997), 
argue on the basis of a simple comparison of the economic performance 
of OECD countries, that public spending beyond the level of small 
Governments does not contribute much to welfare.
21   
 
Trade 
Some authors have emphasised the role of trade openness as important to 
growth.  Krueger (1997) provides one example.  A number of mechanisms are 
suggested, including the stimulation of competition for innovation, the transfer of 
technology more readily in an open economy, the promotion of market 
mechanisms and constraints on harmful policies, according to Gorringe (1990).   
 
Such thinking appears to have reasonably wide, but not universal acceptance.
22   
 
Disequilibrium Phenomena 
Gorringe (1990) in his survey of theory suggests disequilibrium phenomena, 
factors which move the economy away from some sort of steady state growth 
pattern, are also important in growth theory. Examples include the effects of 
technology, disinflation, growing budget deficits, or deficiencies of demand.   
These may exert influence over more than one business cycle, and thus might 
be seen as long term phenomena in some cases.  A possible example is 
Greenwood and Jovanovich (1998). They suggest that the adoption of major 
innovations such as new information technologies is a slow and costly process, 
taking decades, contributing to a drop in productivity growth until the new 
technologies are mastered, with major effects in labour and capital markets 
meanwhile.  The economy may depart from any kind of steady state for 
decades as a new technology is absorbed. They suggest that this phenomenon 
can explain much of the US productivity slowdown since the 1970’s. 
 
Geographical Factors 
A number of theorists suggest that geographical factors may have a significant 
influence on growth.  The mechanisms are numerous and a full review is 
outside the scope of this paper.  However, some are particularly relevant. The 
disadvantage of distance from large markets is a recurring theme in 
                                            
21   “Small” Governments spend less than 40% of GDP on transfers and public consumption in 
this study. 
22   Bruton (1998) for example suggests that a new development orthodoxy, of export orientation 
combined with a removal of distortions, arose in the 1980’s. He argues however that this 
work ignored deep difficulties in transferring technology across boundaries; the need for 
searching and learning by Governments and firms; the necessary role of agriculture; the 
critical role of initial conditions and need for effective implementation of policies.   
Consequently, trade openness in his view was overemphasised.   32 
New Zealand writings and opinions.
23  Another is the suggestion that there are 
substantial economies of scale in the operations of large cities or populations, 
likely to outweigh the higher costs involved.  This might be seen as an overlap 
with one branch of endogenous growth theory.   
 
Quigley (1998) suggests that there are several mechanisms for urban scale 
effects.  Plain scale economies may assist through the ability to operate larger 
sized plants and attract people through the provision of public goods such as 
parks and sports stadiums.  The use of shared inputs may be an advantage in 
both production and consumption.  Shared use of legal services and cultural 
activities are examples.  Transactions costs in production may be reduced 
through better labour market matching in larger cities.  There may be 
economies in production and consumption through the development of resale 
markets for assets.  Quigley refers to studies suggesting that doubling city size 
may increase productivity between 3% and 27% and another study suggesting 
that productivity in cities larger than 2 million people may be 8% higher than in 
smaller cities.  
 
Similarly, Ingram (1998) suggests urban areas are attractive for industry 
because of economies of scale in production; lower transport costs through 
clustering; modest use of land inputs; externalities between firms such as in 
information sharing; linkages such as provision of intermediate inputs; and 
agglomeration economies.  These arise through large clusters of activities using 
specialised resources more efficiently. 
 
Glaeser (1998) suggests that cities of more than 1 million population are sharply 
increasing their share of population and that incomes are significantly higher in 
cities of more than 500,000 populations.  Moreover, 96% of US product 
innovations occur in metropolitan areas and 45% in just 4 areas, New York, 
Boston, Los Angeles and San Francisco.  The advantages of large urban areas 
stem from the costs of moving people and ideas, not transport costs per se.  
There are however also costs to population increasing within cities too.  These 
arise in areas such as commuting costs, pollution, crime, poverty and local 
Government tending to invest in excessive infrastructure.  
 
As a general comment, the theoretical mechanisms for size to contribute to 
higher productivity are plausible, but as usual, it is difficult to be certain whether 
the empirical evidence supports the view about causality.  Unusually productive 




Innovation or changes in technology feature strongly in both the neoclassical 
and endogenous growth models and have already been mentioned.  However, 
                                            
23   Alex Sundakov (New Zealand Institute of Economic Research) for instance has suggested to 
PCD staff that New Zealand’s sheer physical distance from overseas markets is a major 
constraint on marketing and service delivery for business services exporters.    33 
a few additional points from international research are worth making.  Bassols 
(1998) provides a useful summary of OECD thinking.  He notes that R&D is only 
one part of innovation – it can occur on a broad front of activities including in 
marketing and product design.  Moreover, firms tend to under-invest in R&D as 
an inappropriable public good.  Adoption of imported innovations may be 
particularly important for many countries relative to domestic R&D.  Olson 
(1996) for instance notes that imported R&D was important to Korean 
development. 
 
Summary of Theoretical Contributions 
The material outlined above, while not exhaustive, suggests that there are a 
large number of factors impinging upon both growth rates and income levels 
across countries.  It provides a reminder that growth is a complex phenomenon 
and not well understood at a theoretical level.   
 
Matters are further complicated by the likelihood that relationships are unstable 
over time, often non-linear and possibly driven by a few critical, but idiosyncratic 
factors, which must be included for accurate research on smaller economies.  
Imagine an account of New Zealand’s economic growth around 1900, which 
excluded refrigeration!  Understanding growth also seems likely to require a 
high level of integration of macroeconomic and microeconomic factors, still a 
challenging task. 
 
Despite the difficulties, it seems clear that any plausible work on long-term 
growth rates must take into account at least the following factors: 
 
·  The level and growth rate of employment 
·  The level and growth rate of the capital stock 
·  Human capital, including knowledge and skill acquisition 
·  Changes in technology, including through innovation 
·  Institutions and cultural conditions 
·  Government roles in regulation, taxation and expenditure 
·  Trade conditions  
·  Geographical factors, including location and scale of population 
·  Macroeconomic conditions 
 
Empirical Work 
The theoretical work referred to so far inevitably included some references to 
empirical work, although it was work which focussed on particular aspects of 
growth theory.  A large body of work has emerged in the last decade which has 
sought to test growth theory comprehensively, largely in cross-country studies.  
This part of the report briefly reviews several of the more important 
contributions, with a view to determining whether the results support the 
theoretical work.  It also refers to summaries of international experience.   
Plainly, there is much more empirical work than that reviewed here, which can   34 
be seen at most as representative of a wider literature – all that can be included 
within the bounds of the present project. 
 
Barro  
Barro (1997) provides a useful summary of results from his cross-country 
analysis.  His analysis may be seen as a representative example. The primary 
inspiration for this work is the neo-classical framework, with extensions to 
include Government policy, human capital, and diffusion of technology from 
more developed to less developed countries.   
 
Per capita income growth is expected to depend upon the gap between current 
per capita income and steady state per capita income.  This in turn is expected 
to depend upon: 
 
·  Private sector saving rates and capital accumulation 
·  Labour supply 
·  Fertility 
·  Government spending 
·  Tax rates 
·  The extent of market distortions 
·  Maintenance of law and property rights 
·  The degree of political freedom 
·  The terms of trade 
 
To illustrate the model’s operation, an implication is that if the Government 
reduces the burden of regulation, growth will be boosted for a period until 
ultimately it becomes constrained again by improvements in technology.  Such 
transitions may be very lengthy. 
 
Barro tests the model for approximately 100 countries, including New Zealand, 
for the period 1965 to 1990.  Key findings include: 
 
·  Initial GDP per capita is highly significant. Low income countries grow 
faster, implying that income convergence occurs at a rate of 2.5% per 
annum, provided other variables influencing growth are included in the 
model.
24  This means that it could take 89 years to close 90% of the gap 
between current per capita income and steady state per capita income, or 
27 years to close 50 % of the gap, underlining the slow nature of 
adjustment. 
                                            
24   Barro acknowledges that convergence is conditional on measuring the influence of other 
variables. He does not argue that absolute convergence occurs.  On the other hand, some 
more recent research argues that there is a tendency to absolute divergence on a world 
scale with richer countries getting richer and poorer countries getting poorer, with the effect 
being more pronounced in the last decade, using more recent data than Barro.  Pritchett 
(1998) is an example as is Temple (1999).   35 
·  Initial human capital is also highly significant.  One extra year of male 
secondary or higher education may raise the growth rate by 1.2% per 
annum.  Female education is not found to have a positive effect.
25  
·  Higher fertility reduces per capita GDP growth with a significantly negative 
contribution. Barro suggests the effect being captured is a simple dilution 
of capital available per worker. 
·  Higher levels of Government consumption are found to reduce per capita 
income. 
·  A higher respect for the rule of law improves growth, using a subjective 
indicator prepared by a New York consultancy for fee-paying clients.  With 
this variable included, political stability and corruption do not show up as 
significant. 
·  Improvements in the terms of trade are associated with improved growth.
26   
·  Regional variables for sub-Saharan Africa, Latin America and East Asia 
are individually not significant, as the main explanatory variables explain 
exceptional performance in these areas. 
·  Investment is not significant, in Barro’s view.  Apparent relationships 
between investment and growth may be caused instead by growth 
opportunities stimulating investment. 
·  Very high inflation – above 20% per annum is negative for growth. For 
rates below this, there is no statistically significant relationship.  However, 
there is no sign that inflation at any level assists growth. 
 
Barro also examines what growth projections based on the model might look 
like.  The average growth rate for 21 OECD countries, excluding Japan, Turkey 
and Mexico for 1996 to 2000 is projected to be 2.4%.  He concludes that OECD 
countries probably can not do much to improve their growth rates, stating 
 
“Basically, 2% per capita growth seems to be about as good as it gets in the 
long run for a country that is already rich.” 
 
Critiques  
There are many criticisms of work such as that of Barro.  Harberger (1998), for 
instance, says “Cross-country regressions seem hopelessly naive to long term 
observers of the growth process like myself.”  His grounds are that too much is 
drawn from comparisons of completely disparate countries and more detailed 
analysis is required.  The warning seems appropriate but insufficient ground to 
dismiss studies such as that of Barro, where the work has a reasonable 
theoretical foundation, is applicable to developed as well as developing 
countries and is part of a lengthy, careful research program. 
 
                                            
25   Knowles, Lorgelly and Owen (1998) dispute this somewhat controversial result in a New 
Zealand contribution, using a similar approach to that of Barro. They find that female 
education has a positive effect on productivity, especially in more developed countries. 
 
26   Shocks to variables such as the terms of trade, not simply movements, may also be 
important to explaining growth according to Easterly, Kremer, Pritchett and Summers (1993).   36 
Temple (1999) provides an excellent summary of the strengths and 
weaknesses of the cross-country growth literature.  There are data quality 
problems, especially with developing countries.  Much work has serious omitted 
variable errors, especially omitting the level of technology.  There may be 
unobserved country fixed effects; comparison of non-comparable countries; 
outliers may unduly influence the results; and treatment of endogenous 
regressors as exogenous.  More careful studies can reduce these problems, 
especially with panel data.  Temple is finally prepared to agree that the better 
studies can provide worthwhile insights into growth. 
 
Levine and Renelt (1992), in an influential study of GDP growth rates, also 
criticise cross-country studies. They suggest that many cross-country studies 
omit key variables, such as those relating to fiscal policy or trade and that only a 
few studies are robust to slight alterations in their list of explanatory variables.  
They test the stability of cross-country regressions across a data set of 119 
countries for 1960 to 1989, examining a maximum of 8 of 50 variables each 
time.  They acknowledge that there does not exist a consensus theoretical 
framework to guide empirical work on growth, but then attempt to develop core 
models likely to be seen as reasonably consistent with a variety of approaches. 
The core model used assumes the following are related to GDP growth: the 
ratio of investment to GDP (+ = positive for growth), secondary school 
enrolment (+), initial GDP in 1960 (-), and population growth (-). These are used 
in each model tested. Variables are considered robust if the relationship and 
sign for each variable remain the same when extra variables are added. 
 
The core model variables are generally significant, but the only “robust” 
relationships found involve the ratio of trade to output and share of investment 
in GDP.  Those found to be not robust include fiscal expenditure, monetary 
policy indicators and political stability indexes.  The test applied requires 
variables to remain highly significant in all cases as other variables are added to 
the equations.  
 
Notwithstanding this, at least some results emerge.  It appears that trade 
openness is strongly related to growth, regardless of whether imports or exports 
are used in the analysis. The share of trade in GDP is robustly positively 
correlated with the share of investment in GDP. No inflation variables are 
robustly linked to growth. There is some support for the conditional 
convergence hypothesis. 
 
Sala-i-Martin (1997) argues that the tests applied by Levine and Renelt are far 
too demanding.  He conducts tests using a similar methodology involving 62 
variables, including the level of income in 1960, life expectancy in 1960 and 
primary school enrolment in 1960 in all regressions, as these appear to be 
significant in a wide range or published analysis.  He then reports variables that 
appear to be significant in a range of regressions, even if not in every case.  
Factors related to growth appear to include: 
   37 
·  Geographical location variables, such as being in sub-Saharan Africa or 
Latin America.  Another is absolute latitude, with being further away from 
the equator being good for growth. 
·  Variables such as the rule of law appear significant 
·  Religious variables appear significant, with Christian affiliations appearing 
to be negative for growth 
·  Market distortions such as real exchange rate distortions or the standard 
deviation of the black market premium are negative for growth. 
·  Equipment and non-equipment investment are significant, with the former 
more so. 
·  Primary sector production is significant with the fraction of primary 
products in total exports being negatively related to growth 
·  The number of years the economy was open between 1950 and 1990 was 
positively related to growth. 
·  A greater degree of capitalism appears to be positive for growth 
 
Variables that did not appear to be significant included those related to: 
 
·  Government spending  
·  Inflation  
·  Scale effects, measured by total area and labour force 
·  Tariff restrictions
27 
 
Tariff and trade restrictions are particularly important for New Zealand, given 
that a moderately high proportion of GDP is involved either in trade or import 
substitution and some additional views are worth reporting. Barro and Sala-I-
Martin (1995) note work that suggests tariff levels are significantly negative for 
growth in cross-country analysis, seeing the mechanism as another channel 
through which distortions of markets can reduce the growth rate.  Chand (1999) 
notes that neither international theoretical nor empirical work has produced an 
unambiguous association between trade policy and growth. Chand’s study 
suggests that Australian manufacturing pooled data over 1968 to 1995 provides 
a better test than most because of its completeness and variability and 
suggests that reducing the nominal rate of assistance by 1% leads to an 
average 0.18% to 0.5% increase in total factor productivity.  Another Australian 
view is that of Gruen (1986), who like Olson (1982), suggests that protection 
may be particularly harmful in small economies like Australia, with less domestic 
competition and because it tends to be concentrated in industries with potential 
economies of scale. 
 
At another level, trade liberalisation and abolishing regulations which impede 
entry or competition also feature as part of the so-called “Washington 
Consensus” of policies which should be followed in generating growth through a 
reform process, according to Williamson (1994).  This “consensus” also 
                                            
27   This is a more limited variable than the years of openness variable above, drawn from and 
referenced in the work of Sachs and Warner (1995)   38 
encompasses modest budget deficits; moving expenditure to areas such as 
health education and infrastructure; broadening the tax base and cutting 
marginal tax rates; market determined interest rates; and an exchange rate 
managed to assure exporters that competitiveness will be maintained in future; 
privatisation and secure property rights.  While possibly less well-founded 
empirically than the studies cited, the consensus is at least broadly consistent 
with them. 
 
Summaries of Empirical Work 
The broad conclusions of the cross-country studies above tend to show up in 
explicit summaries of other work.  Three examples will be mentioned here. 
 
Bates (1995) summarises overseas experience in an internal Treasury paper.  
He found that no country with per capita income greater than 30% of the US 
level in 1960 managed to achieve per capita income growth greater than 4% 
per annum in the period 1960 to 1990.  Moreover, fundamental change in an 
economy can be slow to emerge: public and business attitudes are slow to 
change; there are limits to the speed of renewal of physical capital and limits to 
the speed at which workforce skills can be transformed. 
 
Policy fundamentals for achieving growth include having: 
  
·  well established property rights 
·  macroeconomic stability   39 
 
·  openness to international trade 
·  an environment conducive to skill acquisition and innovation 
 
Even if these fundamentals appear to be in place though, there is evidence that 
this may not be enough to achieve high growth.  Culture can be important for 
growth, including cultural homogeneity and cosmopolitanism.   
 
Like others, he finds high investment may be a symptom, not a cause of growth 
and may not work as a growth strategy. 
 
More recently, Pilat (1998) claims that the determinants of productivity growth 
are the subject of broad agreement.  He suggests these include: 
 
·  private investment in physical capital, training and technology 
·  supportive public investment in education, research and infrastructure 
·  organisation of factors within firms 
·  openness to trade 
·  a high degree of competition 
 
The latter two factors may be effective through pressing firms to improve their 
performance. 
 
Temple (1999) concludes that: 
 
·  Poor countries are not catching up with rich countries overall, although 
there is evidence of OECD member convergence. 
·  Countries do converge to their own steady state income levels at a 
positive but uncertain rate, through adopting new technology and investing 
in human and physical capital in particular. 
·  Diminishing returns do set in on physical capital investment. 
·  Macroeconomic instability constrains growth 
·  R&D is positive for growth 
·  The benefits of education are imprecisely measured and not sufficient by 
themselves for growth.  There is much uncertainty about the contribution 
of education, given that many studies have an inadequate theoretical 
base, which may not allow for variously the direction of causality, possible 
human capital externalities or the returns to schooling being driven by 
signalling effects. Proxies for human capital, such as school enrolment or 
years of schooling, may not correspond well to the theoretical variable 
concerned and ignore training as opposed to schooling. 
·  Population growth is probably negative for growth but less important than 
often supposed 
·  High inequality may lower growth, perhaps through social and political 
instability. 
·  Depth of financial intermediation is important to growth   40 
·  Democracy is not critical but economic freedom and established property 
rights help 
·  Big government and high taxes may be negative for growth but evidence 
is ambiguous. 
·  Trade openness definitely helps growth. 
 
Conclusions about Empirical Work 
Just as with the theoretical work, there is no simple consensus.  Much work 
acknowledges that it is in practice often very difficult to distinguish between 
models.
28 It is important to acknowledge that uncertainty is inherent in any 
efforts to understand the major contributors to growth, given the diversity 
present in the real world and ongoing change.  However, some of the work 
highlights factors that are likely to influence longer-term growth rates, to be 
taken into account in considering New Zealand contributions in later parts of this 
paper.  These include: 
 
·  The growth rate of population and the labour force. Rapid population 
growth, at least from high fertility, is likely to be negative for per capita 
income growth.
29  
·  The level and growth rate of the capital stock which should raise per capita 
incomes. Both savings and investment can contribute to the capital stock. 
There is a good chance that there is both way causality between growth 
and investment and/or savings.  While there may be diminishing returns to 
capital (and other factors), the time elapsing before this becomes 
significant is probably sufficiently long that savings and investment can 
grow considerably without this substantially reducing the growth rate.  
·  Human capital, including knowledge and skill acquisition.  This emerges 
strongly as an important factor in many theoretical writings.  In contrast, 
the empirical literature is less certain and the role of education in particular 
is somewhat more questionable, as Hazledine (1998) argues. 
·  Changes in technology and innovation.  This is critical in most writings.
30  
Absorption of overseas innovations is important as well as domestic 
innovation.  Moreover, innovation can be important, beyond just R&D. 
·  Institutions and cultural conditions.  Institutions appear critical, particularly 
in upholding the rule of law and property rights, although it is possible that 
New Zealand, as a relatively developed country, already has many of the 
required institutions and structures in place.  Providing for competition 
                                            
28  Poot (1999a) for instance refers to the “commonly observed observational equivalence of 
competing theoretical models of the macro-economy”. 
29   This conclusion may be influenced by developing countries with high fertility rates.  However 
there is no reason to think it irrelevant to New Zealand, which has tended to have slightly 
higher fertility than other high income countries (Cook 1997). 
30   In fact, some very strong claims are made for its pre-eminence.  North (1993) for instance, 
suggests that applying science to technology is the underlying determinant of modern 
productivity.  Stoneman (1995) suggests that “there is sufficient evidence to suggest that 
technological change is a (if not the) major contributor to growth in economic welfare over 
time.”   41 
between firms appears to be important. While we can be reasonably sure 
that cultural factors are important, the international literature offers few 
insights directly applicable to New Zealand. 
·  Government roles in regulation, taxation and expenditure.  Regulatory 
approaches are likely to be important, given what has been found about 
institutions. Maintaining market-oriented mechanisms without distortions is 
likely to be important for growth. Government expenditure and tax levels 
are not clearly so important, although the majority of studies specifically on 
the subject tend to suggest that high levels may be unhelpful for growth. 
·  Trade conditions.  Openness over long periods appears to be positive for 
growth, although not necessarily export production per se.  Improved 
terms of trade also appear likely to help growth.  Adopting a production 
mix oriented to growing sectors and less based on primary commodities is 
also likely to be positive.
31 
·  Geographical factors, including location and scale of population.  These 
appear to be important, particularly for New Zealand given our isolation 
from large markets and small population centres. 
·  Macroeconomic conditions.  Controlling inflation appears to be important 
but maintaining very low rates appears less so, with rates up to 3% or a 
little higher having little apparent effect. Macroeconomic stability does 
appear to be important. Maintaining aggregate demand over time is 
probably also important. 
·  Inequality, depth of financial intermediation and democracy.  While these 
may be significant, the levels found in New Zealand seem unlikely to 
differentiate New Zealand performance from that in other developed 
countries. 
 
The international literature clearly implies that in the post war period up until the 
1990’s, New Zealand would have faced a real struggle to match top growth 
rates, even before specific New Zealand evidence is examined in more detail.  
The factors involved include New Zealand’s initial high income levels, still 
relatively high by world standards; geographical isolation; heavy dependence on 
primary produce exports; declining terms of trade; past limits on the operation of 
markets; persistent trade barriers; lack of R&D orientation; and relatively high 
population growth. 
                                            
31   This certainly does not mean that New Zealand should not exploit primary product 
opportunities, some of which may offer strong growth opportunities, as discussed below.   42 
 
4.  New Zealand’s Performance and Explanations for it 
This part of the paper reports New Zealand’s performance from several angles, 
primarily as recorded by Statistics New Zealand and summarises the views of a 
wider range of analysts about what may be driving New Zealand’s performance.   
 
It is structured as follows: 
 
4.1  Recent Trends in New Zealand’s GDP 
4.2  Comparisons with OECD Performance 
4.3  Output, Productivity and Factor Contributions 
4.4  Sectoral Contributions 
4.5  Performance Projections 
4.6 Microeconomic  performance 
4.7  Conclusions on Performance 
4.8  Analysts’ Views 
 
4.1   Recent Trends in New Zealand’s GDP   
Part 2 argued that GDP per capita, despite its limitations, is the most 
appropriate performance measure for this paper.  Figure 2 shows real GDP and 
real GDP per capita.
 32  Per capita income has not quite doubled in the 51 years 
from 1947 to 1998. While real GDP has grown significantly in the 1990s, it is 
clear that per capita GDP has grown much less, with population growth limiting 
the gains.
33  Figure 2a uses real GDP data from Statistics New Zealand for a 
slightly shorter period. From 1987 to 1998 on a peak to peak basis, per capita 
GDP grew at 0.67% per annum. If the decline in the ratio of real gross national 
disposable income per capita to real GDP per capita of 1.8% from 1993 to 1998 
is taken into account, given the increase in factor payments abroad, the growth 
rate would drop to under 0.5% per annum. 
 
One particular limitation in GDP worth highlighting here is that it measures 
production rather than welfare.  It is quite possible that static welfare gains to 
consumers from greater choice, improved service quality and lower prices have 
been much greater than these numbers imply during the post reform period.  It 
is also possible that consumption has risen as a proportion of GDP, improving 
welfare, as changes such as financial liberalisation have allowed households to 
increase debt. 
                                            
32   The measure used here is based on a composite series of national income measures 
prepared in Treasury to provide a long-term view.  The measure is not entirely satisfactory, 
as it is based on deflating a number of different series by movements in the CPI. 
33   One possible mechanism is that at times of higher growth, additional migrants may enter, or 
New Zealanders return from the Australian side of the open Trans-Tasman labour market.  
Growth may have been temporary, based on fiscal stimulation or unjustifiably high business 
confidence, but the population remains higher even after the temporary stimulus is removed. 
This hypothesis is admittedly speculative and there does not appear to have been serious 
study of the issue.   43 
 
While distributional issues are generally outside the scope of this paper, they 
remain important. For instance, median real household equivalent disposable 
income fell 7.9% from 1982 to 1996 according to Statistics New Zealand 
(1999)
34.  As noted earlier and in Appendix B, it is possible that GDP statistics 
understate welfare improvements and it is likely that incomes at the end of this 
period are more sustainable than in the early 1980s. 
 
4.2   Comparisons with OECD Performance 
Figure 3 shows New Zealand’s GDP per capita performance compared with 
selected OECD countries and the OECD as a whole. 
 
New Zealand has been losing ground against the OECD as whole since 1960, 
even allowing for some measurement error.  It might be possible to argue that 
New Zealand’s comparative performance has levelled out in the 1990’s 
following the period of major reforms.  However, given that levelling out 
occurred temporarily on several earlier occasions and that New Zealand has 
dropped again since 1996, the argument is yet to be strongly established.  It 
might also be suggested that New Zealand’s relative decline is driven to some 
extent by outstanding performances by a limited number of OECD members, 
such as Japan in the early part of the period shown. Even taking this into 
account, New Zealand’s performance has generally been towards the bottom of 
the OECD. 
 
Nahar and Inder (1998) provide another interesting insight on New Zealand 
performance.  They test for convergence of OECD per capita income levels for 
longstanding OECD members from 1950 to 1990, and find that all countries are 
converging to US income levels over the period except New Zealand and 
Australia.  Australia is neither converging nor diverging but New Zealand has 
the singular distinction of diverging from US income levels at a rate of 0.76% 
per annum. 
 
4.3  Output, Productivity and Factor Contributions 
Another view of aggregate New Zealand performance comes from examining 
productivity performance.  This can show the relative contributions to output and 
productivity from different factors, especially total factor productivity (TFP).  TFP 
illustrates New Zealand’s ability to get more output from a given amount of 
inputs and has historically been the single largest contributor to GDP growth.
35  
It can be seen as particularly relevant as a contributor to raising GDP per capita 
or other welfare related measures of performance, in that it does not necessarily 
require additional inputs to achieve gains. 
                                            
34  Specifically, Table 6.1 of the data tables for the publication on the Statistics New Zealand 
web site. 
35   Lawrence and Diewert (1999) suggest that assuming all other factors unchanged, TFP 
growth would have raised GDP by 29% over 1978 to 1998, compared with contributions of 
7% from labour inputs, 20% from capital growth and –3% from terms of trade changes.   44 
 
Lawrence and Diewert (1999) have probably carried out the most definitive 
recent productivity work.
36  They examine New Zealand’s market sector 
productivity performance from 1972 to 1998, using an index number based 
methodology with two separate databases.  
 
Their preferred “Diewert and Lawrence” database includes input measures such 
as land and natural resources, as well as the capital and labour inputs usually 
included in studies.  Including these additional inputs tends to raise measured 
TFP slightly compared with less comprehensive studies.  Their main aggregate 
results are shown in Figure 4. 
 
The other “Official” database Lawrence and Diewert use provides data for 
individual industry production groups, but with only capital and labour as factor 
inputs.  
 
Inevitably, preparing such databases has required judgements to be made 
about the data to be used.  For instance, the official database incorporates a 
decision to estimate depreciation rates for calculating the net capital stock as 
the reciprocal of assumed asset lives.  Philpott (1999) suggests that this will 
produce a somewhat higher capital stock growth rate than a more common 
declining balance depreciation approach.  However, while the resulting TFP rate 
is lower, the impact is not great. 
 
Lawrence and Diewert provide the output index underlying their total factor 
productivity calculation, labelled “Diewert-Lawrence Chained Fisher” in Figure 5, 
together with slightly lower output indexes calculated using Statistics 
New  Zealand GDP data on both expenditure and production bases.  The 
various indexes show output rising between 54% and 68% from 1978 to 1998. 
This illustrates well the inevitable variations in measuring output with different 
techniques and data, warning against placing too much weight on slight 
differences in performance measures. 
 
The growth in factor inputs in New Zealand over time can also be illustrated with 
the Diewert-Lawrence database.  Table 1 shows the growth in major inputs from 
1972 to 1998.  Notable features are the sharp increase in numbers of Managers 
within a growing labour force; declining numbers of production workers; capital 
growing much faster than labour, especially in electrical machinery and plant; 
and inventories showing little growth.  Labour force growth is relatively high by 
international standards, reflecting New Zealand’s population growth.
37  
 
                                            
36   They also review other recent work. 
37  The OECD (1998) show New Zealand’s population growth over the 10 years to 1996 was 
relatively high at 1.1% per annum.   45 
Productivity Results 
Overall, market sector labour productivity grew 1.66% per annum from 1978 to 
1998 while capital productivity has declined 0.9% per annum, possibly because 
of growing capital intensity as capital equipment prices have declined over time.   
 
TFP has grown at a trend rate of 1.4% per annum over 1978 to 1998 according 
to Lawrence and Diewert’s preferred estimate, or 0.8% per annum if the series 
is started in the more buoyant 1972 year.  Lawrence and Diewert also prepare 
an alternative estimate of 1.1% for 1978 to 1998 with data from their second, 
“official” database.  The figure is lower because household labour force hours 
are used to measure labour inputs, as these grow much more strongly than 
Lawrence and Diewert’s preferred labour measure, and the “official” database 
recognises only labour and capital as inputs, biasing the results downwards. 
 
Lawrence and Diewert’s New Zealand TFP calculations using the “official” data 
are broadly comparable to estimates prepared by the OECD.  While 
international comparisons are always fraught with difficulties, the OECD results 
quoted by Lawrence and Diewert for the slightly different period of 1979 to 1997 
show New Zealand’s average TFP growth rate of 1.1% sits at about the median 
level of OECD performance. (See Table 2, which shows the performance for the 
market sectors of OECD economies.) This result is barely distinguishable from 
those of a large group of other countries clustered around 0.9% to 1.3% TFP 
growth, given likely measurement difficulties. The OECD result is consistent 
with the suggestion that growth be measured on a peak to peak basis, given 
Lawrence and Diewert’s finding of cyclical output peaks in 1979 and 1997.  
 
The overall picture that emerges is of a TFP performance that has improved 
since 1979, attributable to bursts of growth in the mid-1990s and early 1980s.  
The disappointing performance from 1960 to 1979 is well known.  Some 
disappointment has been expressed about the later period too, but this would 
seem to be more related to high expectations in the light of reforms than to 
measured performance.  In reality, New Zealand’s TFP performance might best 
be seen as moderate over the last two decades, sufficient to have placed 
New Zealand in the lower half of the OECD in terms of living standards. 
 
New Zealand’s absolute performance is also worth briefly recording. The OECD 
(1998) show New Zealand’s rank on a number of living standard indicators as 
recorded in Table 3.  New Zealand ranks consistently in the lower half of OECD 
countries, except for car ownership, with primarily Eastern European countries, 
Turkey, Mexico and Korea ranking lower. 
 
4.4  Sectoral Performance 
Lawrence and Diewert’s analysis provides some insights for market sector 
performance, although measurement problems are more acute at a sectoral 
level.  For the period 1978 to 1998, sectoral trend TFP growth rates, derived as   46 




Primary industries:   3.8% 
Manufacturing:   0.9% 
Construction   0.6% 
Utilities    4.7% 
Services            -0.9% 
 
The picture that emerges is one of considerable improvement in primary 
industries including agriculture; outstanding improvement in utilities as 
Government controls were removed and the utilities were placed on a 
commercial footing; and a poor performance in manufacturing, services and 
construction.  These results are reasonably consistent within the sectors, 
implying that sectoral analysis holds promise for revealing something about 
New Zealand’s overall growth performance over the last two decades.  This 
might be more revealing for the past than the future, given that the major 
industries contributing to growth regularly change over time as Harberger 
(1998) notes. 
 
There may be some promising signs of change within manufacturing, based on 
the Lawrence and Diewert (1999) results.  For those industries that can be seen 
as largely through the process of tariff reductions, including non-metallic 
minerals, other manufacturing and basic metals, TFP appears to have been 
rising since 1992, following a period of stagnation. This seems less true of 
machinery and textiles, where high protection continued longer.  It seems highly 
likely that with value added being measured at domestic prices, measured 
productivity in manufacturing industries is likely to decline as protection is 
phased out.  Capital stock may also be temporarily overstated until capital made 
redundant by loss of protection is written down, although no measurements of 
this are available. 
 
Measurement difficulties may affect these results. Philpott (1994) suggests that 
TFP has risen in agriculture because much investment is disguised as 
intermediate consumption, for instance in horticulture. The poor rates of growth 
for services may well be generated in part through output measures being 
based on numbers employed and capital being attributed to the finance sector 
when used under leases in other sectors. This is subject to further Treasury 
research but nevertheless, the services growth rates are likely to have been low 
in any event. 
 
                                            
38   While it might be preferable to derive these results by weighting individual production group 
contributions by output shares, these simple average indicators almost certainly provide 
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4.5   Performance Projections 
The OECD (1998) has suggested that if New Zealand could achieve total factor 
productivity (TFP) growth of 1.75%, structural unemployment falling from 6% to 
3% and a rate of capital accumulation of 3% per annum, per capita GDP could 
move from 82% of the average OECD per capita income level to 92% by 2020.  
Such a “high performance” scenario would see real GDP rise at 3.4% per 
annum from 1997 to 2003, 3.9% from 2004 to 2010 and 3.1% from 2011 to 
2020. This would take New Zealand back to 1982/3 relative per capita income 
levels. The expected growth of other countries represents a rising hurdle for 
New Zealand in any efforts to catch up. 
 
Under a more plausible “status quo” scenario, assuming 2.8% capital stock 
growth, TFP growth of 1% and structural unemployment of 6%, the OECD 
projected New Zealand’s per capita income to continue to decline against the 
OECD average in the long term.  In this OECD scenario, the annual GDP 
growth rate for the shorter period of 1997 to 2003 was projected to be 3.2%.  In 
the latest review, the OECD (1999) has revised the projection down to 2.6% for 
the period 1998 to 2004, better than achieved in the 1970s and 1980s. Such 
growth is still insufficient to prevent a renewed decline in New Zealand per 
capita incomes relative to the OECD average.  The revision also illustrates the 
potential volatility in producing any estimates. 
 
The OECD (1998) and Giorno, Richardson, Roseveare and van den Noord 
(1995) describe the methodology for the OECD projections.  Essentially, the 
OECD estimates total factor productivity assuming a Cobb-Douglas production 
function, with capital and labour as factor inputs for the business sector. Labour 
quantities are based on estimated potential employment, derived from the 
estimated NAWRU
39.  Key assumptions are that the NAWRU is relatively stable, 
the change in wage inflation is proportional to the gap between actual 
employment and the NAWRU and that New Zealand real wages have moved 
ahead since 1991 only when the unemployment rate reached 6%.   
 
The per capita incomes calculated for the OECD as a whole are based on 
scenarios prepared in OECD (1997) and UN population projections, while New 
Zealand population projections are based on Statistics New Zealand median 
fertility and mortality rate assumptions.  None of the methodological or “status 
quo” assumptions appear prima facie unreasonable, although, naturally 
considerable uncertainty attaches to them, as to any projections.  The total 
factor productivity assumption for New Zealand of 1% growth per annum, based 
on the historical record, is broadly in line with other calculations, such as those 
by Lawrence and Diewert (1999). 
 
From Treasury’s own projections, it also seems likely that New Zealand per 
capita incomes will not close the gap with average OECD performance 
significantly. Treasury projections in 1999 suggest rates of 1.5% labour 
                                            
39   Non-accelerating wage rate of employment   48 
productivity growth, consistent with 1% TFP growth, 1% labour force growth 
averaged over the next decade and GDP growth of 2.5% per annum.
40 The 
Treasury long-term fiscal model as of 1999 assumes unemployment declines 
only to 6%
41, not 3%. 
 
A further check on the realism of these projections from an independent source 
is the New Zealand Institute of Economic Research (1998) medium term 
projection of the outlook from 1998 to 2003 by industry, prepared on a year by 
year basis.  It suggests an annual average growth rate of 2.8% will apply for the 
6 years ending March 2003. 
 
4.6   Microeconomic Indicators  
Apart from the aggregate indicators of growth discussed so far, there has been 
extensive research into the performance of New Zealand industry at the firm 
level.  This work is important in understanding New Zealand’s growth 
performance as it is axiomatic that growth depends upon decisions and 
practices at the firm and individual level; not just macroeconomic influences. 
 
The single best summary of this work is undoubtedly Campbell-Hunt and 
Corbett (1996). It is conducted within a theoretical framework drawing on and 
summarising authors such as Porter, Enright, Prahalad and Hamel and Kay.
42 In 
this framework, sustainable advantage amongst firms is built on firm culture, 
including relationships with suppliers, the workforce and reputation with clients.  
Innovation per se is less important, being driven by these more basic factors. 
Organisational learning is important and management practices are crucial to 
success.  The study focuses on resource and process based advantage.  
 
It contains a number of important conclusions, although these are largely of a 
qualitative nature: 
 
·  The 1990’s have seen a revolution in economic strategy and practice to 
match that in economic governance in the 1980’s 
·  It takes many years for firms to create assets based on sustainable 
advantage and decades to achieve the full return from this. 
                                            
40  It should be noted that there is uncertainty about any projections.  The figures quoted are 
probably best seen as indicating a possible range rather than being reliable point estimates.  
The Treasury methodology differs from that of the OECD, being based on estimating and 
combining labour force growth and labour productivity growth.  Its labour force component is 
based on Statistics New Zealand projections, together with the judgement that labour 
productivity will stay close to its long-term historic track at 1.5%, partly reflecting the work of 
Lawrence and Diewert (1999). The Treasury assumptions are reflected in Annex 3 of the 
Government’s Fiscal Strategy Report of 20 May 1999 in Birch (1999). 
41   The OECD and Treasury unemployment assumptions are not strictly comparable but it 
seems unlikely that any differences would have a significant effect on the relative sizes of the 
two sets of projections. 
42   Details are included in pages 7-17 of Campbell-Hunt and Corbett (1996).   49 
·  The sustainable advantage created to date is limited to close, cooperative 
relationships with the workforce and distribution chain – not through the 
alternative paths of international brand or product leadership 
·  Many firms are close to developing these strategies 
·  Key determinants of firm expansion include the ability of managers to 
adopt empowering relationships; achieve greater specialisation and 
cooperation within networks of business partnerships; and devote 
themselves and their organisations to the creation of distinctive customer 
value 
·  Whether this happens can not be predicted. 
 
Campbell-Hunt and Corbett found that businesses in 1996 showed more, 
though uncertain, promise of adopting the sorts of changes that would lead to 
growth, compared with earlier work in 1993.  There was evidence of: 
 
·  Fundamental changes in unhelpful attitudes developed in New Zealand’s 
past, more protective environment 
·  Greater interest in undertaking expansion 
·  Interest in exporting was becoming the norm amongst manufacturers with 
even an astonishing 40% of manufacturers employing fewer than 10 
employees having carried out some exporting in one survey 
·  Quality improvements, teamwork and process technology improvements 
were more in evidence 
·  Outsourcing and both-way overseas investment were becoming more 
evident 
·  Three quarters of manufacturing plants surveyed claimed to be within 4 
years of world best practice compared with only one quarter in 1989, given 
equipment upgrades 
·  Governance had improved 
·  Practices such as full product costing, discounted cash flow analysis and 
use of marketing skills had increased dramatically 
·  Large numbers of firms still showed only limited signs of adaptation 
·  New Zealand possibly had as few as 50 globally competitive firms. These 
differ significantly from other firms in having direct relationships with 
offshore distribution channels; use of benchmarking; and emphasis on 
staff culture, including feedback and empowerment. 
·  The attitudes of society at large, for example in attitudes towards work, still 
left much to be desired. 
 
More recent work appears to be consistent with this 1996 study, including an 
update by Campbell-Hunt and Corbett (1998) prepared for the 1998 visit of 
Professor Michael Porter.  The authors, in referring to the improvements 
observed in their 1996 study observe, however, that “Nagging doubts have 
persisted about the permanence of this recovery”.  
 
Another major study, carried out by the Ministry of Commerce, Knuckey, Leung-
Wai and Meskill (1999), involved a survey of 1400 medium and large New   50 
Zealand manufacturing firms, with a high response rate. It concluded that 
manufacturers have come a good way towards best practice in a number of 
areas, although most have not taken the important, but difficult, step towards a 
coordinated and strategic approach to business improvement.  There has been 
great commitment to enhancing customer focus, quality of output and 
operational flexibility.  Less attention appears to have been devoted to 
leadership issues, employee development and innovation, with just less than 
half of sites devoting less than 1% of total sales on R&D. 
 
Together, these studies provide a picture of consistent, positive change at the 
microeconomic level, of the sort that could ultimately be expected to improve 
output and productivity.  Such studies are more vulnerable to influence by the 
prior expectations of their authors and respondents than more quantitative 
studies but nevertheless appear credible, given careful methodologies.  They 
are initially difficult to reconcile with relatively poor reported aggregate results 
from the manufacturing sector in particular, unless weight is given to their 
findings that change processes take a long time and that there are many 
laggard performers.  This seems plausible, especially given findings such as 
those of Harberger (1998), that normally only minorities of participants account 
for the vast majority of growth in most industries and economies.  It is also likely 
that surveys miss completely responses from firms that are winding down 
operations or quitting, although these will inevitably be contributors to the 
macroeconomic picture.  Efforts recorded in surveys of managers will also not 
necessarily reflect the results achieved.   
 
4.7   Conclusions on New Zealand’s Performance  
This part has provided a brief review of New Zealand’s performance within the 
last two decades from several perspectives: per capita economic growth; 
performance relative to the OECD; growth projections; sectoral performance 
and apparent microeconomic performance. 
 
The overall picture is one of extremely slow growth in per capita GDP since 
1987, at 0.4% per annum.  This is despite the growth surge of the mid-1990’s, 
as much of that growth simply represented recovery from the early 1990’s 
recession and much was absorbed by population growth.  Total factor 
productivity growth looks better, with New Zealand lifting to about the middle of 
a large bloc of OECD countries in the last two decades, compared with a poor 
performance earlier.  At the microeconomic level, there appears to have been 
much positive change, although not across the board.  Improved performance 
shows up strongly in the performance of utilities and primary industry, but not in 
manufacturing, services and construction, which are in aggregate a much larger 
part of the economy.   
 
Over the last two decades, as before, New Zealand’s growth has been 
insufficient to avoid a widening per capita income gap with OECD countries.  
Projections suggest this is likely to continue, despite the positive changes 
achieved so far.   51 
 
4.8   Analysts’ Views 
Appendix A summarises the views of significant writers with a consistent 
involvement in analysing the performance of the economy as a whole over the 
last decade, together with some limited commentary from 1982 to 1985 before 
major reforms were initiated.   
 
There is a surprising amount of agreement in the views expressed, given the 
entrenched reputation of economists for disagreeing with each other.  This may 
be because much of the literature puts forward hypotheses about what has 
driven New Zealand’s growth but does not seek to provide conclusive evidence. 
 
The common threads in this literature are drawn together in the next part of this 
paper.   52 
 
5   Reasons for New Zealand’s Moderate Growth Performance 
As noted above, New Zealand’s per capita growth performance continues to lag 
OECD levels.  Projections largely based upon existing performance suggest it 
will continue to do so.  TFP performance places New Zealand at the OECD 
median, despite long-running reforms aimed at lifting performance and 
expectations that New Zealand might grow faster than advanced OECD 
members on the basis of convergence theory.  The performance can hardly be 
seen as disastrous given the TFP results achieved and the improvement since 
the 1970’s and 1980’s.  Nor is it outstanding. Hence, the word “moderate” is 
used to describe it here.  
 
The possible explanations are many.  This part of the report discusses them in 
the following order, broadly from factors over which New Zealand has little 
influence to those where it has some. 
 
Factors Over Which New Zealand Has Little Influence 
5.1  The Post 1945 Legacy 
5.2 Geographical  position 
5.3  Economies of Scale 
5.4  The Reform Process 
5.5 International  Conditions 
 
Factors over Which New Zealand Has More Influence 
5.6    Demographic Factors 
5.7    Human Capital 
5.8    New Zealand Values and Attitudes 
5.9    Capital Growth 
5.10 Macroeconomic Policies 
5.11 Government Expenditure, Welfare Support and Taxation  
5.12 Innovation 
5.13 Microeconomic Policies 
 
In addition, Appendix B comments briefly on measurement issues, which are 
also referred to where relevant in the text. 
 
5.1   The Post-1945 Legacy 
A clear theme from the literature reviewed for this paper is that New Zealand at 
the end of World War II was in a strong economic position for several reasons. 
Most of these did not represent permanent advantage.  
 
New Zealand’s infrastructure was intact and New Zealand business was in a 
position to contribute to first to the war effort and then to overseas rebuilding 
through its exports. The balance of payments and production were strong 
during the war, thanks to strong UK demand for agricultural production at good 
prices and US demand for supplies and bases for troops in the Pacific theatre.    53 
An inability to import during and immediately after the war further strengthened 
savings and the balance of payments. 
 
The 1930’s saw New Zealand benefit from British preferential tariffs, which 
remained in place for many years.  New Zealand was then not long past 
reaching the frontier, according to Gould (1982) with the advantages that 
stemmed from being able to exploit frontier resources at low cost.  However, 
that advantage had been lost by around the end of World War I. 
 
New Zealand may have also have been accumulating at the same time an 
unhelpful legacy from past social and economic experiences, which was to 
reduce future growth prospects.  Prosperity based on the ready exploitation of 
resources provided relatively few incentives for skill development as high wages 
could be earned in straightforward primary processing activities.  Unfavourable 
attitudes towards payments of skill premiums may have been fostered by the 
history of migrants seeking to move from the more rigid British class based 
society.  Putting in place strong welfare safety nets for individuals and industry 
was encouraged by the 1930’s Depression and helped to foster egalitarian 
attitudes as argued by Franklin (1985).  A long period of high incomes and 
stability may have fostered rigidities and limited adaptation to change, as 
argued by Olson (1982) and Blyth, Hawke and Smythe (1984).  
 
On the macroeconomic front through the 1950s, according to Singleton (1998), 
an inability to tolerate even 1% unemployment led to chronic excess demand 
and balance of payments deficits.  Demand management in New Zealand may 
have led in New Zealand, as elsewhere in the post-war period, to increased, 




New Zealand was also firmly locked into specialisation in commodity production 
for which prices have fallen approximately 80% in real terms over 100 years, 
according to the Economist (1999a). 
 
The historical legacy was not conducive to strong growth. 
 
5.2   Geographical Position  
Theoretical literature identifies geographical position as having a significant 
influence on growth, as discussed in Part 3 of this paper.  
 
Likewise, New Zealand’s geographical position is often mentioned as a 
contributor to its economic performance in the material reviewed for this paper, 
although without in-depth analysis.  One example is Bayliss (1994) who argues 
New Zealand is handicapped by high international and domestic transport 
costs.  Another is Gould (1982), who notes that New Zealand has had to devote 
                                            
43   See Anderson and Gruen (1995), who argue that OECD economies generally stimulated 
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an unusually high proportion of resources to transport, given its terrain.   
However, transport and communication costs have tended to fall sharply over 
time. 
 
As is well known, the effects of high transport and communications costs on 
growth are not straightforward.  Their effect depends upon the interaction with 
other transaction costs and economies of scale.  In some cases, isolation may 
raise the prospects for an activity developing. Examples might include 
nineteenth century New Zealand manufacturing, where economies of scale 
were less important; primary products, where comparative advantage in natural 
resources is intensified by isolation; or local service delivery now in areas where 
direct human involvement is important.  In other cases, where economies of 
scale are important or services can be provided remotely, there will be less 
chance of development occurring. 
 
There are other barriers.  Helliwell (1999) suggests that national borders 
themselves show up as much more important barriers than gravity models, 
taking into account market size and distance, would predict.  However, border 
effects apply to a wide range of countries. There is little prima facie reason to 
think these barriers will be more important to New Zealand than other 
developed countries.  These models imply distance may be rather less 
important than might first be thought in international interactions. 
 
The effects of distance may involve more than just physical distance.  If 
developing sustainable advantage requires firms to develop relationships with 
clients and suppliers, as suggested by Campbell-Hunt and Corbett (1996), then 
distance will be a major hurdle.  The concentration of US innovation within a 
limited number of US geographical regions, noted by Glaeser (1996), also 
suggests distance from major developed countries will be an obstacle to growth. 
 
There are no obvious examples of countries with small populations, isolated 
from major markets, having achieved consistently high per capita GDP levels 
without having a strong natural resource export base.
44  
 
While transport and communications costs have fallen and new 
communications technologies reduce the barriers of distance, those barriers still 
remain.  Flights from New Zealand to major markets except Australia continue 
to be physically demanding and expensive. Personal contact appears to remain 
important to business relationships even in the face of new electronic 
communications tools. 
 
New Zealand does of course have geographic advantages.  Isolation from 
northern-hemisphere environments supports a clean, green image. 
                                            
44   Pritchett (1998) divides countries into groups which achieved growth with differing levels of 
consistency form the 1960’s onwards.  Those countries which have achieved the highest 
growth rates consistently tend to fit a description as being either situated close to large 
populations in high or growing income regions (eg Malta, Ireland, Cyprus or East Asia) or 
being able to exploit natural resources ( eg Botswana).   55 
New  Zealand can provide out of season produce to northern-hemisphere 
markets. Business can be processed here overnight. New Zealand can be 
promoted as the first major tourist destination to see in the new millennium.  
These advantages, though, are all either resource related or of limited 
importance.  
 
In summary, these points tend to suggest that distance may limit New Zealand’s 
growth rate through certain mechanisms. These include higher transport and 
communication costs and very large distances limiting interpersonal 
communication.  These might well tend to reduce the level of per capita GDP 
that New Zealand is able to achieve, as New Zealand faces both higher costs in 
what it does and carries out fewer transactions.   
 
There may also be adverse growth rate effects.  In some endogenous growth 
models, knowIedge spillovers are important and could be limited by distance.  
While these models tend to depend upon spillovers of technology, it is not 
difficult to envisage them being extended to include a wider class of commercial 
relationships, including marketing relationships and management practices.   
Clearly these effects could be investigated in more detail, but they are not 
implausible. 
 
5.3   Economies of Scale 
Economies of scale are closely related to geographical factors.  Isolation 
combined with recent settlement means New Zealand has a small population.  
Gould (1982) and Franklin (1985) note the lack of economies of scale in 
New Zealand.  Empirical work by Chapple (1994) has found some limited, non-
robust evidence of economies of scale being important at the 20 sector level in 
food, wood, paper, chemicals, electricity and restaurants and hotels.  According 
to Chapple, Campbell (1984) also found some evidence of economies of scale 
in New Zealand manufacturing in the 1952 to 1973 period, but for only 9 of 93 
industries. However, empirical work will not necessarily find the full influence of 
economies of scale easily. Some activities where they are important may simply 
not be undertaken and some instances may be hidden within the wider industry 
classifications usually employed in studies. 
 
While robust macroeconomic evidence may be hard to come by, it seems clear 
that there are many areas where economies of scale are important to 
international competitiveness and domestic production.  Economies of scale 
show up clearly in case studies.  For example, dairying, both in farming and 
processing; red meat; fishing; telecommunications; and sugar refining clearly 
show signs of significant economies of scale (Pickford and Bollard 1998).  It is 
clear that small scale car assembly plants were unable to survive and that 
successful smelting plants are likely to be large in basic metals manufacturing.  
All in all, experience suggests economies of scale are likely to be important in 
much manufacturing, primary processing activity and in some services and 
utilities.  
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Economies of scale may well be important in some Government activities too.  
New Zealand needs international representation in a wide variety of fora despite 
its small population and has to staff and provide most systems found in larger 
countries. 
 
A possible more recent example of economies of scale may include the transfer 
of a company’s accounts payable systems to Singapore from New Zealand, 
where they could be handled together with payments for 14 other countries 
within the region (National Business Review 1998). 
 
Economies of scale are of course not all pervasive.  Many small businesses 
operate successfully. Chapple (1994) found some suggestion of diseconomies 
of scale at the sectoral level in transport and some areas of manufacturing.  
 
An inability to achieve economies of scale is likely to limit the types of activities 
found in the New Zealand economy.  This does not mean that industries can not 
operate successfully, but it is likely to mean that costs are higher or incomes 
lower in a number of instances.  Again, this discussion tends to imply that a lack 
of economies of scale may constrain achievable income levels, perhaps more 
than growth rates.   
 
There may also be an impact on growth rates, as illustrated in the following 
somewhat speculative comment.  Innovation is important to growth, as argued 
in section 5.12, and also possibly subject to economies of scale, at least in 
some instances.  For instance, The Economist (1999) in a recent survey on 
innovation, provides information that is suggestive of economies of scale in 
some R&D activities.  Large R&D activities within Xerox, for instance, gain the 
advantages of easier access to markets, supplies and finance because of the 
parent company’s image; a large concentration of proprietary patent know-how; 
and support within a company with expertise in many new technology start-ups.  
As a larger company, Xerox appears to have found mechanisms to capture new 
ideas applying outside its core business, which formerly tended to slip away 
with the staff creating them.  
 
The effect of scale on growth is ripe for further investigation but does not seem 
to have received much detailed attention in New Zealand research. 
 
5.4   The Reform Process 
Several aspects of the post 1984 reform process suggest that New Zealand’s 
growth has probably been limited up to the present by transitional factors 
inherent in the reform process itself.  Adjustment may be costly, slow and have 
benefits, which though cumulatively large, may be slow to appear and not fully 
measured.  There has also been an ongoing debate about sequencing. 
 
Reforms are often costly, with the costs up front.  Silverstone, Bollard and 
Lattimore (1996) express cautious optimism that the reforms have contributed 
to growth but suggest that adjustment costs were high and were probably   57 
underestimated at the time New Zealand’s reforms were undertaken. Both 
physical capital and human capital have been made redundant, directly 
reducing production at least in the short term.  
 
There are also substantial costs in adopting new technologies and systems as 
suggested by Greenwood and Jovanovich (1998).  New Zealand had many of 
these to adopt.  North (1993) provides a particularly interesting insight on the 
likely costs of reform, arguing that economies, once on a particular path, find it 
very hard to fundamentally alter the direction.  Network externalities, economies 
of scope and complementarities bias incremental costs and benefits in favour of 
those organisations that are broadly consistent with the institutional framework.  
This suggests the costs of reform in New Zealand may have been widespread. 
 
Quite apart from costs, path dependence undoubtedly affects the time required 
to make and see responses to changes from reforms.  New Zealand’s skill 
levels now reflect decisions on what skills to acquire, sometimes made decades 
ago in the face of high returns to unskilled labour, even after that demand may 
have dropped.  Savings attitudes and New Zealand owned capital quantities 
reflect past decisions to provide tax-funded, pay as you go superannuation and 




The pay-offs may well be delayed.  This was not the view of the former 
New Zealand Planning Council who thought the disadvantages of reform would 
be relatively short term (Blyth, Hawke and Smythe 1984) but it is a consistent 
theme of overseas and later writings.   
 
Anderson and Gruen (1995) examine the pay-back period for reducing inflation 
in Australia, assuming a real discount rate of 5%.  They variously suggest 
delays of 7 to 16 years, in illustrative scenarios for recouping the initial output 
cost of achieving a reduction, notwithstanding that the ultimate pay-off may be 
quite large.   There appears to have been little such analysis in New Zealand.   
 
Harberger (1998) suggests: 
 
“But observing even the best of real-world growth experiences, I think we have 
to conclude that the adjustment is going to be extended over a lengthy period in 
any event, thus causing the big observable result of better policies to be a 
higher growth rate over an extended period rather than a discrete jump to a 
totally different level.” 
 
Winston (1998), examining US industry adjustment to deregulation, suggests “it 
takes firms a long time to tear down decades-old barriers to efficiency and to 
adopt more efficient production and marketing practices.” 
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McMillan (1998), in a view of the New Zealand economy from the outside, also 
suggests that it necessarily takes time for new ways to organise firms and to do 
business to arise.  He suggests a number of contributing mechanisms: 
 
·  Labour market frictions, with too little search effort by both workers and 
employers; sticky wages; and difficulties in assessing the skills of laid-off 
job-seekers 
·  Information externalities, where it pays firms to delay undertaking new 
investments until others have demonstrated their viability 
·  Externalities in downsizing, where it pays to wait until another firm 
downsizes, carrying more of the burden of industry adjustment. 
·  Obsolescence in skills 
·  A legacy of inexperience of competition 
·  Redesigning internal hierarchies; introducing new staff incentives; finding 
new managers for a new environment; imposing new financial oversights; 
finding new trading partners and revamping customer and supplier 
networks. 
 
There is a strong theme in recent New Zealand writings, too, that output gains 
are likely to take time to come through following reforms.  The OECD (1999) 
suggests that the benefits of reform are likely to be slow to emerge and reforms 
require consistent application, despite impressive overall progress with 
structural reform. Campbell-Hunt and Corbett (1996) suggest that building 
sustainable advantage by firms depends upon establishing a network of 
relationships with external suppliers and the workforce and building a reputation 
with clients.  Years are required to build these assets, even with the incentives 
to do so provided by reforms.  Hall (1998a) suggests that by 1984, New 
Zealand had unsustainable macroeconomic imbalances and serious 
microeconomic problems and that these often take longer to turn around and 
require more persistent corrective action than many originally envisage. 
 
A fundamental source of delay in adjustment is likely to be in the 
responsiveness of a range of resource “gatekeepers”.
45  While institutions, 
attitudes and management may all be slow to adjust, individuals also need to 
adjust in order to respond to changed incentives.  New skills may need to be 
acquired. New sources of information flows and improvements in market 
institutions may be needed to support adjustment processes. 
 
For instance, individuals control the allocation of their own labour.  Crude 
signals and incentives, such as job losses will bring re-allocation, but to achieve 
a continuing, higher level of responsiveness will require new skills to be learned, 
monitoring of the labour market and job search.  Land resources locked into 
specific farming types may be another example.  In Southland for example, 
there is a prolonged process of conversion of sheep and mixed farms to dairy 
farms, where new skills are required. The long delays in the process of diffusion 
of innovations, found in almost any study, may also be instructive. Stoneman 
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(1995), in the context of international studies of innovation, suggests diffusion of 
innovation may typically take from 5 to 50 years from first use to 95% take-up.  
Further research on New Zealand responsiveness could be worthwhile. 
 
These suggestions of slow change seem plausible.  Growth promoting changes 
are likely to require acquisition of new skills, new investment, structural change 
and attitudinal changes, all on a sufficiently large scale to be discernible at a 
macro level.   
 
Of course the suggestion that pay-offs are delayed leaves the way open for 
critics to suggest that delay is actually symptomatic of failure in the underlying 
reform processor that the expected pay-off date is constantly being shifted 
forward in time, as noted by Easton (1998).  Such suggestions are 
comparatively unusual in the economic material reviewed for this paper, as 
most analysts tend to accept that some reforms were needed, while arguing for 
differences in emphasis or implementation.  Some like Porter (1998) tend to 
suggest that particular aspects of reform, such as the move to encourage a 
knowledge-based economy have not proceeded far enough. Others, like 
Easton, Bayliss and Philpott, as reviewed in Appendix A, argue that parts of the 
reform process were badly implemented, especially macroeconomic aspects.   
 
The arguments depend closely on the analyst’s assumed counterfactual – what 
would New Zealand’s path have been without reforms?  The majority tend to 
suggest that the appropriate counterfactual on both micro-reforms would have 
been continued deterioration in performance. McMillan (1998) and Evans, 
Grimes and Wilkinson with Teece (1996), for instance, suggest that the pre-
1984 policies, and macroeconomic stabilisation they made necessary, caused 
much of the social cost endured by New Zealanders in the mid-to-late 1980s. 
Dalziel (1998), in the minority, as noted in Appendix A, suggests a different 
counterfactual based on higher, earlier growth rates.
46  
 
Hazledine (1998), as summarised in more detail in Appendix A, also accepts 
that some reforms were needed but comes closest of the analysts reviewed to 
suggesting that the reason for delayed pay-offs was that the reform process 
was fundamentally flawed.  He argues that many reforms fostered selfishness, 
and imposed additional supervision and management costs on society, to stem 
the resulting harmful effects.  Many markets do not work particularly well, while 
externally, New Zealand is excessively dependent on trade, given its isolated 
location. 
 
In some respects, Hazledine’s views can be seen as a warning against taking 
any policies to extremes and are consistent with international thinking. 
Examples might include his warnings against attempting to implement policies 
that may be inconsistent with underlying culture, or assuming a simplistic pay-
                                            
46   It is important to distinguish this “what would have happened?” counterfactual from the 
different counterfactual of “what might have been achieved with optimal policies?”, where the 
majority offer some criticisms, especially in the macroeconomic debate, discussed in section 
5.10.   60 
off to human capital investment.  However, his arguments that New Zealand 
was remarkably successful in its economic management from 1945 to 1975 and 
that restricting trade would assist growth appear strongly inconsistent with both 
a New Zealand majority and international consensus.  A key piece of evidence 
offered for his views is that “management” effort has increased in New Zealand 
over time.  This is questionable on the grounds that such phenomena may 
simply reflect a move towards knowledge based work and are also found 
elsewhere in more successful economies (North 1993). 
 
In summary, the argument that the pay-off to reform is slow, but spread out over 
time seems more convincing than arguments that the reform process has failed.  
The broad consistency of New Zealand’s post-reform policies with international 
growth analysis supports this conclusion.  It would, however, be another matter 
altogether to try to argue that more could not be done. 
 
Slow Implementation 
In New Zealand’s case, a number of key reforms have been implemented very 
slowly, despite rapid reform in other areas.  It took variously 7 to 12 years for 
tariffs to be halved from 1987 levels in high tariff areas such as apparel, 
automotive and electrical equipment, under constant reform programs.   
Protection reform began in the late 1970’s but tariffs will not be eliminated until 
2006. Meanwhile, protected industries have continued to attract resources but 
new investment must have been limited.  This may be consistent with the 
findings of Hall (1996), that the pace of structural change in New Zealand has 
been slow, even after 1985, compared to other countries, measured in terms of 
changes in highly aggregated industry shares of employment and output. 
 
Measurement Issues 
Measurement issues may also have contributed to an apparent slow pay-off 
from reforms.  For example, it seems possible that measured value added in 
formerly heavily protected industries, such as textiles and machinery, will have 
reduced as prices fell, even if essentially the same commodity is still produced 
at the reduced prices.  The matter is further discussed in Appendix B. 
 
A further measurement issue related to reforms may be the effect of recognising 
previously unrealised liabilities.  When the Government recognised liabilities 
arising from guarantees to major projects and Producer Boards in the 1980’s, 
the resulting debt taken on included a substantial overseas component, which 
had to be serviced, with the costs appearing as a one-off reduction in GNI, while 
not necessarily affecting GDP.  The earlier stimulus of construction or 
production undertaken under a guarantee might alternatively be seen as 
generating an artificially high, earlier level of GDP.  Similarly, non-recognition of 
large Government liabilities for ACC or the Government Superannuation Fund 
prior to the 1990s may have lead to a higher measured level of Government 
spending and consequent activity level than after those reforms.  The 
subsequent growth level might appear smaller, as measured on an initial point   61 





Possibly the major debate about the impact of the reform process on growth, as 
opposed to the reforms themselves, has been about sequencing.  Bollard 
(1994) stated the established principles of sequencing at the time of reform to 
be: 
 
·  stabilise before attempting structural reform, to ensure balance in the 
Government sector 
·  deregulate product markets and labour markets before financial ones, to 
ensure that commodity and not capital flows determine the real exchange 
rate 
·  deregulate domestic markets before external ones, to allow local interests 
to absorb any economic rents and to retain internal balance before 
liberalisation 
 
Bollard notes that all of these rules were broken in New Zealand, sometimes for 
considered reasons, but argues there were few precedents to follow.  Joumard 
and Reisen (1992), as OECD analysts, suggest that opening externally, before 
stabilising inflation and undertaking labour market reform, produced a classic 
Dornbusch-style real exchange rate overshooting, with subsequent hysteresis 
effects in manufactured exports.  
 
Evans, Grimes, Wilkinson and Teece (1996) argue that while better results 
would have been seen from earlier labour market reform and a reduced fiscal 
deficit, there is nevertheless a case for proceeding on all fronts at once, given a 
widespread need for reform and given final outcomes.  This latter view seems to 
have gained support over time, with the OECD (1999) suggesting that the 
consideration of sequencing issues should not, by itself, inhibit the pursuit of 
reform measures.  McMillan (1998) notes that current empirical knowledge of 
how markets react to reforms is actually quite limited, in turn limiting the 
prescriptions that can be offered. 
 
Other writers have also suggested that sequencing of particular policies was 
less than optimal.  For instance, Hazledine and Murphy (1996) suggest that 
trade liberalisation from 1982 to 1988 actually increased the rate of effective 
assistance to manufacturing, favouring low wage manufacturing industries on 
balance by raising effective rates of assistance in highly protected industries.
48  
                                            
47  For the sake of clarity, the elimination of artificial Government stimulus and recognition of 
liabilities is likely to show through as a one-off measured output level reduction, not as an 
ongoing reduction in the annual growth rate. 
48   Effective rates of assistance take into account both the assistance rates on an output and on 
inputs, to give a measure of net assistance to an industry, say from tariffs.  Because many 
manufactured goods represent inputs to primary activities and vice verca, the faster   62 
This occurred because assistance measures were phased out more quickly in 
lightly assisted industries. This seems a serious matter: diverting incentives 
away from long term directions risks delaying inevitable structural adjustment 
and does not fit with the more relaxed view of sequencing now gaining favour. 
 
Conclusions about Reform Process 
 
On balance, it is not clear from analysis of sequencing issues that New Zealand 
long-term growth finally suffered.  In any event, sequencing costs are now well 
and truly sunk.  However, sequencing and implementation issues are clearly 
highly relevant to implementation of future policies aiming to generate growth. 
 
The reform process could reasonably be expected to have a slow but prolonged 
pay-off.  There is widespread acceptance from writers sympathetic to the reform 
process, as well as those critical of the process, that there have been output 
costs and costs of dislocation to capital and labour. 
 
A final point worth making is that many of the benefits of the reform process 
may have been static, possibly reflected more in welfare measures such as 
consumer surplus, rather than growth or income directly.  This is implicit in the 
comment from Silverstone, Bollard and Lattimore (1996) that consumers have 
done well compared with producers in terms of prices, variety, quality and 
services. 
 
5.5   International Conditions 
International conditions have plainly had a major influence on New Zealand’s 
growth performance in areas over which New Zealand has relatively little 
influence.  These include terms of trade effects, market conditions, financial 
conditions and regulatory conditions. 
 
New Zealand has faced an overall commodity terms of trade decline since the 
1950s and 1960s, despite the recovery after 1986.  (Figure 6 shows New 
Zealand’s terms of trade.) This phenomenon continues to be debated, despite 
its clear underpinning in product life cycle theory and empirical experience in 
commodity prices.  The Economist (1999b) shows a basket of commodities 
declining approximately 80% in real price over the last century.
49 As noted in 
Part 3 of this paper, declining terms of trade do seem to affect growth 
adversely, with some impact from sharp variations experienced in the 1970s 
and 1980s.  Easton (1997) points out that sharp oil price declines were 
                                                                                                                                 
elimination of assistance to primary production resulted in a rise in manufacturing 
assistance. 
49  It should be noted that the product life cycle also affects commodities and manufactured 
products imported by New Zealand, offsetting declines in New Zealand export prices.   63 
damaging to major project investments founded on an assumption of continuing 
high oil prices, just as increases had been earlier.
50 
 
International demand and supply conditions have a major influence on the 
terms of trade.  Short-term fluctuations may have relatively little effect on 
growth.  Nevertheless, more fundamental changes in demand patterns can 
arise, such as a trend away from red meat because of concern for a healthier 
diet, overseas protectionism or the recent rehabilitation of suppliers such as 
Argentina and Uruguay, after successfully eliminating foot and mouth disease.  
Meat receipts dropped from 27% of total export receipts in 1981 or 1982 to 
12.5% in 1994 or 1995, illustrating the potential order of magnitude of such 
effects (Maughan 1998). 
 
One important trend has been towards growth being more knowledge based 
(OECD 1996).  Grant (1998) also emphasises this.  The development of new 
knowledge intensive products and services in a product life cycle world places 
continual pressure on New Zealand to upgrade its existing products and 
production processes, in order to compete and maintain or improve per capita 
GDP.  Based on US data, more knowledge intensive plants tend to pay higher 
wages, are more productive, grow more and generate more employment.  This 
tends to imply that developing more knowledge based industries would be a 
helpful direction for New Zealand per capita incomes, although not that a 
simple, knowledge based development strategy is necessarily appropriate, as 
argued in parts 5.12 and 5.13. 
 
The rise in world real interest rates in the early 1980s was, according to Easton 
(1997), equivalent to a 5% commodity term of trade drop, illustrating the 
influence of financial markets.  Since 1992, however, international real interest 
rates have dropped significantly, to New Zealand’s advantage as a debtor 
country, according to Brash (1999). 
 
Protection levels adopted in overseas markets are generally beyond 
New Zealand’s ability to influence in the short term and have a serious effect in 
dairy and meat markets in particular.  Trade agreements such as CER with 
Australia or made under the WTO have provided scope for New Zealand to limit 
these influences, although the underlying dynamics encouraging overseas 
protection remain strong.  Seeking to extend the scope of international markets 
within which New Zealand can operate can be seen as a key policy for boosting 
growth for a number of reasons. New Zealand  gains the stimulus of foreign 
competition for New Zealand industry, obtains outlets for areas of New Zealand 
comparative advantage and gains economies of scale. 
 
While the international conditions concerned can not be directly influenced, New 
Zealand need not accept them passively. The pace of response to international 
price signals can be varied, thus modifying their impact.  This might be through 
                                            
50   It would be implausible to argue that New Zealand did not benefit overall from the oil price 
decline.   64 
reducing debt levels in response to high interest rates or changes in the 
structure of production.  It is not only declining commodity prices that might limit 
New Zealand’s growth but also possibly a slowness to respond to such price 
signals.  This would have been more significant in the pre-reform period prior to 
1984, when specific subsidies and protective measures favoured existing 
activities, than now. 
 
In fact, in the 1980s, it was expected that structural change could improve New 
Zealand’s terms of trade. This does not appear to have been widely researched, 
although there is one exception. Winkelmann and Winkelmann (1998) find that 
eliminating import licensing improved New Zealand’s terms of trade 
substantially, suggesting that the earlier total welfare loss involved on imports 
sourced from the USA alone was as much as 1% of GDP in 1985.  It is possibly 
suggestive that New Zealand’s terms of trade have not declined over the 1990s 
as they appeared to do over the previous thirty years, as shown in figure 6. 
Experience suggests, though, that many years of data are required to be certain 
about such trends. 
 
New Zealand may be slightly less vulnerable to adverse terms of trade shifts 
now than 15 years ago.  Further investigation of the following could be 
warranted: 
 
·  Why the terms of trade seem to have improved since 1988  
·  Why the terms of trade have been more stable since 1989 than in the 
previous 30 years 
·  Whether the diversification of exports towards services such as tourism, 
commodities such as fish, mining and forest products, added value dairy 
products and manufactured exports has helped 
·  Whether price declines for imported goods, including other commodities 
and electronic goods have helped. 
 
Factors over Which New Zealand Has More Influence 
5.6 Demographic  Factors 
The influence of demographic factors upon New Zealand’s per capita GDP 
growth is complex and does not appear to have been researched in particular 
depth. This summary can do little more than sketch the main points that have 




·  Fast population growth is probably a negative influence on per capita 
growth through the reduction in the ratios of other inputs to labour.  The   65 
resulting reduction in per capita income for New Zealand from fast 
population growth has possibly been quite significant.
51 
·  Immigration on the other hand is probably slightly positive for per capita 
growth in the long term, though the effects are not well established.  
·  The primary mechanism for population growth to affect growth is through 
its effects on the size and composition of the labour force, although there 
are many other mechanisms. These include both economies and 
diseconomies in city population growth and in the short term, aggregate 
demand changes. 
·  While Governments have some ability to influence demographic variables, 
it is quite limited, applying mainly to inward migration but not emigration or 
natural increase. 
 
These points are expanded upon below.   
 
Demographic factors influence population size through the natural rate of 
increase of population and net emigration, of which the latter has been better 
researched in New Zealand.  General perceptions are that New Zealand can do 
little to influence the rate of natural increase, at least within a democratic society 
(Pool and Bedford 1997).  This is clearly true in the short to medium term. 
Immigration is more subject to policy influence through controls, although rights 
of New Zealanders to return impose limitations on the influence of policy, as do 
rights of exit.  This may explain the relative emphasis on migration in 
demographic work touching on economic growth. 
 
Emigration has fluctuated enormously in its contribution over time, producing a 
large net outflow between the 1976 and 1981 censuses but contributing one 
third of the overall population increase from 1991 to 1996 (Cook 1997).  A 
consistent feature in the last two decades, according to Winkelmann (1998), 
has been net emigration of New Zealand citizens every year since 1981, who 
tend to be better qualified than those remaining.  In numbers, this flow has been 
more than made up by an inflow of non-New Zealand citizens, again better 
qualified than the overall population. The impact of the outflow could well be 
important but has not been closely examined to date and certainly merits more 
attention.  
 
New Zealand has had a relatively fast rate of population growth by high-income 
country standards.  According to Easton (1997), New Zealand’s population grew 
1.6% per annum from 1945 to 1990, 0.3% per annum more than OECD 
countries, especially prior to 1966.  The growth absorbed more than half of GDP 
growth of 2.8% per annum. This continued from 1990 to 1997, when 
New  Zealand’s average rate of population increase of 1.2% per annum 
exceeded that of high income countries by 0.5%
52 (World Bank 1998).   
                                            
51   However, as Sarel (1995) points out, to the extent that fast growth produces a young 
population with expected lower productivity, there may be scope for later catch-up with an 
aging population, with productivity peaking at age 55 and then declining slowly. 
52   The World Bank (1998) shows that in 1990-97, New Zealand’s growth was the same as that 
of other high immigration countries such as Australia and Canada and slightly greater than   66 
 
Just how population growth affects per capita income growth is still an open 
question.  While classical thinkers such as Malthus considered that population 
growth would reduce incomes as production could increase only more slowly, 
thinking about population has varied over time. Temple (1999) in reviewing 
international work recently suggests that there may be a small, negative effect 
on growth.  
 
One useful way to think about the issue is as a trade-off between positive 
economies and diseconomies from population growth, such as those discussed 
in part 3 of this paper, relating to city size.  The effects of population growth in 
New Zealand will be largely those of effects on cities, because of the extent of 
urbanisation of the New Zealand population and because city populations tend 
to be the areas in which growth is concentrated in any event.  Glaeser (1998) 
suggests that at least in US cities, the elasticity of income with respect to 
population is 0.1. However, the observed cost of living also rises strongly with 
population, with an elasticity of 0.11.  This may be dependent on the overall 
range under discussion, with some suggestions that costs increase more 
sharply in very large cities such as New York – off the New Zealand scale. 
Scope exists for New Zealand research.  
 
There is a consistent thread in New Zealand writings on population and growth 
that high population growth has contributed somewhat to New Zealand’s poor 
economic growth.   Gould (1982) suggests that high population growth diverted 
investment into relatively unproductive investments and exacerbated balance of 
payments difficulties.  Poot (1999) suggests that population growth is generally 
found to be negative for per capita income growth.   
 
Easton suggests the high rate of increase may have dropped New Zealand’s 
per capita GDP growth from 1945 to 1990 by 0.17% per annum, compared to 
the OECD, based on cross-country results from Dowrick and Nguyen (1989). 
This would be enough to drop New Zealand’s relative per capita GDP over such 
a lengthy period by 7%.  Smith and Grimes (1990) take the same approach, 
suggesting like Easton that a mechanism of relative capital shallowing is 
responsible.
53  Hazledine (1998) also emphasises that population expansion 
with finite resources will lower welfare.  Rebstock (1997) suggests that while 
more people produce more, per capita output is what counts and that 
diminishing returns are likely to set in.   
 
All these views are consistent with neoclassical theory and cross-country 
evidence. 
                                                                                                                                 
the USA. In 1980-1990, New Zealand’s growth rate was only marginally above the high-
income country average but less than the other three high immigration countries. 
53   Temple (1999) notes that this is the main mechanism suggested.  He also suggests there is 
some evidence that students in countries with higher population growth record lower 
achievement. Temple (1999) also suggests a weak negative relationship between population 
growth and total factor productivity and that population growth affects labour force 
participation.   67 
 
This does not seem implausible, especially given the historic resource base of 
the New Zealand economy. Natural resources and land availability through 
development activity seem likely to respond slowly at best to increased 
population.  A retreat from marginal land development activity after the 1980s 
seems to confirm that there are limits in expanding natural resource 
exploitation, although new ways of adding value in pastoral farming, 
horticulture, processing, forestry, fishing and mining have clearly been found 
over recent decades.   
 
It is likely that an expanding population involves some beneficial effects for per 
capita incomes, such as the ability to exploit more economies of scale in 
production processes and exploitation of infrastructure, as Easton (1997) points 
out. He reports work by Philpott and Poot in the late 1980’s suggesting that 
capital intensity and economies of scale effects were not as important as 
technological growth. That the latter are small certainly fits with the evidence on 
the growth of cities reported by Quigley (1998) in Part 3 of this paper.   
New Zealand would still have a small, isolated population even if it doubled from 
its present level.  
 
These comments do suggest, though, the worth of researching more closely the 
effects of net population expansion on per capita income levels. 
 
Recent views about the contribution of inward migration to growth appear to be 
more positive about its long-term effects.  The NZIER (1998a) suggest that the 
macroeconomic impacts of immigration are ambiguous and effects on 
incumbent New Zealanders complex, but conclude that international research 
suggests that the macroeconomic impacts of migration are positive but small.  
Poot (1998) also reaches the same conclusion. 
 
Box (1999) summarises the influences of migration on per capita growth in 
more detail, noting that the effects depend upon migrant profile, savings and 
investment habits, consumption habits, and capital brought in.  Productivity may 
be boosted through entrepreneurial skills, contacts and contributions to 
economies of scale.  Demand is stimulated.  However, inflationary pressure 
may be exacerbated and local capital and skill development may sometimes be 
crowded out.  Some entrepreneurs have had difficulty transferring their skills, at 
least in the short term, with possibly more interest in migration for lifestyle than 
business reasons (Forsyte Research 1998). 
 
There is thus a conflict between positive views about the growth contributions of 
net inward migration and the preponderance of negative views about population 
growth for per capita incomes. The following points might assist in resolving it: 
 
·  Migration has made a net contribution to population growth and is thus 
likely to have contributed to a shallowing of capital and other inputs.  
·  Migration inward lifts sharply immediately following booms and reverses 
after recessions commence.  This pattern certainly suggests that migration   68 
may be a significant factor limiting growth in per capita incomes even if it 
also serves as a cushion during downturns.  This aspect is worthy of 
further study.  
·  The contribution of migration or population growth to per capita GDP 
growth probably depends upon the contribution it makes to the ratio of 
human capital to raw labour in the workforce.  Inward migration would 
probably have added less to human capital before emigration criteria were 
changed to emphasise skills more in the 1980s and possibly have 
contributed less to per capita GDP growth than it does now.  Similarly, 
natural population growth that adds to human capital, discussed 
separately below in section 5.7, is likely to make a more positive 
contribution to growth.
54   
 
Labour  
The increase in New Zealand employment over time clearly has the potential to 
have a major impact on GDP growth, as illustrated by Treasury’s (1996a) 
assumption that the employed account for a 60% share of output.   
 
The actual impact has probably been somewhat less significant.  Lawrence and 
Diewert (1999) suggest that employment growth would have raised real GDP 
only 7 percentage points from 1978 to 1998, assuming all other variables were 
unchanged.  In contrast, of the other variables examined, the terms of trade 
contributed –3%, capital growth 20% and total factor productivity growth 29%.  
The method assumes the economy follows a translog functional form. 
Employment growth is measured as the contribution of hours of three groups: 
managers and professionals; clerical, sales and services; and production and 
labourers, weighted together by incomes, benchmarked to census data.
55  For 
illustrative purposes, Lawrence and Diewert record total employment numbers 
as growing by 20% from 1978 to 1998. Market sector hours worked per worker 
declined 11% over the same period. 
 
Labour force
56 growth in New Zealand over the last two decades has been 
considerably higher than in other high-income countries.  The World Bank 
(1998) shows that for New Zealand’s labour force, including both employed and 
unemployed, annual average growth rates have been 2.0% from 1980 to 1990 
and 1.4% from 1990 to 1997.  These compare with 1.2% and 0.9% respectively 
for all high-income countries.  The high population growth rates discussed 
above, through earlier high natural increase and emigration, undoubtedly 
provide the basic driving forces. 
                                            
54  It has probably been doing so, given that younger members of the population tend to be 
better qualified.  While the Household Labour Force Survey in 1986 showed that around 
40% of the population had no school or higher qualification, by 1996 this was down to 30% 
and to 18% of those aged 25 to 44, according to Cook (1997). 
55   Lawrence and Diewert do note that labour inputs have grown more on other measures, 
based on employment numbers rather than hours, and on household labour force survey 
data numbers or hours. There is a need for more research on differences between series. 
56   The labour force includes those employed and those seeking work but not employed.   69 
 
New Zealand writers interested in per capita economic growth do not seem to 
have focussed particularly on the composition of the labour force.  The key 
issue here is the proportion of the population actually working, as an increase 
could potentially raise per capita incomes, assuming there are not diminishing 
returns to additional labour
57. Such an effect is more likely to be one-off rather 
than offering any permanent increase in growth. 
 
Overall participation rates of the working age population in the labour force have  
risen strongly since the 1950’s, as noted by Easton (1997), from 62.1% in 1951 
to 71.8% in 1991.  The ratio of the labour force to total population rose from 
38.2% to 46.7%. Over the period, important influences on the size of the 
employed proportion of the population have included: 
 
·  Children being an initially increasing, then decreasing, proportion of the 
population, with corresponding effects on female availability for paid work 
·  An increase in the participation rate of women, which has continued.  From 
1980 to 1997, the female proportion of the New Zealand labour force rose 
from 34% to 44% according to World Bank (1998)
58, compared with high-
income country proportions of 38% and 43% respectively.  With 
comparable countries such as Australia, Canada and the United States 
having female labour force proportions of 43% to 46%, the scope for 
further large increases in female participation would seem more limited. 
Scandinavian countries achieve higher ratios though.  
·  Increased in school leaving ages and in post compulsory education, which 
reduce numbers available for work. 
·  More recently, an increasing proportion of elderly  
·  An effective decrease in 1975, then more recently an increase in the age 
of eligibility for superannuation, which saw workforce participation by 60 to 
64 year olds rise from around 24% of the group in 1989 to 1992 to 43% in 
1997, according to Cook (1997). 
·  Increasing unemployment, which for example rose to 7.7% of the 
workforce by the time of the June 1998 Household Labour force survey, 
from around 4% at the start of the survey over 1985 to 1987.  This 
undoubtedly reflects both structural factors and cyclical factors, with the 
1998 recession lifting unemployment at the end of the period. 
·  Relatively high hours worked by OECD standards, according to PCD 
(1996).  Average hours have declined, though, with a substantial increase 
in part-time work. 
 
These influences have produced relatively high labour force participation rates 
by OECD standards as PCD (1996) notes.  Compared to the high-income 
                                            
57   As discussed above, there may well be diminishing returns, although it would be an 
extremely pessimistic assumption that these would overwhelm the effects of increased 
participation. The participation rate is the ratio of the labour force to working age population, 
which in turn is generally seen as the total population between ages 15 and 64. 
58   Cook (1997) suggests a higher figure of 45.4% women in the workforce by 1997.   70 
country participation rate of 48.1% in 1997, New Zealand shows a rate of 49.2% 
in the year to March 1998, up from 46.7% in the year to March 1991.
59  High-
income country participation rates also appear to have increased over time, 
from 45.1% in 1980.  
 
Despite these various influences, the proportion of the total population 
employed has been remarkably stable in New Zealand since the mid-1970’s, 
generally remaining around 44% to 46%, except for the recession in the early 
1990’s.  This tends to suggest that changing dependency ratios and changing 
mixes of dependents have had little effect over this period.
60 Given that average 
hours worked have tended to decline, this implies that a relatively smaller 
contribution from labour to GDP over time may have made a small contribution 
keeping New Zealand’s per capita income growth moderate.  However New 
Zealand’s labour force participation history does not suggest a record much 
different to that of other comparable countries.  Explanations for New Zealand’s 
per capita performance lie elsewhere. 
 
5.7   Human Capital 
The immediately preceding section examined writings on the contribution to 
New Zealand’s growth performance from increments in the quantity of labour. 
This section concerns work on the growth contribution of the quality of labour.  It 
stops short of matters that relate to culture or values, which are discussed in 
section 5.8. 
 
The concept of human capital goes back at least to Becker (1962).  For this 
paper, as in Williams, Andrews, Nana and Rose (1999), it is defined to be an 
accumulation of knowledge, education, training etc by a person which increases 
the productivity of that person’s knowledge as a factor of production.  This 
leaves aside the possibility that accumulating human capital might stimulate 
growth in other ways, which have not been discussed much in a New Zealand 
context.
61   
 
The definition also leaves aside health and other possible contributors to human 
capital apart from knowledge based contributors.  Although these play a role in 
international research, such as that of Sala-I-Martin (1997), largely as a proxy 
for human capital attributes, there is little reference to the effects of health on 
growth in the New Zealand literature reviewed here.
62  There is a suggestion in 
                                            
59   The data is sourced from World Bank (1998) Table 3 and Statistics New Zealand. 
60   Dependency ratios mean the ratio of those not employed to those who are. 
61   A possible exception is the Porter model which sees demanding consumers as contributing 
to raising competitive advantage and hence growth. Education might play a role in making 
consumers more discerning although this is not emphasised in Crocombe, Enright and 
Porter (1991). 
62   An exception here is Knowles and Owen (1995), which extends a neoclassical growth 
equation by including both health and education variables.  Cross section estimates using 
Mankiw, Romer and Weil (1992) data for 77 countries suggest a strong, positive link 
between growth and health, measured through life expectancy, but if education is included 
as a variable.  However, the work is not New Zealand specific and appears to leave out   71 
literature on the link between health and productivity that health has important 
effects, but with economic development, improved health becomes less 
important in influencing labour market outcomes and education and skill 
acquisition more so (Strauss and Thomas 1998). 
 
There is a strong theme in the New Zealand literature on growth suggesting that 
a lack of skills and/or education is a major contributor to New Zealand’s 
moderate growth performance.  Bandyopadhyay (1997) takes an extreme view 
and suggests that models based on educational achievement differences can 
explain 75% of the cross country variation found in income levels, better than 
the record of the more complex Solow or Mankiw, Romer and Weil (1992) 
explanations.  This seems somewhat implausible, given the likelihood of joint 
causality between income levels and education levels, with education having 
strong consumption good characteristics.
63  
 
Most New Zealand writers see human capital to be important but without 
suggesting a unique role for it or quantifying its contribution.  Franklin (1985) 
suggests low-income families are affected by a lack of education and that there 
have been continuing demands to downgrade the academic and scholastic 
aspects of education.  While noting data difficulties and difficulties in 
international comparisons, Easton (1997) also suggests that historically, New 
Zealand did not have a well educated or trained labour force.  
 
Vandersyp (1993) and Treasury (1996) separately suggest skill development is 
a key issue for growth.  Treasury suggested a number of mechanisms from 
various studies. Better education is associated with lower absenteeism and 
propensity to leave a job. Higher schooling and particular academic subjects are 
associated with higher job productivity. More tertiary educated workers may 
help firms adopt new technology. The performance of certain industries is 
based on how average students perform in mathematics, science and other 
aspects of general education.  Treasury (1996) emphasised the gap between 
wages for the skilled and those with less skills as a key factor driving investment 
in skills and the importance of institutional arrangements to support 
responsiveness to student, employer and wider community needs. 
 
The lack of human capital thesis extends firmly to business and management. 
Williams, Andrews, Nana and Rose (1999) suggest, for example, that New 
Zealand firms tend not to invest significantly in training, possibly because many 
are small and lack the resources to invest.  Crocombe, Enright and Porter 
(1991) found there was little firm involvement in staff training programs.  
 
                                                                                                                                
variables that other work suggests have a very strong influence on growth, such as trade 
openness. Winkelmann (1998) also suggests health may influence the income of Maori men. 
63   Bandyopadhyay’s models are slightly more complex than this might imply.  He also argues 
that inequality in the initial distribution of education is important in addition to levels of 
education, and develops models in which external spillovers of knowledge from better 
educated people (“Managers”) have an important role, as in Bandyopadhyay (1993).   
However, these have not been widely investigated in a New Zealand context.   72 
Bayliss (1994) also argues New Zealand has had a poorly educated and skilled 
workforce, with the lack of skills extending to management. Yeabsley (1996) in 
a study of New Zealand investment in Chile, notes that the transition to 
investing abroad involved much learning for New Zealand management, given 
that New Zealand had been a relatively closed economy with few well trained 
and internationally exposed managers.   
 
Campbell Hunt, Harper and Hamilton (1993) also suggest a lack of marketing, 
strategic analysis and financial analysis skills in business.  Campbell-Hunt and 
Corbett (1996) suggest that organisational learning is important and 
management practices are crucial.  They quote a 1994 Australian Council of 
Manufacturing study that found the availability of skills to be a very significant 
barrier to improvement for New Zealand firms, compared with both Australian 
and international firms.  Their 1996 study at least found that there were 
considerable signs of improvement in skill-dependent  activities in businesses – 
for instance, marketing, discounted cash flow analysis, costing systems, 
innovation and governance. 
 
The analysis extends to the quantity and quality of education system outputs at 
various levels.  Crocombe, Enright and Porter (1991) suggested that New 
Zealand had low participation in formal education and a short school year of 
190 days, compared to Australia (200), Germany (220) and Japan (240).   
Management education was limited. There was a lack of vocational focus in 
education. Curricula were not highly relevant to business skills, with a lack of 
emphasis on language skills, poor maths and science participation and a lack of 
engineering study, although this was comparable to Australia or Canada.  They 
saw limited incentives to upgrade skills where the Government remained 
committed to full employment, pay was not based on contributions and the 
legacy of a past emphasis on high pay, low skill industries remained.  Moreover, 
the Government was not seen to have a strong commitment to resource 
development and there was no clear consensus on results expected from the 
education system. Upgrading New Zealand’s human resources was a high 
priority, requiring high standards; fostering maths, technology and language 
skills; more interaction between education and industry; improved vocational 
training; and improved management and workforce skills. 
 
While most analysts emphasise skill levels as a contributor to New Zealand’s 
growth performance, Hazledine (1998) stands out as a sceptic on the role of 
education. He states that there is no evidence that the supposed ailments of 
slow growing economies are due to inadequate investment in human capital 
and argues that there is no simple mechanism leading from education to 
growth.  People with educated are likely to be more capable to start with; time 
spent in education has a large opportunity cost; some people are slow learners 
anyway; and forcing education on people who do not want it is likely to be 
counter productive.  Moreover cultural differences and social skills may be 
important to performance.  Education may provide signalling about the quality of 
students, which was needed in an earlier era when there was more empathy in 
society and bosses knew their workers better.  Hazledine cites Psacharopolous    73 
as authority for the proposition that countries with high education participation 
have had amongst the lowest growth rates amongst developed countries. 
 
As mentioned in part 3 of this paper, the international empirical literature on the 
relationship between education and growth is somewhat inconclusive, despite 
many analysts suggesting a significant link.  There are many problems in 
making the linkage, including those noted below:  
 
·  There has been a prolonged debate over whether education contributes to 
growth through enhancing human capital or signalling.
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·  Theoretically, education may be a consumption good as well as an 
investment good.  It may affect output levels both directly and through 
externalities, which present modelling complexities.   
·  In this area as in many, the dynamics of the relationship between growth 
and human capital are not always well specified, with distinctions between 
stocks and flows of human capital not always being made (Temple 1999). 
It is often unclear whether the discussion is about levels or growth rate 
effects.  Discussions in the growth literature are more likely to be about 
growth rates while implicitly at least, studies relating more specifically to 
human capital are more likely to relate to levels effects. There may be non-
linear relationships, with different types of education investment generating 
different returns (Maani 1999).   
·  There may well be important complementarities in the effects of education, 
for instance through skilled labour complementing unskilled (Weiss 1995) 
or skills complementing other factors, such as physical capital and 
innovation (Williams, Andrews, Nana and Rose 1999).  In this case, 
human capital investment mechanisms may affect growth rates more than 
simply raising output levels. 
·  Higher returns from primary education, literacy programs and vocationally 
oriented, technical and management training seem to be better 
established. (Weiss 1995) 
·  The specific effects of Government funding versus private funding are 
unclear, with the latter probably generating a closer link between the 
investment and future private returns. Williams, Andrews, Nana and Rose 
(1999) suggest examples of ways Governments attempting to deal with 
human capital market failures may themselves be prone to fail.  These 
include a lack of incentives for performance of the sort faced by firms and 
workers in markets, the creation of monopolies in funding structures and 
difficulties for Governments in measuring outcomes. 
·  Matching the skills produced to jobs available remains important.   
New Zealand, for instance, risks producing skills in a heavily subsidised 
education system which do not match market requirements particularly 
well.  In general, labour markets with more flexible wage levels and 
conditions might be expected to improve the signals and produce better 
matching now than in the past. 
                                            
64   Useful summaries can be found in Psacharopolous (1994), Weiss (1995) and Eliasson 
(1994)   74 
 
Those New Zealand and international analysts who have investigated the 
linkages between education and output specifically are less likely to assume a 
simple relationship between education and output or growth than those whose 
primary focus is growth. 
 
Education is not the only source of human capital building, as Gillman (1993) 
reminds us in considering an endogenous growth model based on learning by 
doing in a New Zealand context.  He points out that countries can build 
experience through leaning by doing, reinforcing existing comparative 
advantage.  For New Zealand, this suggests the desirability of moving industry 
to successive waves of new technology in areas with high scope for learning by 
doing.  How this is to be done is not clear, although Gillman does suggest that 
New Zealand should not ignore existing areas of comparative advantage such 
as agriculture. 
 
Historically, developing on the job skills may have been particularly important.  
Successful farmers without certified knowledge of agriculture were not lacking in 
skills.  New Zealand may have lacked certification as much as skills.  This in 
itself is problematic in a more dynamic economy, where certification can play an 




Comments on recent New Zealand achievement levels give a mixed 
impression.  Essentially, New Zealand’s past levels of investment in education 
may have lagged behind higher income countries, but present investment levels 
suggest that New Zealand’s relative position is improving, compared both with 
its past and with other OECD countries. 
 
Haworth (1998) assessed human resource changes since the 1990 Crocombe, 
Enright and Porter (1990) report.  Key points in his assessment were:  
 
·  New Zealand’s education participation rates have been broadly positive.  
Total industry trainee numbers are less positive but at least exceeded the 
1988 peak again by 1997. 
·  For many small firms, upskilling has not been the norm over the 90s. 
·  Weaknesses in the management and structure of New Zealand 
businesses, together with macroeconomic instability have blocked the 
transformation of New Zealand’s human resources. 
·  It is management’s responsibility to take the initiative for further 
improvements. 
 
Cross-country comparisons provide some indications, although inevitably, they 
are likely to be affected by differing definitions and other difficulties.  The OECD 
(1998) reports that New Zealand had 41% of the working age population with 
only early secondary education, compared to an OECD average of 40% and   75 
14% in the USA.
65  However, it notes that New Zealand has substantially 
increased the proportion of the relevant population in tertiary education, now 
exceeding the OECD average, although with relatively fewer tertiary students in 
universities.  The OECD (1998c) reports that 11% of New Zealand 25-64 year-
olds had university level attainments versus 13% for the OECD as a whole.  
New Zealand’s expected years of tertiary education at age 17 of 3.0 exceeds 
the OECD average of 2.3.  
 
Wagner (1998a) observed that New Zealand still has a very low proportion of 
the 25 year plus population currently in tertiary education.  However, the OECD 
(1998c) indicates that New Zealand has a relatively high proportion of those 
aged 25-64 participating in continuing education and training (46%), for a 
relatively high mean number of hours per year (204). This area is likely to be of 
increasing importance.   
 
In a preliminary analysis, indicative of the relative importance of tertiary 
education, Williams, Andrews, Nana and Rose (1999) estimate overall 
estimated flows into the stock of human capital over 1992 to 1998. Their 
estimates suggest a total 2.25% increment, of which new tertiary graduates 
contributed 1.25%, migrants supplied 0.5%, new entrants to the labour force 1% 
and exits -0.5%. Current demographics imply that the stock of human capital 
will stop growing next century with slow population growth.  Raising the skills of 
existing workforce members will accordingly be more critical. 
 
Achievements against various international benchmarks provide another 
indicator of skill levels.  The International Adult Literacy Survey examines 
performance in a number of countries, using carefully administered standard 
tests of skills with prose, documents and quantitative material.  New Zealand 
rated highly in mean prose skills, but in quantitative and document skills, only 
Ireland and Poland showed achievement levels statistically significantly below 
New Zealand in 1996 (Walker, Udy and Pole 1998).  They also comment that 
poorer literacy skills are concentrated amongst Maori, Pacific Islanders and 
other ethnic minorities.  The results also show that New Zealand outcomes do 
not differ greatly from the outcomes of Australia, the USA and UK, all countries 
with higher income levels. 
 
In schooling, Kovacs (1998) has noted that New Zealand’s early secondary 
school standards lag in several areas, where New Zealand has relatively high 
proportions of pupils failing to attain IEA standards: 
 
·  15% of 14 year-olds fail to meet reading standards (compared with less 
than 5% in Finland).  Mean scores are high, however.  
                                            
65   Maani (1999) notes that from 1996 census data, only 34% of working age males and 35% of 
females now have no school or better qualifications, down from 50% and 54% in 1986.   
New Zealand’s upper secondary school graduation rate (93%) now appears to exceed that 
of the OECD as a whole (85%).   76 
·  20% of 13 year-olds fail to meet maths standards, leaving New Zealand 8
th  
lowest of 25 countries and well below top achieving countries 
·  17% of 13 year-olds failed to meet science standards, again 8
th lowest of 
25 countries. 
 
Campbell-Hunt and Corbett (1996) provide another perspective.  They quote a 
1994 Australian Manufacturing Council study as finding that the availability of 
skills is a very significant barrier to improvement for New Zealand firms 
compared to Australian or international firms. 
 
These statistics and comments are hardly fully representative of New Zealand’s 
educational outcomes.  Nevertheless, they do suggest New Zealand has 
historically lagged in human capital development compared with top OECD 
performers, but has improved investment and attainment in human capital since 
the 1980s.  New Zealand’s achievement levels on a number of key indicators 
are not greatly different from those of significantly higher income countries such 
as the USA or Australia in some instances, again suggesting a weak 
relationship between education levels and economic performance.  
 
It is reasonable to expect that if there is a pay-off from higher investment in 
human capital, it would be reflected in performance only with some delay, given 
the time required for individuals to reach higher earnings levels after 
participating in education.  The earlier comments suggesting some uncertainty 
about the precise link between education and growth or output are worth 
reiterating. 
 
Human Capital Policy Framework 
New Zealand comment on the policy framework generally seems more positive.  
Haworth, as noted, suggests that the main initiative now lies with the private 
sector.  Williams, Andrews, Nana and Rose (1999) suggest that New Zealand 
had an initial period of subsidised and inefficient human capital investment, 
which entrenched many workers into low skill, low wage returns, followed by a 
period of scrapping human capital, as some skills were no longer needed after 
reforms occurred.  However, wider reform has made human capital more 
responsive and flexible to meet the needs of firms, while individuals faced with 
more of the costs of their investment are likely to make better decisions.  The 
OECD (1999) appears to endorse the broad direction of education, while 
warning that the benefits of improving skill levels will only be realised over the 
long term and that substantial improvements in New Zealand’s “low skill” 
position will be needed to match productivity improvements elsewhere. 
 
Given the uncertainty about the linkages between outcomes and human capital 
investment, it is probably appropriate to be cautious in suggesting that there are 
obvious policy implications from this review.  Eliasson (1994) in an OECD 
sponsored study of OECD wide human capital issues may highlight areas for 
possible human capital development that might be relevant to New Zealand. In 
terms Eliasson’s recommendations for OECD countries, New Zealand has   77 
increased incentives to make it worthwhile for individuals to invest in education, 
relies more on student effort and funding than before, removed barriers to 
labour market flexibility and emphasised fostering basic skills in schools.   
However, like its OECD counterparts, New Zealand may have more to do in 
encouraging continued upgrading of skills, developing education markets to 
foster innovation in education and addressing the needs of the part of the 




A number of analysts have attempted to estimate the returns to education.   
Recent New Zealand examples include Maani (1999) and Winkelmann (1998). 
They suggest significant, positive private and social returns to most forms of 
education justify continuing investment, even if returns to bachelors’ degrees 
may be reducing as graduate numbers increase. For instance, Maani calculates 
real, private, after tax returns using an internal rate of return methodology.  She 
shows returns on private investment in most forms of education, mostly over 
5%, are generally well in excess of the real after tax returns to capital calculated 
by Lawrence and Diewert (1999) for physical capital (mostly under 5%) over 
1981 to 1996. 
 
These sorts of results do suggest that income levels are likely to rise as a result 
of additional investment in education and thus should be reflected in reported 
growth rates.  However, as Temple (1999) points out, microeconomic evidence 
about the returns to education are harder to ascertain at the macroeconomic 
level in cross-country studies.  Maani’s results are also suggestive of 
diminishing returns.   
 
It is also less clear from microeconomic studies that investment in education 
would boost growth rates per se in any way, apart from the one-off boost to 
income levels that might be anticipated from investment under a neo-classical 
growth model extended to include human capital as a factor.  There are also 
many questions over where any investment should be made, several of which 
are highlighted below. 
 
Critical Types of Human Capital Investment 
It is plausible that some types of human capital may be more important for 
growth than others.  Crocombe, Enright and Porter (1991) identified science, 
technology and engineering skills as particularly important. The basis for this 
view was not well established, though, especially given that no particular market 
premium is evident for such skills, and that other researchers such as 
Campbell-Hunt and Corbett find a need for improvements in skills more 
                                            
66   The last group appears to include those who do not succeed in school, for a variety of 
reasons, including low effort on the part of students, parental disinterest and family 
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generally, including management skills.  Entrepreneurship skills
67 too are often 
suggested to be particularly important for growth, as in for example OECD 
(1998a).  Grant (1998), of McKinsey and Company’s New Zealand office, for 
instance, suggests that returns to exceptionally talented CEO’s and knowledge 
workers are climbing rapidly as knowledge increasingly becomes the basis of 
wealth creation.  As might be expected, he argues that New Zealand business 
in particular is insufficiently knowledge based, generating both strategic 
management and human capital issues. 
 
It seems likely, that however, market conditions, regulatory environments and 
cultural conditions may be as important to generating this form of human capital 
as explicit investment in human capital.  The OECD (1998a) certainly does not 
identify specific human capital development programs as a means of fostering 
entrepreneurship.  The character traits of entrepreneurs identified by the OECD 
are not necessarily matters which are readily amenable to influence through 
human capital programs either: foresight, imagination, intelligence, 
decisiveness, alertness and aptitude for organisation. 
 
It is also possible that achieving basic skill levels may be significant for 
economic performance.  The OECD (1998d), for instance, suggests basic 
literacy is linked to employment prospects and may assist social cohesiveness, 
with greater participation in community activities by more literate individuals. 
 
Conclusions about Human Capital 
There seems little doubt amongst New Zealand analysts concerned with 
economic performance that weak human capital accumulation has held 
New Zealand’s growth back.  Analysts more concerned with educational issues 
are less certain about these links. Their views seem more consistent with 
international thinking, although there is still agreement that skill acquisition is 
important, even if the role of education is less certain.   
 
With Government having a heavy involvement in human capital investment 
through education, it would certainly be desirable to have a firmer view about 
how to ensure the resources invested are made most productive. Naive 
investment in just any human capital development could risk generating poor 
returns. Yet again, more research is called for.  There are some grounds to 
think that much investment by individuals at tertiary level, with their current 
exposure to costs within the present policy framework, could be expected to 
generate positive results for output levels and measured growth.  The impact on 
underlying growth rates is less certain. 
 
There seems to be a consensus that firms should increase their commitment to 
skill development for their workforces. At least in the New Zealand growth 
literature, less is said about how this might be achieved.  Interestingly, current 
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training by adults seems to be at a reasonable level by OECD standards but 
more investigation of the mechanisms by which skill development contributes to 
growth could be useful.  
 
5.8   New Zealand Values and Attitudes 
According to Temple (1999), there is some distrust of the explanations of 
growth performance afforded by social capital.  One might add values and 
attitudes.  The area has not been deeply researched in New Zealand although 
there are frequent references to these issues - sufficient to suggest that values 
and attitudes may have a substantial impact on New Zealand’s performance.  
This is not implausible.  What is really being studied here is the contribution of 
individuals to growth, as opposed to firms, sectors or macroeconomic factors. 
 
The difficulty in handling these issues may stem from the diversity of factors 
affecting individuals, the need (ideally) to interact with other disciplines such as 
sociology and psychology, and lack of ready availability of consistent New 
Zealand data.  The lack of data shows up in cross-country studies, which tend 
to resort to religion, language and race to measure cultural impacts on growth.  
These show up as significant, for instance in Sala-i-Martin (1997).  What they 
proxy for is another matter altogether.  While religion and race may conceivably 
feature in New Zealand, the main areas that appear in New Zealand 
commentary appear to be equality, ambition and selfishness/trust. These are 
discussed below, pointing to the conclusion that there may well be some impact 




Analysts have suggested that New Zealand has been strongly egalitarian and 
that this has impacted upon growth through several mechanisms. 
 
Casson (1996), in the only New Zealand work located which centres on growth 
and culture, recognises New Zealand’s egalitarian ethos and speculates that it 
may have been rooted in Victorian religiosity and “social” migration 
experiments.  The ethos was translated into a welfare state, which he considers 
was developed incompetently, for instance in allowing overmanning. 
 
Franklin (1985) contended that an egalitarian ethos was central to answering 
what had gone wrong with the New Zealand pre-reform economy. New Zealand 
had built up a system that trapped resources in protected markets, ostensibly to 
protect living standards, but in reality becoming ossified, creating a new 
hierarchy of privilege for those receiving the protection.  Acceptance of change 
would entail acceptance of inequalities.   
 
Similar views about the need for change were expressed by others at the time, 
although the implications for equality were not drawn out as explicitly as by 
Franklin.   80 
 
Franklin’s view contrasts with the view from recent cross-country regression 
analysis, reported as a consensus by Temple (1999), that high inequality tends 
to be negative for growth, based on analysis including developing countries.  A 
New Zealand example is Bandyopadhyay (1997). However, this might be one 
area where conclusions influenced by developing countries are not particularly 
relevant, given that New Zealand’s income distribution is not extreme.  Perotti
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(1996) for, example, in a study encompassing a large number of countries at 
different development stages suggests that the underlying mechanisms which 
account for a negative linkage between income inequality and growth include: 
 
·  a wide income distribution generates sociopolitical instability 
·  fertility decreases and human capital investment increases as equality 
increases 
·  Less strongly, investment in human capital increases as equality increases 
because those investing in human capital are less affected by borrowing 
constraints 
 
There seems little reason to see New Zealand being significantly affected by 
sociopolitical instability.  In New Zealand in the period of most interest since the 
early 1980’s, fertility has tended to decrease and human capital investment to 
increase as equality has decreased.  Borrowing constraints also seem unlikely 
to have been a significant constraint on educational participation, given 
New Zealand levels of state support for education.   
 
Despite an increase in inequality since 1986 (Statistics New Zealand 1999), 
New Zealand’s income shares of over 25% of income in the hands of the 
wealthiest 10% and less than 9% in the hands of the poorest 20% are not 
extreme compared globally
69 or with English speaking countries.  More research 
might however be worth undertaking on whether there are links. 
 
Hazledine (1999) argues that developing inequality is negative for growth.  He 
notes that happiness in a range of countries seems to relate to relative income 
levels within a country and that a sense of fairness has been well established to 
influence behaviour in laboratory experiments, both in New Zealand and 
abroad.  He argues that without a widespread sense of fairness in dealings, 
cooperation levels in society will be lower, adversely affecting the productivity of 
that society, including in New Zealand now, with increased inequality.   
 
At least in New Zealand economic growth analysis, this would appear to be a 
minority concern.  Research outside economics may however imply that 
concerns about equality could affect behaviour.   For instance, focus groups of 
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New Zealanders in their mid 20s to mid 30s run by The New Colenso (1999) in 
July and August 1998 suggested that: 
 
·  “a fundamental egalitarian streak still pervades our psyche”  
·  “ We don’t like the classist society or the widening gap between the ‘haves’ 
and ‘have-nots’ in this country” 
 
This research also suggests that “We’re quick to shoot down tall poppies.   
We’re highly critical of people who stand out in the crowd, people who are 
obviously doing well.”  This is probably unhelpful to entrepreneurship.  The 
OECD (1998a) suggests that entrepreneurship benefits from supportive cultural 
conditions, including trust and tolerance of business failure. 
 
Overall, though, the mechanisms through which equality might affect growth are 




New Zealanders appear to say they want growth.  According to a 1998 survey 
of 1201 people, 69% of respondents said New Zealand should aim for 
economic growth over the next 10 years (Dominion 1998, reporting on 
New Zealand Study of Values). 
 
The analysts reviewed for this paper, however, cast doubt on whether this aim 
is reflected in personal efforts.  Crocombe, Enright and Porter (1991) suggested 
the kiwi lifestyle was entrenched, involving a “relaxed approach to life with 
plenty of time for family and recreational pursuits”, a low status for business and 
a search for security. They suggest that “the prevailing goals of individuals do 
not appear to lend themselves well to the upgrading of the economy”. It is 
difficult to judge how solid the research basis is for these comments though. 
 
Campbell-Hunt and Corbett (1996) suggest society at large receives a “bare 
pass mark” for work attitudes.  They cite a 1995 BERL survey of Managers as 
showing people with the “right” work attitudes are only available half the time.  
This material appears to receive backing from an earlier New Zealand Study of 
Values survey (Gold and Webster 1990). They reported that aspects of work 
related to productivity, such as accomplishment and a chance to use initiative, 
rank below matters of social pleasure, personal reward, security and enjoyment.  
They conclude “There is more in this to suggest a nation committed to comfort 
and enjoyment than to competition.” 
 
There also appears to be a tendency for entrepreneurial businesses grown to a 
medium or large size by New Zealand standards to be sold or move offshore, 
perhaps suggesting limits on ambition.  Examples include Glaxo in the 1950s
70 
and FERNZ recently. Businesses with a dominant offshore operational 
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component may not be easily managed from New Zealand. New Zealand 
entrepreneurs often seem to prefer to sell medium sized businesses in 
preference to attempting to develop them into global marketing operations.   
Indeed that is precisely the advice given by a lawyer, Lowndes (1999) recently: 
 
“The most realistic focus for most New Zealand IT&T companies is still 
based on Nasdaq, and is to sell a shareholding to, or be bought out by, a 
Nasdaq listed company.”  
 
Of course, this may reflect a realistic appraisal of the New Zealand business 
environment, not just entrepreneurial values. 
 
Casson (1996) argues that ambitious entrepreneurs, as also in the arts, science 
and academic life, face limits on the extent to which they can “make things 
happen” here.  New Zealand, like any poorly endowed and isolated country, 
faces the problem that its most able people tend to leave.  There is a constant 
risk of brain drain for New Zealand businesses.   
 
Some prominent examples seem to support this proposition.  Major 
entrepreneurs who have moved their residence or investment focus largely 
offshore include Sir Ron Brierley, Sir Michael Fay, David Richwhite, and Alan 
Gibb, even while retaining some New Zealand links. 
 
The reverse flow of migrants appears to have brought a few high profile 
migrants but there are strong indications the flow is now motivated by lifestyle 
more than business considerations.  Casson suggested that migrants are 
attracted by New Zealand’s environmentally friendly image and lifestyle 
preferences, with less interest in expanding their businesses.  Other migrants 
have been attracted to the public sector.  Box (1999) also cites survey evidence 
showing Asian migrants are attracted more by lifestyle than business 
opportunities. 
 
However, there is evidence suggesting a more positive view, such as a move 
towards more self-employment over the 1990’s. The New Colenso focus groups 
suggested that the most popular and respected role models are business 
people such as Dick Hubbard, Karroll Brent–Edmondson and Stephen Tindall, 
who look to the social as well as the economic bottom line.  Moreover, the 
participants in the focus groups suggest that New Zealanders are doers, hard 
workers and embrace change, conclusions somewhat at odds with the views 
reported by economic analysts.  A minority was reported to be ambitious and 
optimistic, generally those earning higher incomes and in the professions.   
 
It is quite possible that an active capable, small minority with entrepreneurial 
attitudes could make a disproportionate contribution to New Zealand’s growth 
performance. 
 
Even if New Zealanders do have limited ambition, one remaining question is 
whether this is important to the economy.  The issue appears to be little   83 
discussed, but interesting perspectives have been provided in New Zealand 
research on farming.  Ward and Doak (1998) cite research suggesting that the 
single characteristic, which separates high income earners from average 
earners, is the ability to make decisions early, set dates for implementation and 
carry the plan out.  They cite further research suggesting that successful 
farmers have motivation and determination to maximise profit, not just achieve a 
comfortable standard of living and that observations suggest this is the case in 
other sectors too.  This is not conclusive but is at least suggestive of the 
importance of ambition.  Separating ambition from ability may be somewhat 
difficult in these sorts of results though. 
 
Overall, this material can not be said to be more than suggestive.  It is not 
calibrated with cross-country comparisons, may well be affected by the timing of 
the surveys, does not go into details about other potentially important variables 
such as attitudes to risk, and does not represent a comprehensive survey. 
However the material is sufficient to suggest that limited ambitions may have a 
substantial effect on New Zealand’s past economic growth and prospects.   
More research on these issues would seem to be well justified, if it could build a 
more comprehensive picture and indicate whether there is scope for small 
changes in attitudes to have significant affects on growth or welfare outcomes.  
The task is unlikely to be easy. 
 
Trust and Selfishness 
Hazledine (1998) suggests these have made a major contribution to New 
Zealand’s poor economic performance.  The reforms since 1985 have promoted 
selfishness, based on models that assume such behaviour and institutions 
based on the assumption, which reinforce it.  Costs of doing business are 
higher, as more transaction workers and managers are needed to monitor 
performance in the face of diminished trust and increased selfishness – overall, 
a diminution of social capital.  A selfish reduction in willingness to pay taxes and 
unwillingness to bear the costs of providing jobs to the otherwise unemployed 
has increased unemployment, crime and social problems. 
 
There may well be merit in the theory underlying Hazledine’s analysis.  North 
(1993) argues that extreme selfishness is unhelpful for growth. It appears that 
selfishness has increased in New Zealand society, both prior to the reforms, 
according to Franklin (1985) and after, according to The New Colenso (1999). 
Trust is increasingly accepted as an important element of successful 
economies, as suggested in Frey (1997) or OECD (1998a). Casson (1996) 
argues that a concern for privacy and high level of distrust are important 
elements in Anglo-Saxon societies, such as New Zealand, but bring costs in the 
form of increased supervision costs, difficulty in fostering teamwork and a resort 
to law. Levels of trust appear lower in New Zealand responses to comparable 
surveys than in Australia, the United States, the United Kingdom or Sweden 
(Gold and Webster 1990).  Campbell-Hunt and Corbett (1996) report lower 
levels of trust in firms following passage of the Employment Contracts Act in 
1991.    84 
 
However, no other New Zealand economic analysts appear to have advanced 
similar arguments to those of Hazledine.  Scobie (1998) suggests there is a lack 
of evidence for Hazledine’s arguments.  His assessment would appear 
reasonable, at least about the extent of the influence of diminished trust. While 
diminished trust may well have had some effect on economic performance, it 
seems unlikely to have been a principal contributor to moderating New 
Zealand’s growth rate.   Over decades, total factor productivity has tended to 
hover around 1% growth per annum, despite the suggested increasing distrust. 
Other mechanisms and influences in macroeconomic policy, isolation and factor 
accumulation seem likely to be larger influences on growth, in the light of 
international analysis and models.  
 
As pointed out earlier, Hazledine uses an undoubted increase in transaction 
workers in New Zealand to support his argument.  This however is widely 
paralleled overseas and may be argued, as in North (1993), to be an essential 
part of the process of restructuring institutions to realise the increasing returns 
attributes of new technologies, the underlying determinant of increased 
productivity. Those developing theories about trust, such as Frey (1997) appear 
to be very cautious about how far they are prepared to push their findings.  
 
Institutions 
Institutions are closely related to values and attitudes.  Many New Zealand 
institutions derive from our cultural heritage as well as from geographic, 
economic and other conditions.  For instance, features commonly seen as 
important to growth include secure property rights, the rule of law, an effective 
Court system and market based economic mechanisms.  New Zealand has 
these, with their form mainly reflecting a British heritage and current Anglo-
Saxon thinking, as for instance in its common law legal system.  There is little 
reason to think that these institutions in any substantial way impede 
New Zealand’s growth performance.  They are, after all, broadly similar to the 
sorts of institutions found in other countries with a British type heritage, such as 
the United States, Australia, the UK and Canada. These include countries with 
a variable long-term growth performance but which nevertheless has led to 
higher income levels than in New Zealand with reasonable, recent growth 
performance by OECD standards. 
 
Bayliss (1994) suggests that New Zealand’s economic management suffers 
from following the intellectual direction of other English speaking countries, 
through poor savings and investment ratios, poor education and budget and 
balance of payments deficits.  These however cannot really be seen as 
institutions.  On balance, speaking English probably provides major advantages 
for international economic integration. 
 
There is little sign in New Zealand growth analysis that specific, formal New 
Zealand institutions have been seen as a brake upon growth.  It is still possible 
that there are exceptions.  There is, for example, uncertainty over some   85 
property rights as Treaty issues are resolved.  This has lead to delays in at least 
some instances, including for example in the implementation of new radio 
communications technologies for mobile telephony.  However, resolving the 
underlying issues may well be sufficiently important that not resolving them 
would have even more adverse effects on growth. 
 
Conclusions About Values and Attitudes 
Perhaps inevitably, this section of the paper is somewhat inconclusive.  There is 
strong theory and clear international evidence that cultural factors can be 
important for growth.  There are reasons to think that these factors exert some 
influence in New Zealand, at least in the areas of equality, ambition and 
selfishness and trust.  Maori and minority values are also likely to be important, 
although not discussed in their own right, given a lack of literature.
71  
 
New Zealand research is not well developed and in most instances, there is 
little to indicate whether these factors play a significantly different role in 
New  Zealand from elsewhere.  Perhaps the area of greatest prima facie 
concern is New Zealand ambitions.  There are definite reasons to expect that 
emigration and lifestyle considerations will limit ambitions.  There is sufficient 
material to suggest the worth of more research in this area, which might 
establish the mechanisms and the extent to which they might be amenable to 
policy interventions. 
 
Finally, it must be acknowledged that if further research did confirm 
New  Zealanders have limited ambition, the policy implications would not 
necessarily be clear. Some New Zealanders might validly opt for lower income 
lifestyles.  Questions might be raised about myopia, how well informed the 
people concerned were and whether they were imposing an externality, by 
choosing to rely on the continuing earnings of other New Zealanders making a 
greater contribution to living standards. 
 
5.9   Capital Growth 
This section of the paper recapitulates the dominant views emerging from 
theoretical and empirical analysis about the contribution of capital to growth, 
starting with international contributions about the investment/growth relationship 
and moving to New Zealand conclusions.  It then considers foreign investment 
and savings more specifically. 
 
That there is a relationship between capital accumulation and growth is one of 
the stronger conclusions of the growth literature.  The neo-classical model sees 
                                            
71   One reference which illustrates the potential importance of this issue is Winkelmann (1998a) 
which suggests that there is a large difference in Maori and non-Maori unemployment rates 
unexplained by variables such as age, qualifications, family and parental situation. Variables 
such as health, discrimination and culture are suggested as possible explanations, with 
Maori culture possibly reducing labour force attachment by putting lower weight on material 
success and stressing communal values over individual ones.    86 
capital investment as a proximate cause of growth, albeit with diminishing 
returns. Much endogenous growth literature takes a similar view, as does much 
empirical literature.   
 
However, while there may be a relationship, causality and endogeneity are 
issues. Barro (1997) argues that while the ratio of investment to GDP in cross-
country regressions may appear to be important, reverse causality is likely to be 
the explanation.  It may simply be that there is a positive relationship from 
growth opportunities to investment, especially in open economies. Evidence 
includes that the coefficient on contemporaneous investment tends to be high 
while that for investment, lagged 5 years, tends to be insignificant.
72 Barro finds 
variables that promote growth, such as human capital, the rule of law, 
Government consumption and inflation also tend to explain investment, if it is 
substituted for growth as a dependent variable.  
 
Temple (1999) suggests that investment may simply be endogenous and that 
returns to physical capital are almost certainly diminishing. However, there may 
well be externalities to investment.  Equipment investment may be particularly 
important, based on the findings of De Long and Summers (1991), possibly 
through providing opportunities for learning by doing or positive externalities. 
 
On the other hand, in much empirical research, the investment/growth 
relationship seems to pass both tough and slightly less tough “extreme bounds” 
regression tests, according to Levine and Renelt (1992), Sala-I-Martin (1997) 
and Ghosh and Phillips (1998).  The latter also suggest that the investment to 
GDP ratio is a particularly strong discriminator between high and low growth 
countries, with those investing more than 22% of GDP growing faster.  
 
For those analysts who do accept that investment may contribute to growth, a 
variety of mechanisms seem to be suggested.  Plain capital accumulation is the 
implicit mechanism in much of the material.  Illustrative alternative mechanisms 
include innovations being embodied in new capital or less plausibly, capital 
being an important direct component of the R&D process (Howitt and Aghion 
1998). 
 
New Zealand Analysis of Investment 
New Zealand analysts seem to have been more convinced that investment is a 
contributor to growth.  Hall (1998) suggests that sustainable high fixed business 
investment will be needed to achieve higher growth. Bayliss (1994) considers 
saving and investment should be raised and that the volume and quality of 
investment in plant and machinery is particularly important. Easton (1991) 
considers that growth has been constrained by capital investment.  Smith and 
Grimes (1991) suggest that New Zealand has had capital accumulation below 
the average of other developed countries.  Crocombe, Enright and Porter 
                                            
72   Carnahan and Camilleri (1995) find exactly this result for New Zealand in examining the 
savings/ growth relationship.   87 
(1991) saw New Zealand, as they wrote, as facing an acute shortage of savings 
due to fiscal deficits, the effects of subsidies and social welfare incentives on 
saving, which in turn produced a shortage of capital, and high real interest 
rates, crowding out private investment. 
 
Philpott (1994) offers a more sophisticated view, in which capital accumulation 
may help to drive productivity growth, along with innovation, rising demand and 
output and adequate profits.  He sees rising demand as raising investment, 
including through technology embodied in new capital goods. Vandersyp (1993) 
also points to investment and growth being promoted by demand growth and 
profits, suggesting that lower company taxes might spur investment and growth. 
 
Not all New Zealand analysts suggest investment is directly important to growth 
though.  Investment did not rate directly as one of the “three key drivers of 
future economic growth” for Treasury (1996), although it has an indirect role.  
These were seen as enhancing skills, fostering a more innovative business 
sector and creating an environment that limits biases against saving. Nor was 
investment a priority within Hazledine’s  (1998) more radical diagnosis. 
 
Investment Quantity 
As it happens, New Zealand’s recent ratio of gross fixed capital formation to 
GDP appears to be close to the OECD average and has tended to be so 
historically.  In the September 1998 quarter, not atypical of recent trends 
according to PC Infos data, New Zealand’s ratio was 21.1% compared with 
21.9% across the OECD.  The OECD average is pulled up by Japan and Korea 
In fact, in 1996, New Zealand rated fifth highest of 29 countries for the ratio of 
gross fixed capital formation to GDP and sixth highest for plant and machinery 
investment (OECD 1998).  There thus does not appear to be a clear-cut case 
for portraying New Zealand’s current investment levels as inadequate, 
especially given that they appear to have held up through the 1998 recession.  
One cautionary note is that New Zealand might well be expected to invest more 
as a relatively capital short country, at least by OECD standards. 
 
Investment Quality 
One point of near unanimity amongst New Zealand analysts is that while 
New  Zealand has undertaken a reasonable amount of investment, it has 
suffered from poor investment quality in the past. Easton (1997) in discussing 
the pre-reform period cites past inefficient investment design and 
implementation; the 1980’s major energy projects; freezing works hygiene 
investments; and breaking in of marginal land, as all contributing to 
New  Zealand having an extremely high capital/labour ratio. However, 
investment quality is seen as having improved since the period of major 
reforms, including by Easton (1997) and Grant (1998). 
 
Grant suggests that the position may not have improved sufficiently yet.  He 
suggests that market disciplines and reporting standards require improvement   88 
and that equity market standards in particular are poor. From 1988 to 1998, 
New Zealand stock market returns at just over 1% per annum considerably 
under-performed the US, London and Australian markets.   
 
Lawrence and Diewert (1999), in a more robust analysis, show the real, post tax 
return for the entire New Zealand market sector averaged 3.7% per annum over 
the 27 years to 1998.  They suggest that this is consistent with a range of 3% to 
5% for most Western countries.  The simple average is notably higher in the last 
seven years at 6.1%, perhaps supporting the view that investment quality has 
improved.  Lower tax rates, lower inflation and removal of price controls may all 
have played a role, but even allowing for these, returns seem to have improved 
substantially.  Although they find that capital productivity declined at a trend rate 
of 1.13% per annum from 1972 to 1998, New Zealand was not unusual in this. 
 
Foreign Investment 
Foreign investment, both ways, provides another window on capital as a 
contributor to New Zealand’s growth.  Some significant points emerge: 
 
·  Foreign investment is substantial.  Based on the balance of payments 
approach used by Statistics New Zealand (1998a) to measure 
New Zealand’s net international investment position, at 31 March 1998, 
the gross stock of foreign investment in New Zealand was $124,691 
million. Of this, $64,503 million was foreign direct investment.  New 
Zealand foreign direct investment abroad amounted to $10,440 million. 
The net position was that New Zealand owed $89,505 million (90.8% of 
GDP) abroad. 
·  While there are exceptions, the predominant view tends to be that foreign 
investment in New Zealand is positive for GDP, certainly for the level and 
probably for the growth rate (Enderwick 1998). 
·  The ratio of net foreign debt to GDP is still growing, while already at the 
highest level in the OECD  (OECD 1999).  While providing capital, this 
exposes New Zealand to the risk of a change of overseas sentiment and is 
clearly now attracting more concern, despite risk sharing through 
denomination of much debt in New Zealand dollars and much 
indebtedness taking an equity form.  This raises issues about the 
sustainability of growth.
73  It may even raise questions about an impact on 
growth itself.
74   
·  The high flow of factor returns abroad
75 following from New Zealand’s 
indebtedness underlines the lacklustre growth of GNI per capita.   
                                            
73  Collins, Nadal De Simone and Hargreaves however argue that adjustment in the face of a 
large current account deficit, the major contributor to New Zealand’s large stock of foreign 
liabilities, need not be disruptive to the economy. 
74  Fry (1997) for instance suggests that Government debt ratios over about 50% of GDP in 
developing countries become associated with significantly lower growth rates and that 
private sectors may also borrow more abroad than is socially optimal. 
75   These have risen from 2-3% of GDP in the early 1970s to around 8% now, according to the 
OECD (1999).   89 
·  At a more micro level, Cartwright (1998), writing from a broadly neutral 
perspective, raises further questions about the character of foreign direct 
investment in New Zealand.  He argues that: 
 
·  Experience shows New Zealand is not an attractive site for 
manufacturing by foreign multinational enterprises (MNE’s) 
·  Foreign MNE’s tend to focus strongly on local market servicing, and 
therefore do not contribute forms of intellectual capital that would 
enhance New Zealand’s capabilities for exporting and operating 
beyond New Zealand.
76 
·  Export focused MNE’s are focused strongly in resource based areas 
such as food, beverages and wood fibre, enhancing the productivity 
of New Zealand resources and labour, but allowing New Zealand to 
capture little or none of the value that is generated offshore. 
·  Foreign MNE’s are also engaging in small New Zealand firms with 
distinctive capabilities, especially in electronics, software, IT and 
sophisticated engineering.  Sometimes this results in local capability 
being nurtured and productivity increasing, using the MNE’s 
overseas channels.  On other occasions, purchases provide New 
Zealand market based compensation, but result in the immediate 
source of international competitiveness being lost to New Zealand. 
·  In contrast, resource based New Zealand owned firms have achieved 
international presence and competitiveness, but no non-resource 
based firms have so far achieved a substantial presence in world 
markets, despite some having sources of international 
competitiveness. 
 
·  Akoorie (1998) notes some significant points in examining the regional 
implications of foreign direct investment.  It appears to be driven by 
proximity to urban centres, transport infrastructure, financial and 
commercial infrastructure and skills, resulting in it being heavily 
concentrated in Auckland and Wellington.   
 
The picture from this New Zealand analysis fits with a view expressed by the 
IMF (1998), that traditional features that make a country desirable for foreign 
investment include its investment regime, market size, natural resources, 
market growth prospects and labour market conditions.  In the IMF’s view, these 
are now supplemented with specific advantages or “created assets” such as 
communications infrastructure, marketing networks, attitudes to wealth creation 
and business culture, innovative capacity, the stock of information and 
intellectual property protection. 
 
The main conclusion from reviewing this material is that foreign investment has 
and is likely to provide a substantial contribution to New Zealand’s capital 
accumulation, with a net positive contribution to GDP. Much, though not all, of 
                                            
76   This appears to overlook the contribution that MNE’s might make to New Zealand’s 
competitiveness through enhancing the services infrastructure.   90 
the value of that contribution to the economy is, however, likely to be captured 
by foreign investors in a limited range of services, resources and regions. These 
observations underline the importance of the original opportunities for 
investment in encouraging capital accumulation.  
 
The presence of foreign investment per se is not a particularly important issue 
for growth in most New Zealand analysis, probably as a result of the now 





Savings often do not seem to be treated separately from investment in empirical 
growth literature, as in Barro (1997) and Temple (1999), perhaps reflecting the 
neoclassical closed economy assumption that savings flows equal investment 
flows.  However, it is plain that savings might have an independent impact upon 
growth, particularly in New Zealand, with open capital markets. 
 
There appear to be few clear policy conclusions though about the relationship of 
growth and savings.  It seems theoretically likely that in a fast growing 
economy, saving will be boosted. Even if all households have no net lifetime 
savings, younger cohorts in a growing economy will save more in theory, 
according to Eisner (1995).  Consumers may also face costs in adjusting 
spending patterns and habits are likely to persist, according to Carnahan and 
Camilleri (1995). However, this does not indicate what savings will do for 
growth.  
 
In theory in an open economy, capital needs could be met entirely through 
foreign savings, and currently are to a substantial extent in New Zealand.  The 
IMF (1995) has suggested there are limits to foreign capital inflows to supply 
savings, seen largely as the counterpart to a current account deficit. In its view, 
a deficit of 4% to 6% of GDP may be sustainable, especially in a country with 
natural resource based development opportunities. The New Zealand average 
for the decade to 1998 was a more comfortable 3.1% of GDP.
78 
 
Empirical Savings Material 
The IMF (1995) suggests research on the empirical relationship between 
savings and growth is inconclusive, but that positive effects are likely in both 
directions, raising the enticing but unlikely possibility of initiating a virtuous circle 
if savings or growth can be boosted initially in some way.  
 
Carnahan and Camilleri (1995) use Granger causality techniques to investigate 
the relationship between growth and savings in both directions for 8 OECD 
countries, including New Zealand, from 1960 to 1992. They find little evidence 
                                            
77  Hazledine (1998) is an exception, arguing that foreign investors are likely to diminish New 
Zealand’s social capital, thus limiting growth. 
78   The statistic is drawn from Dalziel and Lattimore (1999)   91 
of support for causality from savings to growth.  The data might indicate weak 
causality with a one to two year lag for New Zealand, although the authors 
consider the result should be treated with caution.  Barro (1997) suggests 
similar results really capture simultaneous effects generated by growth. 
 
Most New Zealand authors reviewed seem to be more enthusiastic about the 
potential positive effects of saving on growth, although mostly without in-depth 
treatment.  These include Bayliss (1994), Hall (1998a), Crocombe, Enright and 
Porter (1991), Vandersyp (1993) and Treasury (1996).  Treasury suggested 
then that higher savings could generate higher incomes if wisely invested in 
New Zealand or overseas, implicitly suggesting the mechanism is the simple 
effect of accumulation of savings, with a positive investment return.  As well, 
New Zealand would be less exposed to changes in investor confidence.    
 
A simple savings accumulation mechanism, without any further effects beyond 
generating further investment income, would be relatively slow to build incomes 
at the past rates of return suggested by Lawrence and Diewert, with a return of 
perhaps 5% to 10% pre-tax.
79  However, it may be among the more certain 
means of boosting per capita national income growth.  Savings rates are at 
least capable of being influenced by Government policy action (IMF 1995 and 
Treasury 1996).  Whether the welfare effects of such action make it worthwhile, 
given the inter-temporal consumption trade-offs involved, is a matter for further 
research, as outlined in Treasury (1999). 
 
Conclusions about Capital Growth 
Based on ratios of investment to GDP, New Zealand seems to have been 
investing broadly in line with the OECD average and still doing so.  Whether the 
contribution of capital accumulation to growth is purely a simple accumulation 
effect or there are spillovers, New Zealand has not accumulated capital at a rate 
that suggests high growth should be expected, say on the historic scale of East 
Asian countries.  Much capital investment has been foreign sourced, with 
positive benefits, but a lower net return to New Zealand income levels.  Real 
after tax returns to capital investment, of 3.7% from 1972 to 1998 according to 
Lawrence and Diewert (1999), lie in the range experienced in most Western 
countries.  Improved returns since 1992 are more promising for growth, being 
consistent with improved investment quality in the post reform period. 
 
Savings have not been high, either in the past with large Government deficits or 
more recently with low household savings.  The link from savings to growth is 
not strong, but a simple accumulation effect, with average returns suggests that 
per capita GNI at least would be raised.  Applying income to savings imposes a 
cost of current income foregone, which any policy aimed at increasing welfare 
would need to take into account.  Again, the picture of capital growth presented 
here contains nothing to suggest that New Zealand could have expected to 
generate high-income growth in the post reform period. 
                                            
79   See “Investment Quality” above.   92 
 
5.10  Macroeconomic Policies 
Temple (1999) identifies short run macroeconomic management as one of the 
most controversial areas of empirical work on growth.  The area is generally 
seen to encompass the influences of monetary policy, the budget balance and 
exchange rate policies on growth.  The influences of these policies may be 
reflected variously in endogenous variables such as the rate of inflation, budget 
balance, real rate of interest, real exchange rate and current account deficit, as 
suggested by Anderson and Gruen (1995), in a comprehensive Reserve Bank 
of Australia survey. 
 
Views vary on the importance of these matters for growth. Porter (1998), for 
instance, suggested that although New Zealand has sound stable 
macroeconomic policies, having good macroeconomic policies is not enough – 
because macroeconomic policies do not create wealth.  Firms will not create 
wealth unless the microeconomic foundations of an economy are sound and 
improving.  Pilat (1998) does not include macroeconomic policies as a key 
driver for long-run growth, although most New Zealand analysts, as discussed 
below, see the issues as being critical in understanding New Zealand’s 
performance.  
 
This section of the paper again restates current international thinking on the 
area.  It then reviews New Zealand views on the two issues that seem to have 
attracted most local attention – the impact of inflation and macroeconomic 
policies on growth and the impact of macroeconomic policies on the real 
exchange rate.  A range of other issues including fiscal policy, the current 
account deficit, exchange rate mechanisms, real interest rates, monetary 
targeting will be treated in much less detail, as their impact on growth has 
attracted less attention.  
 
International Views 
Excellent overviews of the influence of macroeconomic policies on growth are 
provided in Fischer (1993), Anderson and Gruen (1995), and Temple (1999).  
 
Fischer sees macroeconomic stability as being conducive to growth. Drawing 
on a World Bank approach, he suggests stability exists when inflation is low and 
predictable; real interest rates are appropriate; fiscal policy is stable and 
sustainable, the real exchange rate is competitive and predictable; and the 
balance of payments position is perceived as viable.  He notes that none of the 
criteria other than inflation are readily quantifiable but that the inflation rate has 
added significance as an indicator of the ability of a Government to manage an 
economy.
80  It thus can be seen as particularly important. The main channels for 
                                            
80   Fry (1998) also suggests that stable macroeconomic policies, including low inflation are often 
associated with higher growth rates, possibly reflecting overall good government 
management.   93 
macroeconomic stability to influence growth are through uncertainty, which can 
impair the price mechanism or reduce investment.  Fischer presents the budget 
surplus as being positively associated with capital accumulation, because of 
reduced crowding out and deficits, like inflation, serving as an indicator that 
Governments are losing control of their actions. 
 
Although endogeneity is acknowledged as a problem, Fischer reaches some 
reasonably clear conclusions, starting with an analytical framework like that of 
Levine and Renelt (1992), discussed in Part 3.  He concludes that growth is 
negatively associated with three variables: inflation, perhaps in a non-linear 
manner; large budget deficits; and distorted foreign exchange markets.   
Causality probably does run from good macroeconomic policy to growth. His 
major conclusions are relatively modest. Low inflation and small deficits are not 
necessary for growth, even over long periods but high inflation is not consistent 
with sustained growth. 
 
Anderson and Gruen (1995) also apply the methods of Levine and Renelt 
(1992), recalling their finding that the relationship between growth and inflation 
is fragile.  Anderson and Gruen find using OECD data that high inflation does 
tend to be associated with lower average growth, but without a high level of 
statistical significance.  Assuming there is a relationship, they suggest that with 
modest effects of inflation on growth, assuming plausible discount rates and 
parameters, there is likely to be a positive pay-off to reducing inflation. 
However, it is likely to require seven or more years to recover the output cost of 
disinflation, using Australian data. 
 
The likelihood that inflation may have a non-linear relationship with growth is 
becoming a consistent theme. Barro (1997) suggests inflation is typically likely 
to reduce growth by 0.3% to 0.4% for a 10 % increase in inflation, but more 
discernibly at rates over 15% per annum.  Sala-I-Martin (1997) suggests 
inflation doesn’t matter much for growth but may be involved in a non-linear 
relationship that he does not enlarge upon.  Ghosh and Phillips (1999), IMF 
staff, examine the issue in detail and suggest using a more plausible, large 
panel data set, that inflation and growth are in fact robustly, negatively related 
using the Levine and Renelt methodology, at all but the very lowest inflation 
rates, below 2% to 3%.  The negative effect tends to grow less than 
proportionally as inflation gets up to higher ranges of 40% to 50% per annum. 
 
All these writers tend to acknowledge that there will be a cost of a specific 
disinflation program, with an output cost typically of at least 2 percentage points 
of GDP to reduce inflation by one percentage point.  Ghosh and Phillips are not 
unusual in suggesting that the cost is usually well worthwhile, except possibly 
for very rapid deflations, such as reducing inflation more than 50% in one year 
at moderate inflation rates. 
 
Interestingly, variability in inflation per se now tends to be seen as less likely to 
be significant, including by those inclined to find inflation itself to be significant 
for growth, such as Barro (1997).   94 
 
On the relationship between the exchange rate and growth, Anderson and 
Gruen (1995) suggest that very little empirical work has been done for industrial 
countries.  There is little to suggest this position has changed since.
81  They 
point to difficulties in identifying any relationship. Equilibrium levels are likely to 
be difficult to identify. Short-run effects are easier to identify than medium-term 
effects and prone to reversal before the medium term is reached.  Amongst 
developing countries, they suggest that it may be possible to exercise medium-
term influence over exchange rates but that efforts to use the exchange rate to 
reduce inflation often have not succeeded, resulting in quite long periods over 
overvaluation. 
 
Temple (1999) suggests the relationships of macroeconomic variables and 
growth are far from clear cut, partly because things tend to go wrong together: 
inflation is accompanied by political instability, exchange rate volatility and so 
on.  Endogeneity and variable selection bedevil regressions. Temple is more 
convinced that output volatility matters for growth, based on data for OECD 
countries. 
 
The impression this literature leaves is one of severe difficulty in proving 
causality conclusively, but that moderately high rates of inflation are likely to be 
negative for growth, even if positive rates below 2% to 3% may not be.  There is 
difficulty in harnessing policy instruments to achieve short run results, but a 
tendency to agreement that macroeconomic instruments can have some 
medium term influence on growth. 
 
New Zealand Views on Inflation 
At the start of the period of major reform, Blyth, Hawke and Smythe (1984) saw 
reduced inflation as important to growth.  There was relatively little discussion of 
mechanisms, but they appeared to see reduced inflation as enhancing 
international competitiveness and possibly providing clearer price signals. Smith 
and Grimes (1990) reflecting earlier international research, saw inflation, 
particularly variable inflation, as likely to have a negative effect on productivity, 
but with a relatively small effect on growth compared to convergence.  
 
Treasury (1996) considered that macroeconomic stability could contribute to 
growth through promoting investment and savings and reducing uncertainty. 
Policy instruments were seen as having uncertain short-term influence and 
being best targeted to achieving medium term results, in consistency with 
apparent current mainstream international thinking. 
 
The Reserve Bank appears to take a strong view on the effects of inflation on 
the economy, perhaps understandably given the legislative framework within 
                                            
81  Aziz (1999) suggests that there is a vast literature on the causes and extent of exchange 
rate volatility, mostly concerning the choice of exchange rate regime.  The concensus of 
international studies on the effects of exchange rate volatility on trade and investment 
appears to be that the effects are small, but may be larger in a specific country.   95 
which it works.  The most detailed view expressed recently is possibly that of 
Bonato (1998). He suggests that the public is averse to inflation and that it 
imposes a variety of static costs and costs on both the level and growth rate of 
GDP.  However, he also notes that the evidence of a negative relationship 
between inflation and economic growth is not very robust, acknowledging that 
some studies suggest that low inflation has little effect on growth while others 
suggest it has. He cites research suggesting that inflation volatility can reduce 
growth slightly even at low inflation rates.  At very low rates of inflation (2%), he 
suggests that there will be benefits of 0.39% of GDP per annum of eliminating 
inflation, based on the interaction of inflation with the tax system, although these 
are not related to growth effects. 
 
Other New Zealand analysts generally seem to have followed conventional 
thinking that inflation in most ranges is negative for growth, including Vandersyp 
(1993) and Hall (1996).  Hall also notes that New Zealand has faced a relatively 
high “sacrifice ratio”
82 of 7.7, from 1986 to 1992, to reduce inflation, suggesting 
that the growth cost of eliminating inflation has been high by international 
standards.  Possible reasons for this high ratio are suggested by Hall for 
consideration include whether disinflation proceeded more slowly than it could 
have; whether labour market flexibility legislation should have been introduced 
faster (Hall 1996); and whether market based disciplines on agents operating in 
non-tradeables sectors are still relatively weak. 
 
Hall’s view of the sacrifice ratio contrasts somewhat with Bonato (1998) who 
reports a ratio of 2.0 currently, although for a later period, perhaps less affected 
by adverse international conditions and restructuring.  Bayliss (1994) however 
suggests there is little evidence that a marginal difference in inflation has much 
effect on growth. 
 
Overall, these views suggest that past relatively high inflation, including at levels 
just above the Reserve Bank’s current target band, probably reduced New 
Zealand’s past growth.  As might be expected, there does not appear to be a 
strong case that variations in rates around the Reserve Bank’s target zone of 
0% to 3% inflation have any significant direct influence on growth, although 
reductions may possibly have positive, static impacts on welfare.  The issue of 
the effect of negative inflation has received no local attention, although it is 
conceivable, given the Lawrence and Diewert (1999) analysis that current rates 
around 0% are in fact significantly negative already, with the probable 
overstatement of inflation by the consumer price index.   
 
The Real Exchange Rate 
While strong views about inflation have been relatively uncommon amongst 
New Zealand analysts, the reverse is true about movements in the real 
exchange rate, with many seeing sharp appreciations in the real exchange rate 
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in the late 1980’s and 1990’s as an important policy failure.  The concern could 
be summarised as that the sharp appreciation in the real exchange rate in both 
periods has been attributable to a considerable degree to the combination of a 
restrictive monetary policy with a floating exchange rate, damaging the 
profitability of exporting and import substitution.   
 
The real exchange rate
83 calculated by the Reserve Bank is shown in Figure 7.   
 
Easton (1997) is not atypical of those that identify these real exchange rate 
appreciations as being harmful for growth.  He argues that floating the 
exchange rate in 1984 led to massive real exchange rate overshooting.  The 
situation was exacerbated by financial liberalisation that made monetary 
conditions difficult to read and allowed international portfolio diversification, with 
overseas investors moving into New Zealand under boom conditions.  Largely 
because of this, his assessment is that macroeconomic reforms swamped the 
productivity gains from microeconomic reforms during the period.  In Easton’s 
view, export growth remains important to economic growth.  In support of this 
view, he cites findings from the Research Project on Economic Planning that 
sustainable 3% growth per annum requires 4.5% export growth per annum. 
 
Bayliss (1994) also thought that good microeconomic policies were swamped 
by poor macroeconomic policies in the period from 1984 to 1991. There were 
risks that exporters’ concerns about exchange rate fluctuations could lead to a 
further repetition.  In his view, the loose fiscal policies in the exit from the 1984 
price and wage freeze saw the real exchange rate surge.  After monetary policy 
was tightened, too late, in 1985, there was too much reliance on it to control 
inflation, producing a real exchange rate appreciation.  This damaged farming, 
manufacturing, forestry and tourism development and led, according to Bayliss, 
to many businesses dismantling their export divisions from 1985 to 1990. 
 
Lattimore (1998) argues that there is a close association between the real 
exchange rate and growth.  From 1985 to 1989, liberalising the capital account 
ahead of the current account mirrored overseas experience in leading to a 
sharp real exchange rate appreciation. Because of long lags of up to three 
years in primary export production, the export response to an appreciation is 
slow.  Lattimore sees a similar phenomenon having been in place from 1993 to 
1997, driven by monetary policy.  
 
Lattimore cites with approval the work of Joumard and Reisen (1992), OECD 
analysts, as showing the hysteresis effects of lagged increases in export 
production.  They argue that with financial opening preceding stabilisation and 
labour market reform, with a floating currency, monetary tightening was bound 
to lead to Dornbusch style overshooting of the exchange rate.  Moreover, once 
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measure of foreign consumer price indexes. The foreign indexes are those of Australia, 
Germany, Japan, the UK and USA.   97 
overshooting is corrected, exports and growth were unlikely to pick up 
immediately, given: 
 
·  Binding constraints, delivery lags, implicit and forward contracts and 
regressive expectations 
·  Fixed, sunk market entry costs such as adapting to foreign requirements 
·  Uncertainty created by structural reform 
 
The Joumard and Reisen study, while successfully highlighting the hysteresis 
issue, does not provide conclusive evidence.  They attach a dummy variable to 
a manufactured export volume equation for the period 1980 to 1990 and 
suggest that it shows hysteresis effects from the first quarter of 1986 onwards.  
This seems rather early, considering that a sustained peak in the real exchange 
rate above the level experienced up to 1982 did not arise until 1987. 
 
Philpott (1991 and 1998) has also argued that the real exchange rate should be 
managed through monetary and fiscal policy so as to generate tradables 
growth. 
 
Other related arguments include:  
 
·  Hazledine (1998): the 1990’s cyclical recovery was flattened by foreign 
exchange and interest rate policies amongst other matters  
·  The OECD (1998): containing inflation in the early 1990’s led to an 
overvalued New Zealand dollar  
·  Hall (1996): achieving higher long-term economic growth depends upon 
maintaining an internationally competitive real exchange rate.  
 
There is clearly an extremely strong current of opinion amongst New Zealand 
analysts that, somehow, the management of the policy settings can have a 
strong influence on the real exchange rate and growth, especially in tradables. 
 
The view is not universal, but analysts taking a more sanguine view about the 
real exchange rate are a distinct minority.  Aziz (1999), from an overseas 
perspective, agrees that the large amplitude and long length of the exchange 
rate appreciation in the mid-1990’s does stand out compared to other countries.  
Hedging options are likely to reduce the costs of exchange rate volatility, 
although he concedes that opportunities to hedge the risk of a lengthy 
exchange rate cycle may simply not exist.  He also suggests that reducing 
exchange rate risk may generate more volatility in other variables; that there is 
little evidence that the strictness of New Zealand’s inflation targeting regime 
played a role in the real exchange rate cycle; that strictness was in any event 
required to establish policy credibility; and that reduced household savings 
contributed to the exchange appreciation. 
 
Reserve Bank analysis has focused quite closely on the issue over 1998 and 
1999.  Brash (1999) notes that the real exchange rate appreciated 29% from 
early 1993 to April 1997, based on the analysis behind Figure 7.  Brash   98 
acknowledges that this resulted from a strong domestic economy generating 
inflationary pressure, requiring the Reserve Bank to lean against the inflation 
through monetary policy and consequently raising real interest rates and the 
exchange rate.  He then argues that New Zealand’s recent real exchange rate 
appreciation is not exceptional by the standards of 1990’s appreciations 
experienced by our trading partners, a point also made by Brook, Collins and 
Smith (1998).  
 
Finally, Brash argues that alternative policy options that might have been 
considered to avoid a real exchange rate appreciation, would have been either 
ineffective or precluded.  These were: 
 
·  Resisting inflation less vigorously: the real exchange rate would still rise 
through the mechanism of rising prices and inflationary expectations would 
become deeply embedded and more costly to remove 
·  Minimising situations where strong monetary tightening is required, 
through the Reserve Bank being quicker to spot excess demand 18 to 24 
months ahead: Here, it is impossible to forecast perfectly. 
·  More limited fiscal expansion: The stimulatory fiscal policy of 1996 and 
1997 must bear some of the blame for the strong appreciation of the 
exchange rate.  A full recognition of the monetary policy implications of 
changes in fiscal policy is necessary to avoid large future appreciations. 
·  Driving a wedge between the exchange rate and interest rates, say, 
through capital controls: this is likely to generate inefficiencies 
·  Pegging to a larger currency: No one, large currency makes an obvious 
choice given the diversity of New Zealand’s trade. Other countries have 
large real exchange rate fluctuations too. 
 
Conclusions on Real Exchange Rate  
The weight of arguments that macroeconomic policies have impacted on growth 
via the real exchange rate strongly suggests that the impact of macroeconomic 
policies on the real exchange rate requires further consideration.  While some of 
the views cited have relatively little analytical underpinning, there are some that 
can not be lightly dismissed, including those of Joumard and Reisen (1992) and 
Lattimore (1998).  Additional reasons for considering this issue seriously 
include: 
 
·  The evidence cited by Brash (1999) on the 1990’s exchange rate 
appreciation can be interpreted to suggest that New Zealand’s 
appreciation is not out of line with our trading partners.  It also suggests 
that New Zealand has had one of the more sustained and higher 
appreciations, as noted by Aziz (1999).  Moreover, it followed another 
sharp appreciation the previous decade. 
·  New Zealand’s exports have grown relatively slowly, continuing to 
decrease as a share of world exports.  There are certainly other causal 
factors, but this is consistent with a difficult export environment.   99 
·  Gawith and Grimmond (1998) suggest, possibly reflecting direct exporter 
contacts, that cyclical exchange rate volatility is a problem for New 
Zealand exporters, and that the volatility is greater in New Zealand than in 
Australia. 
·  In other Reserve Bank research, Orr, Scott and White (1998) highlight that 
there is probably a trade-off between short run output volatility and 
inflation volatility.  Drew and Orr (1999) conclude, after comparing New 
Zealand volatility to other OECD countries, that cross country rankings are 
consistent with the notion that less variability in inflation can be associated 
with more instrument and output growth variability. Reflecting research 
such as this, New Zealand’s monetary policy framework has been altered 
to allow a wider target of 0% to 3% inflation, as inflationary expectations 
have declined and the policy horizon lengthened to a medium term focus, 
18 to 24 months ahead.  Implicitly, earlier, narrower monetary targets may 
have had higher output costs. 
·  It is possible that exchange rate volatility is a more serious problem for 
New  Zealand’s relatively small enterprises than might be the case 
overseas.  The OECD (1998b) in a non-New Zealand study, suggests that 
short term cyclical policies to suppress inflation may have quite debilitating 
long term effects on the international competitiveness of small and 
medium sized enterprises – firms of 500 employees or below.  They are 
seen to be more sensitive to interest and foreign exchange rate changes 
than large firms and “tend to bear the brunt of anti-inflation policy”.  
·  It would appear that there is a tendency for relatively expansionary fiscal 
policy to be associated with a need for tighter monetary policy, in both 
1985 to 1988, while a relatively large fiscal deficit remained and 1996/7 as 
argued by Brash (1999). 
 
This brief analysis would require further development before strong policy 
conclusions could be drawn. Tentatively, however, it suggests: 
 
·  Hysteresis effects in tradables, with long lags in adjusting production, are 
extremely plausible, especially after two sharp real exchange rate peaks 
and troughs, notwithstanding that traders are likely to be learning to cope 
with these experiences. 
·  It is quite possible that import dependent activity has also been adversely 
affected by real exchange rate volatility experienced, even though it has 
not been the subject of analysis. 
·  It has been appropriate to reinforce the Reserve Bank’s medium term 
focus through widening its target band to 0% to 3%; extending its focus to 
18 to 24 months ahead; and targeting the indirect effects of interest rates 
and the exchange rate on inflation, rather than the direct effects of the 
exchange rate.  
·  Any effort put into ensuring the effective implementation of monetary 
policy, for instance through accurate forecasting, could be well worthwhile.   100 
·  The Government should be extremely cautious about exacerbating 
adverse effects on the tradables sectors through fiscal expansion or 
contraction. 
 
Other Macroeconomic Issues 
By comparison with real exchange rate issues, the effects on growth of most 
remaining macroeconomic policy issues appear relatively settled.  Savings and 
investment issues may be an exception but have been discussed elsewhere in 
this paper.  The size of the current account deficit has similarly been treated 
elsewhere.  The effects of the size of Government expenditure and taxation are 
also treated below as a topic in their own right. 
 
Remaining macroeconomic issues that might be seen as being of some 
significance include: 
 
·  The budget balance 
·  Exchange rate mechanisms 
·  Real interest levels 
·  Inflation targeting mechanisms 
·  Demand management 
·  Unemployment 
 
These have however, for better of worse, generally attracted much less 
attention in the literature reviewed for this paper than inflation and the effects of 
macroeconomic policy on the real exchange rate.  This may reflect a 
combination of the way economists have come to think about issues and recent 
experiences, both in New Zealand and overseas. 
 
The budget balance may have attracted less attention in New Zealand simply 
through having turned positive for a prolonged period, but it is interesting that 
analysts such as Sala-I-Martin (1987), Barro (1987) and Temple (1999) give it 
little attention.  Bayliss (1994) suggested that Treasury has overemphasised its 
importance, in not acknowledging that a lack of growth was in fact the primary 
cause of deficits.  The budget balance is however seen as significant in New 
Zealand material in its effects on monetary policy as already discussed and 
acknowledged to be significant in the international material. 
  
Exchange rate mechanisms, whether currency unions, fixed, floating or some 
intermediate option similarly seem to have attracted little attention in literature 
specifically concerned with growth, possibly through not being seen as current 
issues.  The institution of a float in 1985 has attracted some New Zealand 
attention, but more in the context of real exchange rate effects.  Coleman 
(1999) has suggested the issues surrounding monetary integration justify more 
discussion. 
 
Real interest levels do not appear to feature much in growth literature.  Fischer 
(1993) somewhat unhelpfully suggests they should be “appropriate” but offers   101 
little analysis.  Vandersyp (1993) suggests that realistic interest rates of say 6% 
real should be maintained, but is one of few analysts to venture a view.   
Possibly the lack of analysis here may reflect a combination of views. Interest 
rates may be endogenous, investment may not be especially sensitive to 
interest rate levels, or perhaps New Zealand’s real interest rates have not 
varied greatly from international levels once country risk and monetary policy 
effects have been taken into account.   
 
Discussion of inflation targeting mechanisms, a major concern of monetary 
policy also seems to have featured little in the growth literature, although 
arguably, monetary policy implementation mechanisms may have been of some 
significance, as argued above. 
 
Demand management has attracted a little attention locally. Dalziel (1999) and 
Philpott (1994) for example have suggested a positive role for short-term 
demand management.  Treasury (1996), however, probably reflects the 
predominant view in suggesting that macroeconomic stability is best achieved 
through concentration on a limited number of medium-term objectives, rather 
than attempting to use monetary and fiscal policy to manage the economy 
actively.   
 
Unemployment might also be seen as a macroeconomic variable.  However, 
there is relatively little discussion of its contribution to growth either in 
New Zealand or abroad.  Both Hazledine (1998) and Lawrence and Diewert 
(1999) offer analysis in which unemployment might be construed as making a 
contribution to growth, respectively treating the unemployed as transaction 
workers and calculating “social total factor productivity”.
84 However, these are 
isolated analyses. 
 
5.11  Government Expenditure, Welfare Support and Taxation  
The influence of the Government activities in this heading on growth is subject 
to less agreement than most of the factors considered in Part 5 of this paper.  
The issues have received considerable attention internationally, although 
relatively little New Zealand scrutiny.  Two particularly useful New Zealand 
papers are, however, readily available on the effects of expenditure and 
taxation on growth. As a result, this discussion will be less detailed.  These are 
Poot (1999) on the impact of Government on long run growth and Lockwood 
(1998) on the relationship between taxes and growth.  Both are at least 
implicitly concerned with effects on per capita income growth. 
 
This section of the paper considers first expenditure and then taxation effects 
on growth. 
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Government Expenditure 
Poot (1999) notes various mechanisms through which Governments may 
influence growth rates: 
 
·  Regulatory means 
·  Provision of pure public goods such as defence and public infrastructure 
·  Budgetary influences on monetary conditions 
·  Changing market prices through taxes and duties 
·  Ownership of institutions providing external benefits to society or having 
natural monopoly positions 
·  Regulatory instruments to protect property rights or respond to 
externalities 
·  Income redistribution
85 
 
It is widely acknowledged that different types of Government expenditure will 
have different effects.  Expenditure adding to physical or human capital, 
contributing to institutions supporting growth or addressing a growth enhancing 
externality should be more positive for growth than pure consumption. Poot 
examines separately general Government consumption, education and health, 
defence and public infrastructure, reflecting both these expected differences 
and the relative abundance of studies since 1983.  
 
General Consumption 
A variety of findings on general consumption spending is apparent in the 
international literature reviewed for this paper.  For instance, Barro (1997) finds 
negative effects, attributed to non-productive Government expenditure and 
related taxation effects, illustrating the link between the two. Levine and Renelt 
(1992) find higher Government consumption to be negative for growth but once 
again, the relationship is not robust.  Temple (1999) regards the studies done 
as inconclusive, with the nature of the expenditure being particularly important. 
 
Poot summarises the results of 36 international studies on general 
consumption. He finds the following weaknesses to be common: 
 
·  No distinction is made between consumption and transfers or other 
expenditure types, even though different growth impacts might be 
expected, with investments like R&D activity being more positive than pure 
consumption. 
·  The usual problems of endogeneity in cross-country studies are present. 
Although some studies use other techniques, such as time series analysis 
or pooled data, there is no more evidence of consensus of the effects of 
expenditure from these studies than the cross-section studies. 
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·  No account is taken of the Government budget constraint, which can 




The varying quality of these studies is illustrated by one of them, Gwartney, 
Lawson and Holcombe (1998).  The theory put forward appears reasonable. 
They plausibly suggest that some Government expenditure on items such as 
protecting property rights, contract enforcement, providing stable monetary 
policy, infrastructure and education will be beneficial for growth.  At higher 
levels of expenditure, diminishing returns set in, affecting workforce 
participation, changing incentives to invest and take risks and causing crowding 
out effects. They suggest Government organisations are less dynamic than 
private institutions, taking longer to weed out mistakes and bad practices and 
being slower to develop and implement new technologies.  The various 
empirical studies provided in support of the theory purport to show that growth 
is restricted once expenditure exceeds about 20% of GDP.  However, the study 
loses credibility in suggesting that reduced Government expenditure in the 
1990’s in New Zealand and Ireland boosted growth, ignoring the alternate, 
plausible possibility of economic growth outpacing Government growth and 
many other plausible influences on growth in each case. 
 
On balance, 7 of the 36 studies cited by Poot find positive effects of 
Government expenditure on growth, including one New Zealand study, Bairam 
(1988), which suggests increased expenditure over 1960 to 1980 accelerated 
business investment and eventually economic growth.  The study is somewhat 
dated and could be questioned on the grounds of whether long run effects of 
Government expenditure were effectively captured.  
 
Twelve of the other general consumption studies find significantly negative 
effects and seventeen are inconclusive. 
 
Other Studies 
Most of 12 further studies find expenditure on education to be positive for 
growth, while the only one reported on health finds it to be negative. A slight 
majority of 22 studies find defence expenditure is likely to have a negative effect 
rather than show either a positive or inconclusive result. 
 
Poot also examines 34 studies on investment in public infrastructure, such as 
roads, dams, communications, water and sewerage.  Three-quarters find a 
positive impact, with one survey of this work suggesting a range of output 
elasticities to Government infrastructure expenditure of between 0.03 and 0.39.   
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Government expenditure.  This could involve parameter calibration methods for micro-
foundations based models, more detailed assessment of previous studies, natural 
experiments and more use of instrumental variables based techniques in regressions.   104 
An Australian study, Otto and Voss (1994), which Poot does not cite, and might 
be seen as reflecting an environment closer to that of New Zealand, suggests 
an elasticity of 0.20 with a wide 95% confidence interval of 0.04 to 0.036. Public 
capital includes state owned enterprise and general Government investment. 
They find that private investment returns are higher, that public and private 
capital are complementary, and marginal increases in public capital produce 
modest returns on private capital. This is hardly surprising.  There is little in 
these studies though, to suggest that there is anything special about 
Government doing the investment, as opposed to suitably structured private 
operators.  It must be acknowledged that difficult regulatory issues might arise 




One area not covered by Poot is the effect of welfare spending on growth.   
New  Zealand literature once again seems to be scarce, with relatively little 
attention given to the issue in New Zealand material concerned specifically with 
growth.  The main area of comment relates to the effects of welfare transfers on 
incentives of beneficiaries. Hazledine (1998) for example comments that leisure 
is too attractive. Crocombe, Enright and Porter (1991) suggest that 
unemployment benefits should be replaced with training benefits and that a 
meaningful gap should be opened between unemployment benefits and wages, 
to promote labour force participation. Treasury (1996) was also more explicitly 
concerned with this aspect than with other potential effects, such as reduced 
savings incentives or low incomes limiting the acquisition of skills by children 
within low income households.  
 
The OECD (1999), in examining New Zealand’s economic strategy, notes the 
impacts of benefit reform since the early 1990’s and of the Employment 
Contracts Act in stimulating labour force participation and job growth. It 
suggests that reforms could go further to reduce the generosity of benefits, to 
increase the incentives to take work and avoid poverty traps.  These analyses 
are not in depth and implicitly seem to be more about output levels effects 
rather than growth rate effects. 
 
In a different approach, Stephens (1996) argues that poor growth in the 1970s 
and 1980s can not be blamed on high levels and growth of Government 
expenditure and welfare spending.  He argues that New Zealand welfare 
spending was at less than OECD average rates
87, especially after netting out 
the tax component of welfare payments to allow valid comparisons.  Dalziel 
(1999) makes the same point with respect to New Zealand’s taxation to GDP 
ratio. These seem reasonable arguments. Dalziel also argues that redistribution 
can build social capital, which builds economic productivity.  Public expenditure 
can build a sense of participation and belonging in the community.  Greater 
                                            
87   Gwartney, Lawson and Holcombe suggest New Zealand’s Government expenditure as a 
proportion of GDP was 28.9% in 1960 and 39.1% in 1996, compared with OECD averages 
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social cohesion and civic responsibility can build productivity to everyone’s 
benefit.  These arguments also seem plausible, but the magnitudes of these 
effects are difficult to assess, and marginal benefits are likely to be smaller than 
average benefits. 
 
More substantial work has been carried out by Maloney (1997) and (1998) on 
the effect of benefit reform and the Employment Contracts Act, focusing on the 
direct effects of benefit changes rather than the effect of overall benefit 
expenditure.  According to Maloney, the 1991 cuts in benefits reduced the 
unemployment benefit and domestic purposes benefit by 9.5%; provided for a 
26 week stand-down on voluntarily leaving employment; an increase in the age 
of eligibility from 16 to 18 years and a tightened work test.  An increase in the 
age of eligibility for superannuation from 60 to 65 was phased in from 1992.  
Levels of superannuation benefits have also been reduced.  Maloney 
considered from time series analysis that benefit reforms strongly increased 
both employment and hours of work, explaining between 29.6% and 37.6% of 
the 4% rise in the proportion of the workforce in employment from 1991 to 1996.  
The Employment Contracts Act in contrast explained much less. 
 
International Research on Welfare Expenditure 
Implicitly considering welfare expenditure, Temple (1999) suggests that there is 
not much evidence that fiscal policy is closely related to inequality, even though 
the latter could affect growth.  Atkinson (1995) examines the question directly, 
reviewing cross-country evidence and theoretical mechanisms.  Nine studies of 
various groups of OECD countries find that a 5% decline in welfare spending 
would raise the annual growth rate variously between 1% per annum and –0.9% 
per annum.  There is no agreement in the results.  A number of possible 
reasons are suggested by Atkinson: 
 
·  The underlying relationships are more complex than the studies might be 
expected to elicit, with difficulties in determining causality. For instance, 
where welfare effects relate to output levels, poor economic performance 
may lead to high welfare spending rather than vice versa.  Alternately, 
successful countries may be able to “afford” a more generous system or 
industrialisation may lead to both higher living standards and the need for 
social insurance in a more complex society.  
·  It is unclear whether a reduction in welfare expenditure would affect the 
level of GDP, without a permanent change in the growth rate, or affect the 
growth rate. 
·  Measurement of the welfare state size varies between countries.  Some 
countries’ benefits are paid gross of income tax, as in New Zealand, while 
others are paid on a net basis, affecting overall expenditure to GDP ratios. 
·  The nature of apparent high spending on welfare may vary, depending 
upon whether it is influenced by say, high benefit rates or simply low rates 
but a high proportion of the population being eligible.  Incentives to 
participate in work will vary.   106 
·  The form of welfare programs will have definite effects, for instance 
depending on differences in the conditions attached to benefit receipt. 
·  Welfare systems may also affect savings behaviour, not just work 
participation incentives.  How savings affect growth is in turn complex, 
depending for example on whether private pension  funds have a short 
term view of investment, making them unsupportive of R&D.  
 
In summary, while welfare spending almost certainly affects long term growth 
through effects on workforce participation, savings and skill acquisition in 
beneficiary households, neither in New Zealand nor internationally does it 
appear that strong aggregate evidence is available.  This probably implies a 
need for further research, possibly at a micro level, more than it implies that the 
effects of welfare spending programs on growth should be discounted.  Indeed 
more narrowly focused studies, such as that of Maloney may produce more 
credible results, although still leaving questions about economy wide effects. 
Maloney’s work at least suggests a one-off boost to output levels may follow 
from reduced spending in some circumstances, possibly through the effects on 
work participation incentives.  However, it says little about static welfare effects 
or possible wider effects. 
 
Taxation 
At the outset, it must be noted that expenditure and taxation are related, 
although not necessarily closely, given that mechanisms such as borrowing or 
even inflation taxes
88 might separate the two.  Making a complete distinction 
between their effects on growth in empirical work could prove difficult, although 
the underlying theoretical mechanisms are often suggested to be different. 
 
Lockwood (1998) provides a good summary of the effects of taxes on growth.  
Major points only will be mentioned here.  The paper deals with micro level and 
aggregate channels through which taxes may affect growth.  As with 
expenditure, the structure of taxes can be important for growth effects, not just 
aggregate taxation.  Effects may be on output levels or growth rates and many 
effects may be on welfare without affecting growth. 
 
Taxes may affect growth through both the efficiency with which productive 
inputs are used and the rate at which resources are accumulated, in turn 
affecting growth through labour supply and productivity, investment amounts 
and productivity and saving.  Lockwood reports the following effects, all small 
but negative on growth: 
 
·  The overall economy wide labour supply elasticity to a change in after tax 
wages is likely to be small and positive, mainly based on US and UK data.  
Women’s response is more elastic than that of men. 
·  Labour productivity may be affected by effects on incentives to invest in 
skill acquisition, with taxes probably discouraging the investment.  They 
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may also reduce the amount of capital New Zealanders have to work with 
and make New Zealand less attractive to high productivity migrants. 
·  Taxes may discourage investment through raising the cost of capital.  The 
effect is probably small, although empirical studies suggest international 
financial capital flows may be highly sensitive to regimes and rates in 
particular. 
·  Uneven taxes across sectors may shift activity to less productive activities. 
·  Taxes may reduce savings through reducing returns, but these effects 
may be small and muted as, say, households reduce saving in response to 
increased corporate saving. 
 
Macroeconomic studies show mixed results.  Poot (1999) reports that of nine 
studies, none found higher taxes to be associated with higher economic growth. 
Rather, higher taxes tend to reduce growth, especially where the studies focus 
on marginal rather than average tax rates.  However, tax variables do not show 
up as robustly linked to growth in Levine and Renelt (1992).  The problems that 
affect most cross-country analysis show up here too, including model 
specification, causality, differences in tax structure and measuring tax to GDP 
ratios on a comparable basis (Lockwood 1998)
89.   
 
Lockwood finds studies aggregating micro level evidence more convincing, 
supporting the suggestion of a small, positive effect of tax reductions on growth, 
at the level of tax to GDP applying in New Zealand.
90  He notes that even with 
small growth effects, the case for reducing taxes may be strengthened by static 
welfare effects.  There are certainly good prior reasons to expect marginal and 
average effects and individual program effects on growth to differ substantially, 
lending support to a microeconomic approach.  The importance of considering 
the effects of different types of taxes is heightened in analysis such as that of 
Vandersyp (1993), who contends that that investment is affected by tax rates 
and depreciation rates and that research tends to show investment is affected 
by profitability and cashflows. 
 
There has of course been a wider debate in New Zealand. Scully (1996) in 
particular purports to show that the growth maximising level of taxation is 
around 20%, but the results have been found to be not robust, including by 
Sieper (1997) and Chapple (1997), for both model specification and data 
reasons. 
 
                                            
89  Slemrod (1995) identifies a further set of factors complicating studies of the effects of high 
income tax regimes:  
·  the use of nontax, nonbudgetary instruments  
·  the availability of safety valves within tax and transfer systems to mitigate disincentive costs, 
such as work tests or lack of a capital gains tax 
·  the availability of responses such as tax avoidance or evasion 
·  adjustments in institutions to reflect the absence or presence of taxes, such as higher levels 
of private giving in the US, which has no European style church taxes. 
 
90 The study investigated the effect of a tax reduction of around 2% of GDP.   108 
Conclusions about Expenditure and Taxation 
New Zealand is not exceptional by OECD standards in its current ratios of tax 
and expenditure to GDP – in fact, these appear to be in the lower half of the 
OECD. There is little clear evidence about the effects of Government 
expenditure and tax activity at present levels being responsible for New 
Zealand’s moderate growth performance. 
 
Empirical studies tend to suggest that lower tax levels compared to current New 
Zealand levels would be beneficial for achieving higher GDP levels, but without 
strong suggestions that growth rates would improve markedly.  The results are 
more uncertain for expenditure studies and, as might be expected, are highly 
dependent on the nature of the expenditure.  The effects of welfare 
expenditures, like other expenditures, are also not clear-cut in empirical studies, 
again depending on the nature of the institutional structures. 
 
Theoretical arguments do tend to suggest that reducing expenditure and tax 
slightly from present levels could be beneficial for growth, but such conclusions 
must be viewed as weak.   
 
5.12  Innovation 
The importance of innovation for growth is almost universally recognised, 
including in overseas writings, as already discussed.  The position is similar in 
New Zealand writings.  Crocombe, Enright and Porter (1991) for instance go so 
far as to suggest that  
 
“...in assessing any Government policy that affects the economy, we must ask: 
Does this policy provide the incentives, pressures and/or opportunities for our 
firms to innovate and upgrade? If the answer is no, the policy is unlikely to 
contribute to long-run prosperity.” 
 
Treasury (1996) also identifies fostering a more innovative business sector as a 
key issue for growth.  None of the New Zealand material reviewed for this paper 
suggests otherwise. 
 
The literature on innovation is vast. A few broadly supported findings from the 
international literature relevant for assessing the New Zealand position include: 
 
·  There are high private average returns to R&D, with even higher social 
returns because of spillovers.  However, in small, open economies, some 
spillovers may flow out abroad.  Any case for Government support may 
depend more upon spillovers in areas such as developing skills through 
related educational activities and developing the capacity to absorb 
knowledge from abroad. (eg Griliches 1995). 
·  Local R&D is not the only source of innovation – strong flows of 
technology and information among people, enterprises and institutions are 
the key to the innovation process (OECD (1997), Stoneman (1995)).   109 
·  Much innovation occurs through trade in producers’ goods ie capital 
equipment (Patel and Pavitt 1995) 
·  Innovation processes are time consuming.  Using the common three 
phase analysis of innovation into invention, innovation and diffusion, 
Stoneman suggests the innovation phase may take a mean of 13 years, 
where innovation is defined as the development of ideas into marketable 
products. Diffusion of innovation may typically take from 5 to 50 years, 
from first use to 95% take-up. 
·  Government research institutions may be among the less important 
external sources of innovation for firms, being much less important than 
interactions between firms and those they relate to and technical analysis 
of competitors products (OECD 1997).  They may still be important as a 
source of knowledge. 
·  Much innovative activity is unrecorded, especially in small firms without 
formal R&D (Patel and Pavitt 1995) 
·  National capability in basic research may not be closely directly linked to 
economic performance, although it does contribute through providing 
training, measuring instruments and complementary inputs to other 
industries Mowery ((1995), Salter and Martin (1999)). 
 
The New Zealand Record 
At first sight, viewed using the indicator of R&D spending, the New Zealand 
innovation record does not look good.  If the consensus on the importance of 
innovation for growth is correct, then this may be a significant contributor to 
New Zealand’s moderate growth record. 
 
Crocombe, Enright and Porter (1991) noted that New Zealand spent less than 
1% of GDP on R&D in 1987 compared with the OECD average of 1.58%.  The 
largest proportion of that was Government spending and of that, 53% was spent 
in agriculture, which does not figure in international lists of high tech industries.
91 
Davenport and Campbell-Hunt, in an update on innovation prepared for the 
1998 Porter visit, suggest that by 1996, New Zealand’s gross expenditure on 
R&D was still only 0.99% of GDP.  A glimmer of light was that the expenditure 
had grown by 2.8% per annum from 1990 to 1995 compared with 0.8% for the 
OECD as a whole, although it is possible that reduced military R&D may 
account in part for the latter result (Bassols 1998). Bassols also notes that R&D 
expenditure as proportion of value added has been falling in the OECD – from 
2.3% in 1985 to 1989 to 2.2% in 1995.   
 
New Zealand also seems to have been reducing the share of expenditure by 
private firms. Davenport and Campbell-Hunt report that New Zealand’s firm 
R&D expenditure as a proportion of sales by firms dropped from 0.45% in 1987 
to just under 0.4% in 1995.  Private expenditure on R&D was down to 27% of 
total New Zealand spending in 1995/6 compared with 39% in 1987. Moreover, 
                                            
91  According to Patel and Pavitt (1995), typically 75% of new technology is concentrated in 
machinery and instruments; electrical; chemicals; and transport.   110 
at the firm level, private sector R&D is heavily concentrated in a few firms.  In 
1995/6, 660 enterprises or 0.4% of the total population of New Zealand firms 
were undertaking R&D, a decrease of 14% since the high of 765 in 1991/2.  The 
top five firms accounted for 18% of firm R&D and the top 70 for 65%.  Only 1 in 
216 firms spends more than $5000 on R&D.  
 
Davenport and Campbell-Hunt do however suggest that the R&D expenditure 
results they report are of an essentially static character and may not do justice 
to changes in New Zealand over the 1990s.  They suggest that New Zealand 
firms may be moving towards best practice and that increased innovation might 
well become more important once a “frontier of competitive best practice” has 
been reached.  Increasing internationalisation may direct more firm attention to 
innovation.  They suggest studies by Corbett in 1994 and 1996 confirm that an 
increasing number of firms are gaining competitive leadership from product 
innovation – up from 13% of manufacturers to 28%.   
 
For manufacturers, where formal R&D might be expected to be more common, 
the picture is confirmed by a large sample, 1997 study, Knuckey, Leung-Wai 
and Meskill (1999), which shows that R&D effort was quite low across 
manufacturing.  Just less than half of sites spend less than 1% of total sales on 
R&D. There is a lack of integration of innovation and technology practices with 
planning processes.  Just over 50% of respondents report at least moderate 
improvements to products or services in the three years prior to the study.  The 
position may be more encouraging in services, where Davenport and Campbell-
Hunt report that services sectors carry out far more R&D than the OECD 
average. 
 
In a more recent New Zealand study examining New Zealand’s experience from 
a national innovation system perspective, utilising a range of indicators, giving 
weight to diffusion as well as R&D, Darroch (1998) in comparing 18 selected 
large and small OECD countries using mainly 1994 data, suggests: 
 
·  New Zealand has the poorest record in its potential to produce knowledge, 
with low expenditure on R&D, low business expenditure on R&D, a low 
number of researchers in the labour force; low direct payments for 
disembodied knowledge from abroad
92 and relative concentration of 
activity in non-high tech activities. 
·  New Zealand rates better in terms of opportunities for ideas to flow into 
New Zealand with a high level of foreign direct investment inflows and 
strong imports of high and medium technology products.
93  
                                            
92  Darroch reports that the ratio of technology payments to business expenditure on R&D in 
New Zealand is disproportionately low at 0.09 compared with 0.64 for 9 small OECD 
members, 0.13 for Australia, 0.19 for G7 countries and 0.39 for the 18 countries in the study.   
93   To the extent that investment is concentrated on acquiring access to resources and domestic 
service provision in New Zealand, it is possible that the foreign investment indicator used, 
based on overseas experience, may give an unduly optimistic view of information flows into 
New Zealand. However, good evidence on the relative concentration of R&D in various 
areas of foreign investment was not available.   111 
·  Average numbers of tertiary qualified individuals by OECD standards offer 
a reasonable level of absorptive capacity for new ideas
94 
·  New Zealand evidence suggests diffusion of technology is occurring at a 
low rate.  (Darroch’s evidence here, though, seems questionable. It is 
based on a low GDP growth rate, to which many factors contribute and 
relatively low proportions of high tech manufactures production and 
exports, which could be influenced more by the past than the present and 
by many other factors than diffusion.) 
 
The relatively pessimistic view above of New Zealand’s innovation performance 
is reflected in other, more general New Zealand studies.  Bayliss (1994) for 
instance suggests that New Zealand has been slow to adapt historically. Blyth, 
Hawke and Smythe (1984) and Treasury (1984) make similar suggestions at a 
more macroeconomic level, in suggesting the economy was unresponsive to 
change.  
 
None of the New Zealand literature cited above attempts to directly relate the 
amount of innovative effort to overall GDP growth.   
 
Assessment of New Zealand Views 
On its face, the New Zealand evidence cited suggests that a poor innovative 
record, by OECD standards, may well have been a contributor to New 
Zealand’s moderate economic performance.  The widespread view, at least 
internationally, that innovation is particularly important to growth lends weight to 
this conclusion. 
 
However, there are some important caveats to this view of a poor performance 
which emerge largely from considering the international literature and have 
been discussed little in the New Zealand material reviewed for this paper: 
 
·  By international standards, New Zealand’s businesses overwhelmingly 
consist of small and medium sized enterprises, whose R&D effort is 
thought to be systematically under-reported.  Small businesses that 
undertake little formal R&D may not have their effort recorded. (Bassols 
1998) 
·  New Zealand does not offer tax concessions for R&D, which is likely to 
mean R&D effort is under-recorded, compared to say Australia.  
·  With New Zealand’s income level lagging behind the highest income 
countries, there may well be some truth in the Davenport and Campbell-
Hunt view that New Zealand first needs to reach the frontier in many areas 
before returns to innovation rise sufficiently to justify more expenditure. 
Japan’s extremely high research intensity came only after its income levels 
had risen (Patel and Pavitt 1995). Diffusion of innovations from abroad is 
therefore likely to be relatively more important to New Zealand.  
                                            
94   A measure based on raw graduate numbers may however be misleading: New Zealand has 
relatively few science and engineering graduates, compared to say Finland or Ireland.   112 
·  New Zealand has clearly been importing much more plant and equipment 
through the 1990’s, which is likely to provide much embodied technology.  
This is shown by import volume statistics for capital equipment except 
transport equipment, which from 1996 to 1998 for example were 60% 
above their 1989 level.
95  Campbell-Hunt and Corbett (1996) report 
research showing that at their date of writing, three-quarters of 
respondents to one survey reported their plant to be at or within 4 years of 
industry best practice, compared with one quarter in 1989.  Fare, 
Grosskopf and Margaritis (1996) who suggest that openness to foreign 
knowledge and technology is the principal engine of TFP growth, reinforce 
the importance of this mechanism. 
·  Some indicators suggest a better performance and need to be taken into 
account to provide a balanced picture.  For instance, New Zealand 
inventiveness, as recorded in per capita resident patent registrations in 
1994 is relatively high by OECD standards, with New Zealand ranking 7
th 
of 21 reported OECD members (OECD1998a).  Patenting of course need 
not imply high success in the wider innovation process.  Mowery (1995) 
points out that access to facilities such as marketing and manufacturing 
may be necessary to capitalise fully on research.  As pointed out earlier in 
this paper, New Zealand seems to have a history of selling inventions, 
rather than exploiting them in international markets from New Zealand. 
·  New Zealand research productivity, measured using patents produced 
from labour inputs, also appears relatively high according to Eaton, 
Gutierrez and Kortum (1998).  Writing about European experience, they 
suggest that the relative lack of research in smaller countries may be 
explained by a relatively low value of research, without a large home 
market for inventions.  Of the 21 countries reported in the article, New 
Zealand has by far the lowest estimated pay-off to research – some 11% 
of the USA figure. This raises the wider issue of comparative advantage in 
R&D.  It is possible that New Zealand’s comparative advantage lies less in 
research than is the case in larger, higher income, higher skill countries 
nearer to large research facility agglomerations and larger markets.  In 
other words, it is possible New Zealand’s apparent poor record in 
innovation may be a rational response to market conditions. 
·  New Zealand’s recent record of innovation may also look slightly better, 
assuming there is a connection between aggregate industry level data and 
innovation, rather than considering only micro level data.  Insights might 
be possible from several sources.  Easton (1997), for instance, points to 
the considerable diversification in New Zealand’s export product mix, and 
export and import product mix over the last three decades.  While New 
Zealand is still heavily dependent upon primary exports, not only has the 
proportion dropped but the primary product mix has changed considerably 
towards forestry, fishing, mining and horticultural products over time.  Hall 
(1996) notes that New Zealand’s rate of structural change, measured by 
comparing absolute changes in employment shares across sectors 
                                            
95   Statistics New Zealand import volume data   113 
increased substantially from 1985 to 1993 compared with 1978 to 1985, 
having been historically low by OECD standards from 1970 to 1987. 
·  New Zealand has historically devoted a high proportion of R&D effort to 
primary products and now appears to be doing so in services.  These 
might well be rational strategies, given New Zealand’s relative lack of 
success in developing manufacturing behind protective barriers. New 
Zealand’s innovation efforts may have been better directed than if viewed 
only from a manufacturing oriented perspective, with which many overseas 
studies appear to be conducted. 
 
Conclusions on Innovation 
There appear to be good reasons to think that New Zealand’s moderate growth 
rate owes something to a relatively low rate of innovation, particularly as 
measured by R&D expenditure levels.  This is especially true when considering 
the limited volume of private sector R&D, which seems likely to have a higher 
pay-off than public sector R&D.  New Zealand’s ability to assimilate overseas 
innovation may also be limited in some respects by its apparent low proportion 
of R&D activity and limited direct expenditure on overseas technology. 
 
The picture may look brighter when account is taken of New Zealand’s apparent 
comparative advantage in primary products, small business orientation, lack of 
fiscal incentives for R&D, geographic factors and ability to import overseas 
technology in embodied form.  New Zealand is probably more innovative than 
the statistics usually used in comparisons suggest. This is not to say that more 
could not be achieved with higher levels of innovation, especially given the 
universal agreement on its importance to growth.  However, it does warn 
against simple policy conclusions about what Governments might do to 
stimulate growth through encouraging innovation.   
 
Policy Responses 
There are many warnings about Government interventions in the literature.   
Mowery (1995), in surveying technology policy practice, accepts that carefully 
structured Government interventions
96 can raise levels of innovation but notes: 
 
·  Public sector activity may displace private activity to some extent 
·  “There is abundant evidence of the limits to the ability of public agencies to 
closely direct and control the development of commercial technologies for 
civilian markets” 
·  Much intervention depends on context. For example, formal instruments of 
R&D support may only become effective after establishment of a more 
R&D intensive industrial base.
97 
                                            
96   These may include tax breaks and grants; public procurement; information provision; 
development of technical standards and competition policies. These all have risks.  
97   Davenport and Campbell-Hunt take a similar line. They suggest that there are dangers in the 
public sector being pressured prematurely into programs of “technology push” in frustration   114 
·  Improving the ability of mature industries to absorb and exploit the 
products of R&D may be more important than nurturing sunrise 
industries.
98 
·  Many policies determining overall economic performance may have little to 
do with technology per se.  It could be that education at all levels and 
regulatory and financial policies conducive to savings and capital formation 
assist both growth and innovation.  
 
To these general warnings might be added one that the environment for 
New Zealand innovation to be successful is complex and not necessarily the 
same as in other countries where most research has been done.  Once again, 
the analysis reported here suggests that comprehensive policies are more likely 
to be successful in promoting growth than any single factor.  The impression 
that is left, though, is that careful promotion of innovation undoubtedly could 
enhance New Zealand’s growth prospects, particularly within the private sector. 
 
5.13  Microeconomic Policies 
The contribution of microeconomic or firm level policies to growth is important.  
Indeed, Porter (1998) picks it out as the most important area for growth.   
Harberger (1998) implicitly takes the same view in arguing that “the great bulk 
of the action associated with the growth process takes place at the level of the 
firm.”  
 
This section of the report briefly summarises international and New Zealand 
views and notes two particular issues which stand out amongst a surprising 
degree of agreement that the area of microeconomic reform has been positive 
for New Zealand.  These are: 
 
·  The scale of the contribution of competition to growth 
·  The level of support which should be offered to particular sectors 
 
A third microeconomic issue briefly discussed is the structure of New Zealand 
business. 
 
The scope of microeconomic reform is enormous.  It includes: 
 
·  The extent of openness of markets to competition, including international 
markets
99 
·  Means and methods of regulation 
·  Governance and ownership of firms 
                                                                                                                                 
at the lack of growth in demand for science, when evidence suggests firms will increasingly 
be providing “market pull” for it, as they reach a further stage of development. 
98   The OECD (1997) points out that high tech applications may be found in primary industries, 
citing Norwegian aquaculture, which demonstrates applications of optics, acoustics, 
electronics and information technologies. 
99   In this context, there is little to distinguish opening local markets to competition and opening 
local markets to overseas competition. In both cases, allowing competition is the key feature.   115 
·  Institutions and arrangements for markets, including specific market 
arrangements  
·  Demand and supply conditions 
 
New Zealand microeconomic reform has involved all these areas, with 
emphasis on: 
 
·  Moving to market based regulatory mechanisms 
·  Opening markets to entry and competition, including entry by private firms 
·  Removing unnecessary regulation and uneven industry assistance 
measures and adjusting regulation to support a competitive environment 
·  Redefining property rights in ways more consistent with competition, as in 
radio spectrum, fishing or forestry cutting rights. 
 
Taking these areas together tends to suggest that if there is a single key feature 
to microeconomic reform, it is opening markets to competition.  
 
It is clearly not possible to do justice to all these areas within one overview 
paper.  However, the task of examining the contribution of microeconomic 
policies to New Zealand’s growth is simplified somewhat by the assessment of 
this area in most recent New Zealand writings noted below, that microeconomic 
reform has tended to be broadly positive for growth or welfare.  This supportive 
view is certainly consistent with international writings, although like all work on 
growth, unanimity is lacking and uncertainty remains.   
 
International Views 
Research tends to support the view that introducing competitive market 
conditions is positive for growth.  Poot (1999a) reports that there is wide support 
for the view that economic liberalisation, amongst other factors, is beneficial for 
growth. As noted in Part 3 of this paper, analysts such as Levine and Renelt 
(1992), Temple (1999), Pilat (1998), and Barro and Sala-I-Martin (1995) confirm 
the importance of trade openness and competition to growth.  The precise 
mechanism is less clear, but may involve a combination of the stimulation of 
competition to improve productive efficiency, improve allocative efficiency, and 
through continuous pressures for innovation. 
 
Trade openness does not necessarily equate to a lack of regulatory barriers to 
trade per se, although it is not unreasonable to expect the two to be related. 
 
Removing market distortions and establishing clear property rights also receive 
wide support. 
 
A useful New Zealand reference to literature on privatisation and competition is 
contained in Boles de Boer and Evans (1996).  They cite arguments that 
Government Departments are less productive than private firms because of the 
political connection to management, multiple objectives and the absence of an 
immutable budget constraint.  Competition and managerial accountability matter   116 
particularly.  Several reviews suggest that privatisation contributes greatly to 
static welfare.  Boles de Boer and Evans themselves suggest that there were 
very large static gains to welfare, especially for consumers, following the 
combination of privatisation, allowing competition and corporatisation in New 
Zealand telecommunications. They also suggest that competition is significant 
to dynamic efficiency, spurring the earlier adoption of new technology.  
 
Economy-wide New Zealand Views of Microeconomic Reform  
New Zealand analysts’ views of microeconomic reform are broadly positive. 
This is not surprising in material such as Evans, Grimes, Wilkinson and Teece 
(1996), Treasury (1996), Silverstone, Bollard and Lattimore (1996) or OECD 
(1998) and (1999), which can be seen as broadly supportive of the view that 
reform has contributed positively to New Zealand’s growth prospects.  The last 
for instance suggests: 
 
“Overall, the economic strategy that has evolved in New Zealand since the mid-
1980’s appears to be on the right course, particularly with its emphasis on 
structural reform and the implementation of transparent policies within a 
medium term context.” 
 
In all cases, though, the positive assessments tend to be qualified.  It may be 
suggested variously that: 
 
·  It is too soon to make a firm assessment, because the fruits of reform are 
likely to be slow to emerge 
·  Policy implementation alone is insufficient to produce growth 
·  Mistakes made in areas such as macroeconomic policies or sequencing 
have limited the pay-off to microeconomic reform 
·  There has been some unevenness in implementing reform or 
inconsistency in implementing policies through time, contributing to 
uncertainty.  The OECD (1999) provides an example of this view. 
 
At the level of industry studies, there is also a positive view of the effect 
competition.  According to Bollard and Pickford (1998), summarising the results 
of a number of selected industry studies, 
 
“Taking the studies overall, one consistent feature is the inefficiency, high prices 
and poor product qualities of regulated industries, and the substantial 
improvements across all dimensions of performance when industry-specific 
controls have been removed and effective competition has emerged (eg, red 
meat, freight distribution, telecommunications.  Other industries subject to 
general controls, including import protection, have also improved their 
performance with deregulation and competition (eg. banking, brewing)”. 
 
In the specific realm of state owned enterprises and privatisation, studies tend 
to suggest strong positive results from reforms.  These include Duncan (1996), 
Boles de Boer and Evans (1996) and Spicer, Emanuel and Powell (1996).     117 
Duncan, for instance concludes that corporatisation raised productivity.  These 
studies however face difficulty in distinguishing the effects of privatisation, 
corporatisation and regulatory changes as well as the effects of important 
environmental changes such as technological change.  There are strong 
reasons to think that all the first three would push the organisations concerned 
to improve productivity and it may be fruitless to attempt to tie down the 
distinction. 
 
At an empirical level, perhaps one of the more telling pieces of information is 
the result for total factor productivity in the utilities sector, as calculated by 
Lawrence and Diewert (1999).  These include transport, electricity, gas and 
water and communications. State owned enterprises historically dominated 
these industries more than most, both in size of operations and levels of 
protection provided to them.  In each case, total factor productivity appears to 
have accelerated since 1987, despite it being a peak year for economic activity 
and despite the goal posts being higher, with productivity in each of these cases 
already rising strongly prior to 1987. 
 
What is more surprising is that economic writers who might be seen as sceptical 
about overall economic management tend to take a broadly positive view of 
microeconomic reform.  Easton (1997), for instance, suggests that:  
 
“The micro reforms probably contributed to the disinflation, in that it made it 
easier to lower prices.  However, few of the benefits – such as productivity 
gains – claimed for the reforms appeared, primarily because the damage 
caused by the macroeconomic mismanagement has swamped any potential 
gains from microeconomic liberalisation”. 
 
Easton also argues however that the gains from protection reform are likely to 
be small based on older international studies, with a maximum gain to GDP or 
welfare of 0.7%. 
 
Bayliss (1994) also suggests that microeconomic policies were basically right, 
while heavily criticising macroeconomic policies. Hazledine (1998) 
acknowledges that there are many anecdotes of productivity improvement, but 
sees an important role for competition, arguing for a strengthened competition 
policy and suggesting that a more moderate pace of reform, with less extreme 
application of market based policies, would have been beneficial.  Hazledine 
and Easton (1997a) share this last view, arguing that commercial models have 
failed in areas where they are incompatible with the culture of the industry. 
Dalziel (1999) argues that that the reform program as a whole was directed 
towards growth.  Like a number of these critics, adverse effects on distributional 
outcomes and on macroeconomic policies are of concern to him.  
 
The Scale of the Contribution of Competition to Growth 
Easton (1997), as noted, has argued that the welfare gains from introducing 
competition are small.  This is not because the welfare gains from competition   118 
in a given industry are necessarily small.  Boles de Boer and Evans (1996), for 
instance, suggest that in telecommunications, the net benefit from price 
reductions by Telecom alone over 1987 to 1993 amounted to $575 million, 
generated by increased consumer surplus and reductions in fixed costs, offset 
by reduced producer surplus. These figures at least suggest the static gains 
might be large.  However, as Temple (1999) notes, microeconomic studies like 
that of Boles de Boer and Evans often miss the economy wide effects.   
 
There are arguments that the wider welfare gains from increased competition 
can be very large.  Winkelmann and Winkelmann (1998), for instance, argue 
that import licensing had the effect of enabling overseas exporters to raise their 
prices for sales to New Zealand substantially, estimating that the total welfare 
loss due to quotas on US exports to New Zealand in 1985 alone was nearly 1% 
of GDP. 
 
Most of these arguments are conducted within an essentially static framework.  
There appears to be an absence of detailed evaluation in New Zealand of the 
effects of allowing competition in its widest sense, including international 
competition, on growth. 
 
It could well be that the most significant impacts of microeconomic reform are in 
fact static.  Moreover, if these show up primarily through a mechanism such as 
increased consumer surplus, through large price reductions on services or 




Easton (1997) in fact says that to argue there are “dynamic effects” from 
reducing protection levels without detailed analysis is merely “hand-waving”.   
He is not alone.  Quiggin (1998), in examining Australian microeconomic reform 
experience, which is similar to that of New Zealand in many respects, also 
argues that expecting benefits from competition in stimulating technical 
efficiency or dynamic efficiency lacks a theoretical foundation. Any benefits, 
which might come from mechanisms which he regards as credible, such as 
reduced x-inefficiency or producer satisficing, are likely to be small in practice.  
In contrast, Parnham (1999), of the Australian Productivity Commission points 
out that Australian productivity has surged and argues that microeconomic 
reform is partly responsible.   
 
From an international innovation perspective, Mowery (1995) suggests that 
there is little strong evidence either way on the effects of competitive structures 
on innovation, perhaps the most plausible mechanism for achieving gains from 
microeconomic reform, but nor is there a strong case for relaxing competition 
                                            
100  Consider an imported consumer good where there is a large price fall and a large increase in 
the quantity imported, so that the value imported remains the same. The value added in 
distribution and the amount of imports may be measured as being the same, but consumer 
surplus, and consequently welfare is likely to have increased considerably.  However, GDP 
need not have budged.   119 
policies.  However, at least allowing more firms to try out different strategies 
should enhance innovation. 
 
The debate is however unlikely to be resolved through purely theoretical 
arguments.  Empirically, Quiggin's views receive little support in New Zealand 
industry studies, such as those included in Pickford and Bollard (1998).   
Providing conclusive empirical evidence on the effects of competition on growth 
in New Zealand is likely to be difficult, given the welter of different influences 
affecting any industry.  
 
To summarise, it seems quite conceivable that there are relatively large static 
welfare gains from introducing competition, which may not be fully reflected in 
GDP.  International growth literature tends to suggest that enhanced 
competition will be positive for growth, and local writings mainly accept the 
proposition.  There appears to be sufficient weight behind this argument that for 
policy purposes, it is probably best accepted.  However, it is still open to debate, 
especially on the size of any contribution, and more research into the extent to 
which competition has stimulated growth would be in order. 
 
The level of support which should be offered to particular sectors  
One consistent theme, which is reasonably classed as a microeconomic issue, 
is whether New Zealand has allocated its resources to the “right” sectors. The 
issue is old, being closely associated with Sutch (1966), who argued that New 
Zealand was concentrating too heavily on producing agricultural products facing 
declining terms of trade.   
 
Related arguments are run by Crocombe, Enright and Porter (1991), that New 
Zealand is too heavily based in resource based products, rather than industries 
which are more knowledge based and likely to support high living standards.  
Similar arguments are apparent from Bayliss (1994) and Grant (1998).   
Lattimore and Wooding (1996) suggest that if New Zealand’s exports had not 
been concentrated in slow-growing meat, wool, dairy and Aluminium products, 
over 1970 to 1985, export growth would have been far higher. Hall (1995) also 
suggests that New Zealand suffered from having too much resource in slow-
growth sectors and in shifting further into such services sectors has accordingly 
experienced a reduced growth rate. 
 
These arguments are all valid, taken at face value, as ex-post assessments.  
There does appear to be a clear trend for more knowledge-based workers to 
earn higher incomes internationally, as argued for instance by Audretsch 
(1998).  Caution is required, though, before concluding that services sector 
growth has been slow, given that there appears to be a tendency to 
underestimate services sector output. It is also another matter altogether to 
draw a strong policy conclusion about the desirability of Government promoting 
growth through explicitly directing resources into particular sectors. 
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New Zealand seems unlikely to have had a knowledge based, higher growth 
scenario easily available. Upgrading skills is more likely to be a slow process, 
taking decades. Geographic isolation may well also affect the feasibility of such 
a strategy. 
 
As noted in part 4 of this paper, primary products appear to have enjoyed a 
relatively high rate of total factor productivity growth over the 1978 to 1998 
period, at least by New Zealand standards. This may well reflect embedded 
resource based advantage, as New Zealand’s institutions have developed in 
line with past industry comparative advantage and requirements, in a pattern 
that North (1993) identifies. It may also reflect that less protected areas do 
better as high effective rates of assistance are wound down, in areas where 
New Zealand has less comparative advantage, as was expected, when the 
policies were introduced. Increasingly since 1984, private industry has had a 
choice about where to invest, with increasing knowledge about the prospects for 
commodities and diminishing influence from earlier industry assistance 
measures.   
 
The theme of the dangers of Governments picking winners is still alive and well. 
As Bayliss (1994), who sees a role for the Government in planning, points out, 
earlier policies directing investment into manufacturing for many years directed 
investment into low skill, low value added areas.  Overseas analysts continue to 
emphasise the lack of success of Governments in attempting to pick strategic 
sectors, including Ostry (1993) and Mowery (1995).   
 
Sachs and Warner (1995) specifically investigate the links between growth and 
natural resource intensity.  They find that a high rate of resource based exports 
to GDP is associated with low growth, without necessarily identifying precisely 
why. The mechanisms considered and conclusions include that resource 
dependence may: 
 
·  allow  an inefficient bureaucracy to develop (no strong evidence);  
·  foster protection of weaker sectors, such as manufacturing (stronger 
evidence) 
 
They are careful to warn that promoting non-resource based growth is not 
necessarily a conclusion from the analysis. Resource based development may 
still support high consumption levels, more basic policies such as open trade 
may be more important for growth and their aggregate analysis is far from 
definitive.  To this might be added that the study focuses on developing 
countries. 
 
Harberger’s (1998) conclusions reinforce the warning, in emphasising that at 
industry and firm level, typically only a few industries experience rapid growth at 
a time, with a minority generating most of the growth of a country.  Moreover, 
these industries regularly change.   
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There are clearly still significant dangers in Governments attempting to identify 
likely winners. A particular risk could be attempting to emulate the apparent 
success of other countries in areas in which they appear to be successful now – 
which are both more likely to attract international competition and reflect 
another country’s comparative advantage in skills or geography. 
 
A safer exception to the general policy rule of forbearing intervention might 
however be the recommendations of Porter (1998) and Crocombe, Enright and 
Porter (1991), to support the development of emerging clusters of successful 
industries, reinforcing their development through areas of existing Government 
activity in education or research support.
101  In this case, support is at least likely 
fit with underlying strengths.  Porter goes further in arguing against resource 
based development for New Zealand but if the arguments put forward here are 
accepted, this aspect of his advice should be treated with scepticism.  Similar 
conclusions are reached by Campbell Hunt and Corbett (1998) and Cartwright 
(1998), who argues that it is possible succeed in resource based industries, with 
value adding strategies.  
 
Regulation 
The effects of regulation on growth have also received relatively little attention 
in the material reviewed for this paper.  It is possible that literature dealing 
                                            
101    Porter’s views, particularly as reflected in Crocombe, Enright and Porter (1991) have 
attracted some criticism in New Zealand including from Philpott (1991) and Burnell and 
Sheppard (1992), as noted in part 3 of this paper. However these critics, perhaps somewhat 
reluctantly concede that Porter’s views are really more mainstream. Philpott suggests that 
the “new right” framework is forced into Porter’s framework. Burnell and Sheppard suggest 
that even although unproven, many of the propositions are “probably true”.  These seem fair 
assessments, given that Porter’s views do appear largely consistent with much of the wider 
growth literature. 
 
  Key propositions from Porter’s analysis include that growth will be assisted by: 
 
·  upgrading human resources and foster capital accumulation through saving 
·  stimulating domestic competition 
·  improving infrastructure 
·  tackling microeconomic issues as well as macro issues and avoiding over-reliance on 
exchange rate depreciation to maintain industry competitiveness 
·  focusing on innovation 
·  promoting the development of industry clusters in obvious areas of success, with 
Government support through policies such as human resource development and research 
support 
·  encouraging more demanding consumers, to help develop industry’s ability to meet 
demanding standards. 
 
Little if any of this appears to be in conflict with the more widely agreed propositions in 
international growth literature. Government support for cluster development is less conventional, 
but it can also be seen to fit with endogenous growth models based on R&D, conventional 
thinking about spillovers and newer thinking about agglomeration economies, such as that on 
urban scale economies, reviewed in Part 3 of this paper. 
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explicitly with regulatory issues, rather than growth, would be a more fruitful 
field.  However, the overall impression left is that static effects may often be of 
more concern, with relatively little attention being given directly to growth 
effects.  A typical example is Ministry of Commerce and Treasury (1995), a 
major discussion paper on regulation of access to vertically integrated natural 
monopolies, which tends to be more concerned with static efficiency and 
administrative issues. 
 
There has been considerable debate about certain regulatory issues, most 
notably the extent to which competition policy should be applied.  Crocombe, 
Enright and Porter (1991) are convinced that New Zealand’s small market has 
limited competition, losing New Zealand the benefits of vigorous domestic 
rivalry as a means of spurring international competitiveness.  Hazledine (1998) 
suggests there should be more vigorous enforcement, while Evans (1998) is 
more convinced that a light-handed approach, as followed up to that time is 
justified.  New Zealand’s competition law up to 1999 does appear to be more 
tolerant of duopolies than the regimes of larger markets, such as those of the 
EU of United States.  While there is broad acceptance that competition policy 
measures are needed, this debate finally tends to be around the margins of the 
policy.  Possibly the apparent importance of competition for growth suggests 
that New Zealand would be better to err towards more vigorous enforcement 
measures where the choice is otherwise unclear. 
 
Regulatory measures otherwise are not clearly a constraint on growth.  It is 
abundantly clear that New Zealand commercial regulation is typically far simpler 
than that typically found in larger economies, such as in Australia, North 
America or Europe. Crocombe, Enright and Porter (1991) consider that tougher 
regulatory measures in the domestic market may actually assist firms in 
learning to compete in more demanding, more difficult export markets.  This is 
not implausible, but it seems more likely that firms will be more productive with 
fewer restrictions on their conduct.   
 
Goff (1996), who rather unusually specifically attempts to measure the 
macroeconomic effects in the United States of higher quantities of regulation, 
suggests that there is a significant, measurable reduction in growth rates with a 
lag as regulation increases.  The study develops an index of regulation as a 
latent variable and suggests that a 10% reduction in an index of the volume of 
regulation could be associated with a 2% higher growth rate.  Other studies are 
quoted suggesting a variety of figures but finally, there is no more certainty 
about the magnitudes of such effects than most other growth parameters. 
 
New Zealand firm level surveys also suggest that the effects of regulation are 
not necessarily large here (Knuckey, Leung-Wai and Meskill 1999).  Their report 
indicates that for manufacturers, safety regulation is not onerous but 
compliance costs and the Resource Management Act generated concerns. 
Campbell-Hunt and Corbett (1996), suggest Government regulation is now 
perceived to be broadly supportive of the primary drivers of competitive 
behaviour.  They report a BERL study showing legislation has been perceived   123 
as negative for innovation in the areas of tax law and environment law however 
(Frater, Stuart, Rose and Andrews 1995).  Views were more positive on 
competition, patent, industrial relations,health and safety laws. 
 
Structure of Business 
The structure of New Zealand firms may have some implications for 
New Zealand’s growth performance.  This relates more to the scarcity of large, 
strong multinational enterprises (MNEs) controlled by New Zealand interests 
rather than the high population of small firms.   
 
An excellent illustration of the importance of small firms in New Zealand can be 
found in comparing the thresholds used for defining small and medium size in 
New Zealand and OECD studies.  For Knuckey, Leung-Wai and Meskill (1999) 
in their study of 1400 New Zealand manufacturers, small firms had less than 10 
employees; medium sized firms less than 40 and large sized firms 40 or more 
employees.  In contrast, in OECD (1998b), small and medium sized firms for the 
purposes of an OECD-wide study of small and medium sized enterprises and 
globalisation range up 500 employees in size.   
 
For firms which are small or medium sized in the OECD sense, it is not clear 
that there are important barriers to establishing global competitiveness either 
internationally or in New Zealand that larger firms do not also face.  There are 
clearly disadvantages in being small, such as lack of back-up, lack of 
specialisation, financial and time constraints (Knuckey, Leung-Wai and Meskill 
1999).  There are advantages in flexibility, customer and within-firm 
relationships.  Interestingly, in Knuckey, Leung-Wai and Meskill’s study, 
outcomes across areas such as timeliness, quality, innovation, flexibility and 
competitiveness do not appear to show a marked disadvantage to New Zealand 
medium sized manufacturers compared with large manufacturers.
102   
 
In a related vein, the OECD (1998b) suggests small and medium sized 
enterprises can be globally competitive, with 1% of the OECD population of 
small firms being active in multiple countries or continents.  Success factors 
include attention to the need of customers; products and services of 
international quality; management resources and commitment; international 
experience; access to accurate and reliable information and Government 
programs and regulations taking account of the needs of small firms. 
 
More of an issue may be the scarcity of large, strong MNEs controlled by 
New  Zealand interests, as suggested by Cartwright (1998).  Cartwright 
suggests that only Fletcher-Challenge, Lion Nathan and the New Zealand Dairy 
Board qualify, with other potential candidates disqualified by sourcing products 
                                            
102  Medium sized firms in the study do show a tendency to a lower rate of adoption of firm “best 
practices”.  The reasons this does not show up in outcomes may be that the definition of best 
practice is more appropriate to larger sized firms, or that the benefits from best practices are 
harder to achieve in large firms.   124 
largely from within New Zealand.
103  Cartwright suggests however that it would 
be reasonable to expect to find a limited number of New Zealand MNEs 
comparable to Finland’s Nokia.  Without these firms, New Zealand does not 
gain the downstream value from marketing, manufacturing and production 
operations on some scale overseas.  We may also lack the spillover of skills in 
running large businesses. Running and developing small to medium sized 
businesses may involve a different skill set. 
 
There are some obvious, possible reasons for the lack of New Zealand MNE’s 
to explain the position identified by Cartwright, although he does not suggest 
them.  The difficulty in managing business relationships across long distances 
from major markets and attraction to entrepreneurs of operating directly in 
larger markets have been raised in sections 5.2 and 5.8 of this paper.  Further 
research in this area could be valuable. 
 
Conclusion on Microeconomic Issues 
The microeconomic reforms undertaken in New Zealand since 1984 seem 
broadly consistent with most international thinking about growth, in that allowing 
competition, the single key factor characterising the reforms, is consistent with 
most prescriptions.  New Zealand thinking largely appears to concur.  Perhaps 
the strongest evidence of success comes at the industry case study level. 
Microeconomic reform may possibly contribute as much to static welfare as to 
growth, where the precise extent of the contribution remains an open question.  
Its major contribution to growth could well be through pressures to generate 
further innovation and increase the degree of international openness of the 
economy. There are, however, question marks about how much microeconomic 
reform alone could be expected to deliver, with culture, macroeconomic policies 
and factor accumulation also being important to varying degrees.  This certainly 
does not mean that microeconomic reform should not be a key part of any 
growth strategy but simply that it is a part only. 
 
Overall Conclusions to Part 5 Analysis 
These are included in Part 1 of this paper. 
 
                                            
103  The proposed sale of the Fletcher-Challenge paper interests and sale of the Myers interest 
in Lion Nathan, subsequent to the Cartwright paper being written, may raise questions about 
two of these three.   125 
6  Conclusions and Policy Implications 
The analysis in this paper examines theoretical and empirical views of what 
contributes to growth, New Zealand’s growth performance and reasons why that 
performance has only been moderate since the period of major reform 
commenced in 1984.  This section of the paper summarises conclusions from 
the analysis about what might have driven New Zealand’s growth performance 
and seeks to draw policy conclusions from it, identified below in italics.  It 
concludes with a summary of potential further areas for research. 
 
New Zealand’s Growth Performance 
New Zealand’s per capita GDP growth from 1987 to 1998, on a peak to peak 
basis, has not been high, at 0.67% per annum. The GDP boost after 1992 was 
accompanied by high population growth.
104  Much of that growth in per capita 
terms was simply making up lost ground from the 1990-1992 recession.   
Allowing for increased factor payments abroad with a measure such as GNI 
(Gross National Income) would reduce the growth further, although leaving it 
positive. 
 
The evidence of low growth may understate New Zealand’s achievements in 
welfare terms.  Welfare improvements arising from lower prices, increased 
choice, better product quality and services growth are not fully picked up in 
GDP statistics. As Lawrence and Diewert (1999) point out, much services 
sector output is still measured using input measures such as employment 
growth and the deflators used to calculate real output probably overstate 
inflation. Measured value added before the reforms was probably boosted by 
price distortions caused by protection from foreign competition.  Given that New 
Zealand has tended to have more reforms than most OECD countries since the 
1980s, and that the benefits of reforms may tend to be understated in GDP 
measures, New Zealand’s welfare performance may be slightly better than 
measured in its growth rate. 
 
                                            
104   OECD (1999) contains a table comparing statistics for various OECD members. Leaving 
aside an anomalous German figure, this shows New Zealand’s annual population growth 
rate of 1.1% in the 10 years to 1996 was exceeded only by Mexico, Turkey, Luxemburg, 
Australia and Canada. Although New Zealand experienced amongst the higher GDP volume 
growth rates over the five years to 1996 at 3.7%, countries such as Ireland, Korea and 
Norway enjoyed much higher GDP growth and lower population growth rates than New 
Zealand.  Table 12 of the same publication shows New Zealand’s per capita GDP growth 
over the period 1983 to 1997 to be behind the following selected major countries: the United 
States, Japan, France, Italy, United Kingdom, Canada and Australia.  New Zealand’s GDP 
growth exceeded that of countries such as France and Italy, but per capita growth was 
higher in those countries because of their lower population growth. New Zealand at least 
increased its per capita growth rate from 0.5% per annum from 1973 to 1983 to 1.3% from 
1983 to 1997.  In all three periods covered (1963-73, 1973-83 and 1983-97), New Zealand 
had the lowest per capita growth rate of the countries listed except for Germany in the last 
period, where reunification seems to have affected many German statistics.   126 
Growth and output levels at the start of the 1980’s were boosted by 
unsustainable policies, such as Government guarantees and borrowing, now 
mostly unwound.  However, these factors are not necessarily large in their 
impact and also would have been experienced in some other countries.   
New Zealand’s relative per capita income growth has simply been slow. 
 
Encouragingly, total factor productivity did improve in the 1990’s.  However, 
OECD and Treasury projections do not suggest that New Zealand is likely to 
close the gap with average per capita OECD incomes.  
 
Reasons for Moderate Post Reform Performance 
On reflection, there is little reason to have expected New Zealand’s recent 
growth performance to be outstandingly high, at least compared with other 
OECD countries.  The specific reasons for this are summarised below.   
Possible policy areas for further consideration follow under each heading in 
italics.  These should be seen as tentative suggestions for further work and 
research, not definite policy recommendations.  The latter would require 
consideration within a wider welfare framework than one that simply considers 
growth and would require analysis beyond the merely economic analysis here. 
 
Convergence 
Economic theory tends to suggest that lower income countries’ incomes will 
converge to those of higher income countries.  Research tends to find such 
results at least amongst OECD and APEC members.
105  Taking these results at 
face value suggests New Zealand would have been unlikely to experience high 
growth in the post war period.  In fact, there are some suggestions that 
New  Zealand incomes are diverging downwards relative to the OECD and 
APEC. 
 
Despite some support for the view, there is not a consensus that convergence 
exists more generally.  If it did, there are few reasons to think that it would pull 
New Zealand incomes towards the average or top of the OECD with any 
strength.  New Zealand’s per capita GDP is still relatively high at around 80% of 
the OECD average.  Any tendency to convergence could be expected to be 
weak at this level.  The mechanisms that might bring rapid convergence are 
absent.  There is no obvious, large technology gap able to be bridged with the 
transfer of technology from wealthier countries, little unproductive labour to 
transfer to a high productivity sector and no large, adjacent high-income area 
for New Zealand to integrate into. 
 
·  Policy work should not assume convergence of New Zealand incomes to 
higher levels. 
 
                                            
105  Convergence is less likely to be found globally though.   127 
Geographical Factors and Economies of Scale 
Geographical and scale effects are likely to constrain the levels of income that 
New Zealand can achieve.  Distance from markets makes it more difficult to 
develop business relationships and participate in innovative activity.  Having a 
small, isolated population makes it difficult to achieve economies of scale in 
many areas.  To the extent that this involves a level rather than a growth effect, 
it may impact more upon New Zealand’s ability to close the income gap with 
wealthier countries than on the growth rate itself. 
 
While New Zealand may face some limitations on the income levels to which it 
can aspire, from these factors, some possible policy implications do emerge:  
 
·  New Zealand may face some significant disadvantages, but there are 
possible policy responses to these. 
·  Policy makers should actively consider possible scale and geographical 
effects in policy development 
·  We should be extremely cautious in following industry policies or 
development approaches which appear to work overseas but in very 
different geographical or scale settings 
·  Geographic isolation, coupled with existing industry strengths, greatly 
increases the chances that resource based development will be an 
important part of a successful growth strategy for New Zealand.  Resource 
based industries are less affected by distance from major markets. 
·  Geographical factors raise the pay-off from policies that help overcome the 
effects of distance and scale. These might include seeking improved 
quality and cost of transport (especially for people) and communications 
services; international economic integration through bilateral and 
multilateral fora; and open trade policies in all areas of trade in goods and 
services. Given that national boundaries seem to create significant barriers 
to interactions
106, research and consideration should be given to policies 
which could break down such boundaries, reducing isolation and scale 
effects.
107  
·  If economic growth is given a high weighting, supportive policies towards 
urban development could be appropriate. Naturally, national growth is not 
the only consideration in developing policy. 
 
The Restructuring Process 
Lawrence and Diewert (1999) suggest that New Zealand’s recent measured 
productivity has been lower than anticipated by many while Hazledine (1998) 
goes as far as to suggest that the reform process itself has failed.  What the real 
                                            
106  This is noted in Coleman (1999) and Helliwell (1999). 
107  Apart from countries with high natural resource endowments, there is a clear tendency for 
countries with high incomes to be clustered in regions allowing high levels of interactions, 
including across national borders.  These are notably in North America, East Asia and 
Europe.  Countries with consistent high growth rates since 1960 tend to be adjacent to these 
zones (Pritchett 1998).   128 
impact of the restructuring since 1984 on growth has been is probably 
impossible to determine given the many different factors operating.  However, 
the following points seem worth making: 
 
·  Adjustment costs were high and up front 
·  They were probably exacerbated by costs of unconventional but expedient 
sequencing 
·  The full results of reforms are often seen as slow to emerge, given the 
deep-seated changes required in structures, attitudes and responsiveness 
of participants within the economy. 
·  Some aspects of the reforms were very slowly implemented, such as the 
phase-out of border protection being timetabled over more than a quarter 
of a century, probably generating uncertainty and limiting investment. 
·  Measurement errors may well have resulted in the benefits of reforms 
being under-recorded 
 
On balance, these points tend to suggest that New Zealand’s growth rate, both 
real and measured will have eased upward as reform processes are completed 
and that there may still be some upside.  It is difficult to say how much.  In many 
respects, New Zealand may have simply been catching up to the growth 
potential of other OECD countries in undertaking reforms, not exceeding them. 
 
·  The full benefits of New Zealand’s economic reforms since the mid-1980s 
are still probably coming through. 
·  With major policy changes having up-front costs, generating uncertainty 
and requiring wide consequential institutional change, it is probably 
desirable to have in place mechanisms which allow constant, incremental 
change rather than requiring periodic shocks.  An open, lightly regulated 
economy is more likely to allow this, although regulation and other 
interventions are still needed to address real market failures. 
·  There is a high probability that the welfare and growth benefits of reforms 
are not fully measured.  Further analysis would be desirable. 
 
International Conditions 
International macroeconomic conditions have probably not had a marked 
impact on New Zealand’s recent growth performance.  The terms of trade rose 
slightly after the major reforms commenced but have been remarkably stable by 
past standards since 1988, with only a slight decline.  On the other hand, 
international real interest rates have fallen significantly since 1992, to New 
Zealand’s great advantage as a debtor country. Market access has tended to 
improve.  There do not seem to be any strong implications from international 
conditions for New Zealand’s growth performance more recently, at least 
viewed from a medium term perspective and ignoring short-term business 
cycles.  In the longer term, New Zealand faces ongoing pressures from 
continual innovation overseas, requiring innovative responses. 
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·  Reduced international real interest rates may explain some of the increase 
in New Zealand’s indebtedness over the last decade.  The possibility of an 
increase at some point, perhaps remote at present, would pose a risk to 
New Zealand’s growth prospects 
·  Other countries are continually seeking to upgrade their economic 
performance, including in areas in which New Zealand has strengths. 
Policy development should acknowledge that New Zealand has to actively 
pursue innovation and growth opportunities even to maintain its relative 
position. 
·  It would be wise to assume that New Zealand’s commodity export prices 
will continue to fall over time, reflecting the product life cycle model in 
operation.  However, similar effects also apply to New Zealand’s imports. It 
is difficult to say which effect will be more significant for the terms of trade. 
 
Employment and Population Growth 
New Zealand’s population growth has been fast compared to OECD countries 
in the post-war period and still relatively fast in the 1990s.  Employment has 
grown faster too, with indications that participation is relatively high by OECD 
standards, although tending to decline.  Other things equal, higher participation 
might be expected to have boosted the level of New Zealand’s GDP per capita.  
However faster long term population growth tends to be associated with 
somewhat slower per capita income growth.  Such results may be influenced by 
developing country experience, but there is no reason to think they are not 
applicable here, as the primary mechanism is probably a simple dilution of 
capital per workforce member.   
 
In addition, New Zealand has a medium-term tendency for population to rise as 
growth occurs and sink as it reverses.  This at least in the short run is a 
significant effect in limiting per capita growth, even if research about inward 
migration suggests it may have slightly positive effects on long run income 
levels. 
 
·  Population policies could play a role in increasing per capita incomes.   
This area particularly requires further research.  On the one hand a larger 
domestic market and knowledge spill-overs arising from dense urban 
centres may be positive for growth. Inward migration probably has net 
positive effects according to existing research.  On the other, the medium 




There is little in the picture of human capital developed here to suggest that 
New Zealand’s post reform growth would pick up strongly compared with OECD 
members.  While the proportion of people in tertiary training has increased 
substantially, any pay-off is likely to be longer term.  Skill levels are generally 
not high by OECD standards, although there are possible exceptions such as   130 
prose literacy.  A relatively high proportion of children fail to meet reading, 
science and maths standards. The proportion of the workforce without 
qualifications is still moderately high compared to high-income OECD members.  
Management skills in business appear to have been lacking in some areas, 
although there are signs of improvement now.  There appears to be a 
substantial net loss of skills through outward migration, despite high skill levels 
amongst inward migrants. 
 
·  Human capital investment, including through education, seems likely to be 
a contributor to output levels and growth although the precise contribution 
is quite uncertain.  
·  The pay-off may not be dramatic, varies across investments and there 
may be diminishing returns. Careful assessment of specific investment 
opportunities and interventions is desirable, including by Government, 
given its extensive investment in education. 
·  Promoting skill development at firm level and amongst disadvantaged 
groups and further developing education markets might be options that 
could be investigated further. 
·  The exit from New Zealand of skilled New Zealanders requires further 
consideration. 
 
Institutions, Values and Attitudes 
New Zealand generally has the sorts of institutions seen as most important to 
growth, including developed property rights; effective Courts and a developed 
finance sector.  None of these plainly stand out as superior or inferior to those 
found elsewhere.  In terms of culture, there are suggestions that lifestyle 
considerations may limit ambition. This is not quantified or well researched but 
again nothing here suggests New Zealand could be expected to have a high 
growth rate. 
 
·  Cultural issues could usefully be investigated further to see if there are 
implications for growth or opportunities for measures to promote growth 
here. 
 
Capital Stock Growth 
The capital stock is not yet well measured, but based on ratios of investment to 
GDP, New Zealand seems to have been investing in line with the OECD 
average and still doing so.  Whether the contribution of capital accumulation to 
growth is purely a simple accumulation effect or there are spillovers, New 
Zealand has not accumulated capital at a rate which would suggest high growth 
should be expected, say on the historic scale of East Asian countries.  Much 
capital investment has been foreign sourced, with positive benefits, but a lower 
return to New Zealand income levels.  Real after tax returns to capital 
investment of 3.7% from 1972 to 1998 according to Lawrence and Diewert 
(1999) lie in the range experienced in most Western countries.  Improved   131 
returns since 1992 are more promising for growth, being consistent with 
improved investment quality in the post reform period. 
 
Savings have not been high, either in the past with large Government deficits or 
more recently with low household savings.   
 
·  Increasing savings and investment rates might boost per capita income 
growth, provided average rates of return were achieved through 
generating an environment that secures suitable investment quality.   
·  Governments can probably boost savings rates, but the total welfare 
effects, not just the growth effects, would need to be carefully examined in 
considering any policies seeking to boost growth through this path. 
·  Examining whether the performance of New Zealand’s capital markets 
could be enhanced might be worthwhile. 
·  Investment in human capital and innovation are alternatives to pure capital 
accumulation.  Trade-offs between investment in these various areas 
require consideration in policy development. 
 
Macroeconomic Policies 
Judging from the main ideas discerned from the literature on the effects of 
macroeconomic policy on growth, macroeconomic policy changes since the 
reforms and current settings and achievements have been positive for growth.  
In 1984, New Zealand started out from a position with serious macroeconomic 
imbalances.  These were costly to remove.  Some, like McMillan (1998), 
comparing experience before and after the reforms, consider that the most 
clear-cut reform success came in the macroeconomy, with the move from fiscal 
deficits to surplus and breaking the inflationary spiral.  Most analysts would 
probably agree that these were successes. To this might be added the move to 
more moderate real interest rates.  
 
Much of the analysis reviewed for this paper has, however, used a more 
exacting standard. It compares what has been achieved with what might have 
been achieved with ideal macroeconomic management. The weight of New 
Zealand analysis has been that macroeconomic management has been harmful 
to growth on several occasions, through generating high peaks in the real 
exchange rate.  There seems to be some truth in this although other well 
informed official and quasi-official analysis argues otherwise.  It seems plausible 
that several large, sustained appreciations in the real exchange rate have 
inhibited exports and import substitution.  However, monetary policy is a difficult 
policy instrument to manage and inflationary expectations have been persistent.  
 
·  There are few obvious, easy gains to be made here. Current policies seem 
broadly in line with the requirements for generating growth. 
·  Minimising sharp real exchange rate peaks looks to be important and now 
possibly more feasible given current inflation expectations. 
·  Avoiding net fiscal stimulation when the economy is strong could help this.   132 
·  The present more flexible monetary policy approach, with a wider target 
band and medium term focus seems to be appropriate. 
 
Government Role 
New Zealand does not seem to be exceptional in its total tax take or 
expenditure and there is no really clear evidence that these have a substantial 
effect on growth, at least at the levels currently applying in New Zealand. 
However, lower levels of tax and expenditure are more often suggested to be 
associated with higher growth or income levels. 
 
·  The overall weight of analysis seems to indicate that a slightly smaller 
proportion of Government expenditure or taxation to GDP would be 
beneficial for growth, but this is not a strong conclusion. 
·  Ensuring that expenditure is of high quality and is considered in each case 
for its potential growth effects as well as static welfare effects is desirable.  
While it is difficult to prove their existence, consideration of expenditure 
and tax decisions should at least take into account the possibility of 
positive externalities in areas such as accumulation of capital, human 
capital and knowledge. 
·  Similarly, ensuring the quality of the tax system is high is desirable. 
  
Innovation and Microeconomic Policies 
A large number of microeconomic policies have impacted on New Zealand’s 
growth including policies affecting innovation, corporate structure, competition, 
trade barriers, industry policies and regulation. 
 
The predominant view amongst New Zealand analysts appears to be that 
reforms in all these areas have improved New Zealand’s growth prospects.   
Businesses are more exposed to competition and international conditions, 
improving investment quality.  New Zealand’s small market however produces 
less pressure for improvement than larger overseas markets. Competition law 
may have imposed a lesser degree of restraint on restrictive practices than 
some overseas regimes.  Regulatory restraints are not tight by international 
standards, although constraints on business inevitably remain in compliance 
costs, tax compliance and environmental issues. 
 
Innovation is agreed to be a particularly important driver of growth.  In R&D, 
New Zealand has a low level of expenditure.  This may be less serious than it 
might first appear, given that New Zealand has many small businesses; no 
fiscal incentives to lead to an artificially high measured level of effort; and 
opportunities to import overseas innovations in many areas.  However, it is 
possible that New Zealand’s growth performance could be improved with more 
innovation, involving faster diffusion as well as R&D. 
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·  Existing microeconomic measures based on fostering competition, 
reducing regulatory barriers, compliance costs, and open trade, appear 
consistent with most views about growth. 
·  Regulatory measures are still required as market failures, including those 
that can adversely affect growth, are possible.  Such failures are best 
considered within a comparative institutions approach, which requires 
assessment of feasible alternatives. 
·  There is no clear evidence on industry policies, but much of Porter’s 
advice looks realistic: improve infrastructure; focus Government research 
programs on opportunities; encourage successful clusters and facilitate new 
business formation.  These approaches involve reinforcing success within a 
well-developed set of economy wide policies, to be distinguished from selective 
interventions. 
·  Microeconomic reforms should continue in areas where probable benefits 
to growth and static benefits can be identified. Viewed from a forward looking 
viewpoint, they may not be a great contributor to growth in their own right, with 
many reforms having been completed and other contributors to growth also 
being important. 
·  Investing in the “right” sectors, viewed retrospectively, does seem to be 
important.  However, we should be very wary of following models that suggest 
quick, easy pay-offs from selecting sectors likely to prosper.  Overseas fashion 
countries and industries come and go quickly as development models change 
and booms have a habit of petering out. 
·  New Zealand should be particularly wary of attempting to emulate other 
high-tech models in investment or research policies.  
·  Policies towards innovation should focus on innovation its widest sense, 
not just on R&D.  This could encompass diffusion of new ideas, new forms of 
business organisation and marketing.  Just why private sector spending on R&D 
appears to be low requires further investigation.  
·  There is still much promise in resource-based development as part of 
market led development.  Resource based development can involve 
sophisticated products, not just unmodified commodities moving towards the 
end of their product life cycle. It has a good productivity track record, there are 
opportunities to apply sophisticated knowledge, and New Zealand has strengths 
in the area. 
·  Growth can come in domestically oriented developments too. 
 
Measurement Issues 
Measurement issues affect analysis of New Zealand’s growth performance, as 
they do elsewhere.  Amongst these are: 
 
·  GDP does not represent national income well, nor does it reflect the per 
capita position and nor does it represent welfare. 
·  Services output is not well measured. 
·  New activities are likely to be missed, while declining industries will be 
more faithfully recorded.   134 
·  Until now the capital stock has not been officially recorded.  Other 
important inputs like human capital are not recorded at all. 
·  Reforms may well have resulted in output being understated 
·  Even if the measurement of growth was accurate, sustainability of the 




·  Economic performance should be discussed using a range of indicators.  
Amongst these, there should be much more emphasis on real gross 
national income per capita and related measures.  Plain GDP is very 
misleading. 
·  Efforts to improve national accounts and hence growth measurement 
should continue. 
·  There may be a need for new welfare measures to be developed, which 
capture a broader picture of welfare change than national income 
measures. 
 
General Conclusions   
This synthesis does not suggest there is much new, low-hanging fruit to be 
plucked in bolstering New Zealand’s growth performance.  Such a result should 
probably not be expected.  Intense policy analysis has been put into the reforms 
undertaken over the last 15 years. The reforms have been broadly in line with 
the firmer conclusions about what sorts of conditions are most likely to generate 
growth in mainstream economic literature.   
 
There has been remarkably little direct focus on growth in New Zealand 
economic research, despite the importance of the topic.  It is just possible that 
low-hanging fruit might be found in some of the many areas that have received 
little research attention so far.   
 
Economic growth is of course just one potential contributor to welfare, the 
underlying concern.  Much economic research is justifiably concerned with 
boosting static welfare rather than growth, either in income levels or through 
higher growth rates.   
 
An important conclusion is that there are many potential contributors to growth. 
Typically, a small proportion of firms and industries contribute disproportionately 
to growth in a large variety of ways.  The players involved can change quite 
rapidly. Policy formation needs to take such a vision into account. 
 
At a proximate level, as pointed out by Temple (1999), investment in physical 
capital, human capital and innovation are important, but there are many other 
contributors, as already discussed.  Many of these interact to provide an 
overlapping and analytically difficult picture.  It is clear that: 
 
·  Simple models are unlikely to provide complete explanations   135 
·  Almost any theory will be supported by at least some real world example  
·  There are few if any universal conclusions, although fortunately, there are 
more areas heading towards consensus than might first be expected 
·  There is no magic formula to spark growth 
·  Even if all the basic conditions seem right, there is no guarantee that 
growth will follow  
·  Following certain approaches should however improve a country’s growth 
prospects 
 
New Zealand is unlikely to quickly achieve higher income levels or close the 
gap with higher income countries.  Past levels and projections for population 
growth, capital accumulation, human capital development, innovation and our 
geography suggest otherwise.  There are elements of path dependence 
affecting a number of these areas.  Existing skill levels for older members of the 
workforce may reflect high past demand for unskilled labour.  Past high per 
capita income levels and welfare support mechanisms have affected 
expectations of appropriate levels of savings and consumption, limiting current 
savings levels.  Basing success on innovation was less important when 
manufacturers could sell to a protected home market and primary producers 
could sell commodities for high returns.  These sorts of mechanisms all make it 
harder for the economy to switch to a different path. 
 
Even just eyeballing the graph of New Zealand’s per capita GDP since 1947, in 
Figure 2, gives no indication that New Zealand has embarked upon a higher per 
capita income growth path since the 1980s. However, this cannot be ruled out. 
 
There is some good news though. In many areas, policies now being followed 
seem broadly consistent with the requirements for growth.  Macroeconomic 
policy settings and variables are broadly consistent with recommendations for 
growth in the international literature.  Investment returns have improved.   
Microeconomic decision-making is largely exposed to market signals that 
should assist in determining the best course for investment.  There is much 
greater participation in education. A strong theme in much of the growth 
literature is that it takes time for the gains from reforms to come through. The 
reforms implemented may be contributing to New Zealand’s growth 
performance for a considerable time to come. 
 
New Zealand’s income levels in general appear to be more sustainable than 
fifteen years ago.  They are now not based on large Government borrowing or 
guarantees.  Despite risks, there is a reasonable chance that the present large 
current account deficit will not bring a disruptive correction to the economy.
108 
 
However, growth is influenced by much more than Government policy, even if 
well formulated.  Many choices important to growth are largely in the hands of 
individuals and firms rather than Government.  These include areas such as 
savings and capital accumulation decisions, entrepreneurial and innovative 
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behaviour, and culture.  These and many other areas would justify more 
research, to determine if there are measures that might contribute more to 
growth in welfare consistent ways. 
 
Further Research 
There is scope for further research in many areas relating to both what New 
Zealand’s growth performance has been and what would generate a higher 
growth rate.   
 
There have been relatively few attempts to provide a broad overview aimed at a 
professional audience, even though the complexity of the subject, with many 
different factors contributing to growth, requires a broad view.   The reasons are 
plain enough.  Researchers have their own interests.  Some Government 
interests may have been focused on economic welfare more than growth.  New 
Zealand’s small size, despite past economic reforms having attracted 
international attention, does not support a large research effort.  There are 
difficulties in remaining rigorous when examining a large number of areas 
simultaneously and many individual areas have attracted little attention.   
 
It is fortunate that growth has attracted a large, intensive international research 
effort, which has played a larger role in this paper than initially expected.   
However, even in the international literature, there are many data and 
methodological difficulties, resulting in high uncertainty about many policy 
conclusions. 
 
Additional research then is likely to have a positive pay-off, given the limited 
amount undertaken to date, although it is unlikely to resolve all of the issues 
often debated.  It would be helpful if it had the following characteristics: 
 
·  A strong New Zealand focus, as overseas conditions are not necessarily 
applicable here. 
·  Firm placement within a broad context of factors influencing New 
Zealand’s growth, given that any narrow focus is likely to miss something 
important. 
·  A strong empirical focus 
·  Use of more sophisticated analytical techniques, such as the panel and 
case study techniques suggested by Temple (1999) 
·  A focus on meaningful policy implications 
 
Areas in which further research would be particularly useful include the 
following.  They are not in order of importance, but as the list is long, some 
indications of areas that might be seen as being more important are offered in 
brackets: 
 
·  New Zealand’s position in cross-country regressions – this might highlight 
areas where New Zealand’s policies need close examination, say if New 
Zealand appears to be an outlier.    137 
·  The effects of geography and economies of scale on New Zealand’s long 
term growth prospects. 
·  Potential gains from further international economic integration.  (It is clear 
that isolated parts of larger, high-income entities such as Tasmania and 
Hawaii achieve higher income levels than New Zealand, underlining the 
important potential contribution of wider economic integration.) 
·  The speed of responsiveness of New Zealand labour, capital and other 
resources to changed signals and opportunities. 
·  The interaction of population growth and per capita economic growth.   
These mechanisms are not well understood and seem to have had little 
local research, except in the case of immigration. 
·  How does investment in human capital, especially through education affect 
growth in New Zealand? 
·  How, if at all, the permanent outflows of skilled New Zealanders affect 
growth and might be reduced.  
·  Effects of values, attitudes and culture on growth: The potential effects of 
limited ambition; lack of trust; selfishness, views of success and other 
factors are worth further investigation. Policy responses might be possible, 
as have been attempted with savings information campaigns.  (This area 
could be important because of the lack of attention it has received to date.) 
·  Why New Zealand businesses have not expanded internationally or 
transferred overseas when they have they have attained scale in 
international operations?  (This is particularly important to resolve before 
developing industry policies, to ensure that policies encourage activities 
from which New Zealand is likely to benefit long term.) 
·  The effects of inequality on growth in NZ. International research suggests 
this is an issue, but there appears to be little rigorous work on the subject 
here.  
·  Possible improvements in New Zealand capital market performance, 
including participants’ monitoring of investment quality 
·  The effect of real exchange rate surges on growth.  (The extent to which 
analysts have raised this suggests its importance.) 
·  What is currently driving the terms of trade for New Zealand?  
·  How does innovation, in its broadest sense, including in management, 
marketing and diffusion of technology as well as the creation of new 
technologies through R&D occur within New Zealand?  Some of the areas 
other than R&D appear to have had less attention. 
·  Why does the private sector appear to undertake so little R&D and how 
much does it matter? (This area is clearly of importance given current 
interest in the subject.) 
·  What have been the effects of microeconomic reform on growth? 
·  Means of better measuring overall welfare and improving national income 
statistics 
·  The specific effects of reform on measurements of New Zealand’s GDP 
and GNI performance.  (As there are reasons to suspect national accounts 
statistics may be not capturing these results, further work would be 
important to allow a more informed policy debate.)   138 
 
Appendix A: Analysts’ Views on the New Zealand Economy and Factors 
Driving its Performance 
This Appendix summarises the views of a number of analysts who have 
reviewed the overall performance of the New Zealand economy.  Those who 
have written only on narrow aspects of performance are excluded from this 
survey, to confine its scope and ensure that the views reviewed form part of a 
consistent, broad picture.  Writings reviewed are largely those from over the last 
decade but with several exceptions intended to illustrate views prior to the major 
period of reforms commencing in 1984.  The writings, with a few exceptions are 
largely confined to authors writing as individuals rather than those likely to be 
articulating an institutional line, to increase the level of independence of the 
material. 
 
Views Before the Reforms 
Gould (1982)  
Gould takes an economic historian’s perspective of New Zealand’s growth in 
the post-war era.  He notes New Zealand’s growth rate was relatively poor 
throughout the period.  Even in the 1950’s, New Zealand achieved only 2% per 
capita income growth, compared with 4.5% in continental Europe or 8.5% in 
Japan.  TFP was 1.3% from 1950 to 1960 - coincidentally around its present 
level.  Historically, from 1926 to 1964, agriculture had a high rate of TFP growth, 
and higher than manufacturing, based on research by Philpott.   
 
New Zealand did not have available to it some of the mechanisms promoting 
growth in other countries in this earlier era. There was less scope for catch up 
to US productivity levels; a lack of availability of economies of scale; little scope 
to reallocate resources out of inefficient sectors; and less scope to benefit from 
new technologies given the limited industrial base in New Zealand. 
 
Other factors limiting New Zealand’s growth included: 
 
·  High population growth, which tends to limit per capita income growth 
·  Reduced demand as the baby boom ended 
·  Lack of availability of a frontier to exploit after World War One 
·  Declining terms of trade, affected by overseas protection and dumping  
·  Consistent inflation and balance of payments difficulties 
·  Costly Government spending associated with the electoral cycle 
 
Treasury (1984) 
The key points for long term growth were: 
 
·  The New Zealand economy continued to display one of the most lacklustre 
performances among countries in the developed world.   139 
·  The growth, inflation, external payments, and employment records were all 
poor, despite investment ratios close to the OECD average. 
·  The poor performance in part reflected New Zealand’s unwillingness to 
adjust to changing external conditions, shown also in increasing external 
indebtedness. 
·  Government policies lacked balance and consistency.    
·  Micro interventions locked resources into areas with low social returns and 
delayed adjustment through the economy. 
 
Implicit throughout Treasury (1984) is the view that growth would flow from 
improved economic management, with a medium term focus; reduction of 
macroeconomic imbalances; and reduction in Government interventions in 
markets.  However, generating growth per se is not a strong structural feature of 
the document. 
 
Blyth, Hawke and Smythe (1984) 
This report by the Planning Council was prepared just after the 1984 election 
and set out a proposed growth strategy.  It contained a blunt, negative 
assessment: 
 
“In recent years, we have failed to meet our economic objectives which include 
·  A rising material standard of living 
·  High employment 
·  Reasonable price stability 
·  A sustainable balance of payments situation 
·  Fair distribution of income” 
 
The prescription offered was that: 
 
·  New Zealand needed an economic structure capable of responding 
continuously to change, with the key attribute of adaptability 
·  Price signals need to reflect the situation in the real world and be market 
based; greater flexibility is needed in the exchange rate to reflect overseas 
realities; and greater flexibility in labour market incomes and mobility 
·  There should be few specially encouraged activities and subsidies import 
licensing and domestic controls should be removed 
·  New Zealand must guard against the inflexibility of monopoly and special 
privilege 
·  Growth requires New Zealand to be competitive with foreign goods 
through achieving lower inflation; a lower real exchange rate; or relative 
productivity improvement 
·  The public deficit should be reduced and monetary policy be tightened 
·  Retraining and relocation assistance might be appropriate   140 
 
With these policies, the Economic Monitoring Group expected: 
 
·  Production of some goods and services would cease and be replaced with 
new activities 
·  All of society would benefit eventually and it is much easier to address 
equity issues in a growing environment 
·  Attitudinal, educational and institutional changes would be needed before 
the policies became effective 
·  A quite rapid transition is required and the disadvantages would be short 
term 
·  There is no simple or straight-forward answer to New Zealand’s economic 
problems but past policies offered only continued stagnation 
 
Franklin (1985) 
Franklin’s book was written just before the major reforms commenced in 1984, 
and reflected extensive earlier research.  He argues that New Zealand’s poor 
economic performance reflected: 
 
·  New Zealand trapping its resources in protected markets such as 
manufacturing.  Change and constant restructuring are required. 
·  An egalitarian ethos had created new privileges and rigidities, in the 
welfare state, bureaucracies and protected industry.  A move away from 
privileges built up under the welfare state is essential, to allow greater 
competition and restructuring in industry. 
·  Creative planning, with cooperation between Government, unions and 
business was needed to set aside three yearly electoral auctions.   
Government nurturing is required in markets where science and 
technology are important. 
 
Views Since the Reforms 
Philpott 
Bryan Philpott has written prolifically on growth and related issues over many 
years, as the bibliography of almost every significant work on growth testifies.  
This summary draws on only a limited selection of his writings as recorded in 
the bibliography of this paper (Philpott 1991, 1994, 1995 and 1998). 
 
Philpott (1995) uses a Solow-Denison approach to estimate TFP for market 
based production groups and derives similar results to Lawrence and Diewert 
(1999) for comparable, though different periods.  For the full period 1960 to 
1995, he finds real GDP grew 2.8% per annum, although only 1.6% and 2.1% 
respectively in the last two decades.  TFP grew 1.0% for the whole period and 
0.1% and 2.6% for the last two decades to 1995.  
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Important influences on this growth pattern are suggested to be: 
 
·  Falling capital productivity due to trade liberalisation in manufacturing and 
capital intensive major projects in the 1980s 
·  Tradables, being exportable manufacturing sectors and primary sectors 
make the major contribution to growth 
·  Labour productivity was boosted in the late 1980’s by restructuring through 
cutting employment, but this was a one–off effect and did not boost 
growth. 
·  Falling terms of trade in the 1970’s depressed growth (Philpott 1991) 
 
Elsewhere, Philpott is critical of New Zealand’s growth performance.  Consistent 
themes in his work are: 
 
·  Economic planning is required – being prepared to monitor and alter policy 
settings, not just sole reliance on markets. 
·  Monetary and fiscal policy need to be integrated in economic 
management, to generate a lower exchange rate to generate tradables 
growth, control the overseas deficit and spiralling overseas debt. (Philpott 
1998)  This is especially true in managing the real exchange rate to a level 
consistent with tradables sector growth. (Philpott 1991) 
·  Keynesian demand management remains important to generating growth.  
Output growth raises productivity more than the reverse. (Philpott 1994) 
·  Incomes policies could reduce inflation and assist exportables growth. 
·  Microeconomic reforms, such as reducing tariffs may be appropriate, but 
require support from monetary and fiscal policy to be effective.  
·  Steady and growing demand will promote adoption of new technologies, 
as firms are more likely to enjoy economies of scale, reallocate resources 
between firms and sectors; and undertake managerial changes.   
·  Adequate profitability is necessary for productivity growth as well as 
innovation and capital accumulation (Philpott 1994) 
·  Protection of manufacturing may have reduced welfare and GDP in the 
1960’s but helped growth (Philpott 1991) 
 
Easton 
Brian Easton has also written with an enduring interest in growth, a long 
historical perspective and an economy wide focus to his analysis.  His thinking 
is most comprehensively set out in Easton (1997), the main source of this 
summary. 
 
New Zealand had just under 1% per capita GNP growth per annum from1859 to 
1939, according to Rankin (1991).  A higher growth rate than in Australia, the 
USA or the UK was achieved from 1932 to 1955, with recovery from the 
depression and the stimulus of the war.  However, in the 40 years to 1992, New 
Zealand consistently slipped behind the OECD per capita income growth rate, 
to reach 79% of the OECD level. A brief exception was 1979 to 1985 when New   142 
Zealand exceeded OECD per capita income growth by 0.6% per annum.  From 
1985 to 1992, however, New Zealand slipped by 1.4% per annum relative to the 
OECD average. New Zealand growth rates may have been slightly 
underestimated by Statistics New Zealand, biased downwards by perhaps 0.3% 
per annum, because of service sector mismeasurement. 
 
Easton’s assessment of the factors driving New Zealand’s recent performance 
can be summarised as: 
 
·  Micro economic reforms have been on balance beneficial, although the 
benefits of reductions in protection are quite small: +0.7% of GDP, based 
on Easton’s own 1980 estimate.  Subsidies did inhibit agricultural 
diversification in the 1980’s and their removal was beneficial. 
·  While the decline in the terms of trade since the 1950’s has been a large, 
negative influence for the level of GDP, it is an unresolved question how 
that affects growth.  Easton (1991) suggests that declining long term terms 
of trade may have moved production into lower productivity industries, 
away from pastoral exports. 
·  In the last decade, poor growth is not attributable to the terms of trade 
though – they have recovered since the mid-1980s.  As a debtor country, 
New Zealand also suffered from higher real interest rates in the 1980’s – 
equivalent to a 5% commodity terms of trade drop in 1985. 
·  A sharp, sustained rise in the real exchange since the mid-1980’s has 
inhibited GDP growth.  The 1985 float was part of an uncoordinated macro 
strategy.  Foreign investment as part of overseas portfolio diversification 
also raised the exchange rate.  Although inflation has been reduced, 
efforts to control inflation through monetary policy have impacted mainly 
on the exchange rate and had a substantial growth cost (Easton 1998). 
Subsequent poor tradables profitability is a key cause of poor economic 
growth. 
·  The 1980’s major projects imposed high costs on the economy. There is, 
however, no consistent evidence that Government interventions are 
always associated with poor growth. 
·  Rapid post-war population growth probably dampened capital productivity 
and reduced per capita income growth, perhaps by 0.17% per annum.  
·  Capital productivity has been low in New Zealand anyway for a variety of 
reasons: inefficient investment; breaking in marginal land; and freezing 
works hygiene expenditure for example. 
·  A low proportion of the population with higher education has probably 
inhibited growth. 
·  It takes at least a decade for the effects of crashes such as that of 1987 to 
be overcome.  The 1987 boom destroyed much capital. 
 
Bayliss (1994) 
Bayliss wrote his 1994 monograph, “Prosperity Mislaid”, as an independent 
writer, after a long banking career.  This summary of his analysis is based on it:   143 
 
·  New Zealand is geographically isolated, heavily dependent on 
international commodity trade and handicapped by transport costs and the 
distances required for overseas travel. 
·  Recent microeconomic policies have been appropriate. 
·  Macroeconomic policy has been poor for a long time.  Loose fiscal policy 
destroyed the effects of the 1982 to 1984 wage price freeze. Loose fiscal 
and monetary policies after the 1984 devaluation set off a round of 
inflationary pressure and speculation.  The higher terms of trade of the late 
1980’s were frittered away by poor macroeconomic policies, which caused 
a real exchange rate appreciation.  With import liberalisation, this 
undermined exporting.  Officials overestimated the benefits of low inflation 
and were excessively optimistic about the effects of the 1984 devaluation. 
·  New Zealand has been unsuccessful since the 1920’s in achieving stable 
growth in the face of terms of trade fluctuations and has been hampered 
by a long-term downtrend in the terms of trade. 
·  New Zealand’s post war living standards were artificially high, thanks to 
Empire preferential tariffs; coming out of World War II in good shape and 
high war-time capital investment in farming. 
·  The policy mix of 1945 to 1975 produced a difficult legacy of internationally 
uncompetitive manufacturing; a poorly educated and skilled labour force; 
low-grade business management; bloated construction sector; rigidities in 
resource allocation and a weak work ethic.  Trade barriers, competition 
from artificial fibres, competitive sources of supply for New Zealand 
exports and geographic isolation all contributed to poor performance. 
·  New Zealand suffers from following the intellectual direction of other 
English speaking countries, which are all bedevilled by budget and 
balance of payments deficits; poor savings and investment ratios; poor 
education; and excessive debt. 
·  Because of bad experience with Government intervention, New Zealand 
now lacks an economic strategy and long term policy focus. 
·  International competitiveness depends on having both volume and quality 
of investment in plant and machinery; low unit labour costs; effort in R&D 
and training; a culture of excellent customer service and encouraging 
employee participation. 
·  Appropriate policies would include improving the skills of the unskilled; 
raising savings and investment, especially in tradables and services; 
raising R&D; reducing dependence on commodities; improving racial 
harmony; raising the quality of welfare spending.
109 
·  New Zealand should also consider joining Australia given its lack of 
resources 
·  The chances of a substantial lift in performance are low. 
 
                                            
109  He does not suggest how some of these policies could be implemented, nor does he offer a 
comprehensive account of how New Zealand could have implemented better 
macroeconomic policies successfully.   144 
Hazledine (1998) 
Hazledine’s 1998 book provides a comprehensive summary of his analysis, 
although it is also been presented to professional economic audiences as in 
Hazledine (1998a) 
 
He argues that New Zealand’s reforms have been based on an unsatisfactory 
neoclassical model, concerned with economically efficient outcomes but 
ignoring process culture and social capital.  Radical commercialisation since 
1984 has fed off the previous stock of empathy, shared attitudes and goals, 
which now needs to be replenished, strengthening trust and forbearance by 
individuals from exploiting their own selfish advantage. An alternative path to 
the radical reforms would have been a path of moderate reform.  Key points 
include: 
 
·  New Zealand’s isolated location makes trade expensive.  Excessive 
emphasis on trade could be at the expense of production in New Zealand 
for the domestic market and be welfare reducing.  We still subsidise 
tourism and aluminium exports. 
·  Policy from 1945 to 1975 was remarkably successful in coping with 
fluctuating and declining terms of trade, as New Zealand diversified; had 
low unemployment; reduced protection levels, and operated a wage 
earners welfare state.  Growth was understandably lower than in unlucky 
countries recovering from World War II.  
·  Many markets do not work particularly well, being affected by greed, ego, 
concentrated market power, externalities, imperfect information and asset 
market instability.  Private planning guided by markets is usually best but 
not always. 
·  Education does not simply lead to growth – it may simply reflect initial 
capability of individuals.  Social qualities may be important to growth, 
including interpersonal skills, leadership and self-reliance. 
·  Economic prescriptions like that followed by New Zealand are premised on 
the selfishness of individuals, but this can be costly.  It requires higher 
transactions costs and more supervision activity, which New Zealand is 
now experiencing, compared with a society built more on trust and human 
empathy. 
·  Excessive concentration on reducing inflation has been harmful. 
 
Hazledine’s prescription includes: 
 
·  New Zealand should build its social capital, trade less, restrict foreign 
investment and produce more for the local market, where New Zealanders 
understand their own needs best. 
·  There should be less emphasis on GDP growth and more on various 
social indicators, such as nutritional intake, drug consumption and suicide 
rates.   145 
·  Income should be redistributed to the less well off – this would improve 
overall welfare, as peoples’ sense of wellbeing is influenced by 
distribution.  Controls on high pay rates, minimum wages, safeguards for 
collective bargaining and proactive competition policy are possible 
instruments. 
·  Move away from costly supervision models derived by agency theory and 
back towards trust based models, which are self-reinforcing.  For example, 




Dalziel (1999) provides a recent summary of his views, argued in a number of 
publications, including Dalziel (1998), about the economic reform program from 
1984 onwards.  He considers: 
 
·  The reform program as a whole was directed towards promoting economic 
growth.  However, virtually every change involved restraint, retrenchment 
or redistribution towards the better off.  Poverty increased.  Adverse 
effects were recognised, but discounted on the grounds that higher 
economic growth in the long run would make up for any losses. 
·  Analysing long term per capita GDP growth trends suggests that output 
dropped from trend between 1987/8 and 1993/4, causing substantial 
foregone income. 
110  Moreover, the sustainability of the post reform 
position as argued by Evans, Grimes and Wilkinson with Teece (1996) is 
doubtful, given a high increase in debt from 1984 to1995 of 30 percentage 
points. 
·  Arguments in New Zealand that lower tax rates would contribute to growth 
are all flawed.  These variously ignore the greater welfare impact of the 
marginal dollar in the hands off the less well off; the negative effects of 
Government expenditure reductions on growth and the marginal impacts 
of tax reductions, in analysing impacts on average taxpayers. 
·  Redistributing income towards the less well off would rebuild social capital, 
which builds productivity. (The mechanism, as in Hazledine’s analysis, is 
unclear.) 
·  New Zealand may have ignored the demand side of the economy.  With 
an over-reaction to inflationary experience in the 1970’s, there is now no 
conscious Government effort to smooth peaks and troughs in the growth 
rate over time.  Income distribution towards the wealthy may have 
depressed demand. 
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unsustainability of the growth of per capita income in 1982, the endpoint from which Dalziel 
extends the pre-reform growth trend. They suggest that growth from 1967 to 1982 was low in 
any event – so much so as to be not statistically different from zero. They also suggest that 
post reform growth sustainability is supported by lower inflation, an improved fiscal balance 
and current account balance and that Dalziel underestimates the initial level of New Zealand 
indebtedness prior to reforms.   146 
Hall  
Viv Hall has written extensively on New Zealand’s structural change, economic 
reforms and productivity and growth in various publications, including those 
noted in the bibliography to this paper.  Hall (1998a), the most recent paper 
available for this review is the main basis for this summary: 
 
·  By 1984, New Zealand had unsustainable macroeconomic imbalances 
and serious microeconomic problems.  These often take longer to turn 
around and require more persistent corrective action than many originally 
envisage. 
·  Following reforms, there is widespread but not universal recognition that 
significant progress has been made. 
·  New Zealand has successfully controlled inflation and reduced 
unemployment from its peak, probably helped by the Employment 
Contracts Act although the evidence is not conclusive.  Unemployment 
has probably been affected more by macroeconomic policies than 
structural change. 
·  New Zealand has made significant progress with fiscal deficits and public 
debt sustainability. 
·  The current account deficit is uncomfortably close to the 6.6% average of 
1982 to 1987 and the overseas debt to GDP ratio leaves New Zealand 
vulnerable to substantial real and financial shocks. 
·  Growth since the-mid 1980s of 1.6% per annum is still unfavourable 
compared to comparable OECD countries and is still slightly less than the 
poor performance of 1977 to 1984.  
·  There is general agreement that New Zealand’s growth performance has 
been poor for a long time, that there were considerable costs through to 
1991 from correcting macroeconomic imbalances, including reducing 
inflation and that performance has since improved. It is too soon to tell if 
there has been a structural improvement. 
·  Achieving growth rates higher than 3 to 3.5% is needed to reduce 
unemployment and improve living standards on a sustainable basis.  This 
is unlikely without further micro reforms, higher savings and sustainably 
high business fixed investment. 
·  Structural change was substantially greater during 1985 to 1995 than in 
the period 1978 to 1985.  The best industries at improving productivity 
have been significantly affected by structural reforms. This offers some 
encouragement as does State Owned Enterprise performance. 
·  New Zealand has gained little from shifting employment into more 
productive sectors and still has too great a proportion of resources in poor 
or badly performing sectors. (Hall 1995 and 1996) 
·  Generating sustainably higher long-term growth probably depends upon 
maintaining an internationally credible macroeconomic environment; 
continued microeconomic reform; maintaining an internationally 
competitive real exchange rate and generating the domestic savings 
necessary to finance investment opportunities.   147 
·  Further measures which would help growth, which Hall quotes without 
demurring, include consolidation of health and education reforms; 
electricity restructuring; improvements in local Government financial 
management and accountability; workforce skill and competence 
development; reduced trade protection; corporatisation and privatisation of 
central and local Government business operations; Producer Board 
reform; and compliance cost reduction. 
·  Despite progress, there are still major challenges for sustainability and 
improvement on all fronts.  This arises from the relative ease with which 
macroeconomic imbalances can re-emerge under lax policy settings, 
inconclusive evidence of sustained productivity improvement, a desire to 
reduce the NAIRU
111 further and the likelihood that other countries’ reforms 
have eroded some of the advantages achieved earlier by New Zealand. 
·  There is evidence that changes in the terms of trade have a substantial 
impact on growth (Hall 1996) 
·  Further fiscal contraction in the period 1989 to 1994, rather than simply 
generating benefits through reduced inflation and an improved country risk 




Professor Michael Porter has had a continuing interest in New Zealand 
economic performance since 1991, when his views were applied to New 
Zealand and reported in Crocombe, Enright and Porter (1991).  They were 
updated in a visit by Porter (1998), supported by New Zealand academic 
research in Yeabsley (1998).  The Porter view of the New Zealand economy 
can be summarised largely from the 1991 book as: 
 
·  New Zealand has failed to broaden and upgrade its competitive 
advantages to cope with increasing international competition, despite 
market liberalisation 
·  New Zealand has specialised too much in resource based activities such 
as agriculture.  These have low entry barriers and face powerful buyers. 
This was fine in 1888 when agriculture represented 76% of world trade but 
not by 1988 when it was 9%. 
·  The education system has too little participation and insufficient focus on 
vocational needs, such as maths and science, modern languages and 
engineering. 
·  New Zealand innovation and R&D spending in the private sector are too 
low.  Firm strategies have often been short term, with limited investment in 
human resource development, distribution channels and brands, and a 
cost or commodity orientation. 
·  Capital constraints exist, with household savings slipping during the 1980’s 
as consumers sought to maintain living standards. Social welfare and 
Government deficits undermine saving. 
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·  Government subsidies and protection may have stopped the development 
of the competitive supporting industries needed in clusters, with 
exceptions in farming and horticulture.  
·  Firm rivalry has been limited.  New Zealand culture has not helped this, 
with emphasis on a relaxed lifestyle; low status of business and limited 
incentives to upgrade skills.  Success in commodity production may have 
contributed to this. 
·  Firms need to move beyond cost based strategies; develop clusters; focus 
more on knowledge base and innovation; invest in human resource 
development, corporate leadership and more global strategies. 
·  The Government needs manage carefully the incentives resulting from all 
it does; avoiding protecting existing institutions and stifling change; 
encourage innovation; upgrade skills and training; reduce flows of skilled 
emigrants; stimulate more domestic competition; maintain an open 
economy, improve transport and communications infrastructure; improve 
access to capital; and stimulate clusters. 
·  Porter (1998) in reviewing progress considered New Zealand has 
successfully addressed macroeconomic issues, ceased many of the most 
harmful Government interventions and now needs to address 
microeconomic issues  
·  Key policy requirements are now to:  
·  adopt a Government strategy  
·  improve human resource skills through education and universities in 
particular 
·  increase innovations, R&D expenditure and links between academic 
research and firms 
·  develop specialised banks to provide equity and venture capital 
·  develop incentive structures, not grants, to encourage private sector 
investment in New Zealand, for instance in R&D and training, 
recognising that externalities exist there 
·  build the level of business rivalry to promote innovation 
·  generate more demanding consumers and Government purchasing 
to improve firm capability  
·  promote cluster development  
 
The recipe is much the same as in 1991. 
 
Grant (McKinsey and Company) 
Grant (1998) offers another management-oriented perspective.  He argues that 
the New Zealand economy has under-performed comparable economies in per 
capita GDP growth and TFP since the 1950’s.  The performance is mirrored at a 
corporate level.  It shows through strongly in an under-performing equity 
market, since 1988, after the 1987 crash.  His diagnosis and prescription 
includes: 
 
·  Knowledge based industries now dominate international growth   149 
·  Knowledge workers are commanding an increasing share of the returns, 
making it more difficult for corporate shareholders to retain a share of the 
surplus generated 
·  New Zealand has under-performed because of: 
·  Previous distortions of market signals supporting unattractive sectors 
of the economy at artificially high levels of activity 
·  Wasteful public sector capital investment 
·  A slow transition in the sectoral composition of New Zealand output 
to faster growing industries 
·  The inability of New Zealand businesses to transform themselves 
into intangible asset rich businesses, capturing global growth 
·  Low managerial aspirations and standards 
·  New Zealand businesses must focus more on intangible assets; raise 
management aspirations and standards; provide better value to attract 
talent; and adopt new organisational models such as webs and alliances. 
·  The Government needs a dialogue to promote these changes; to address 
the venture capital market failure; examine education and immigration 
strategy to attract and retain talent and sharpen market disciplines and 
reporting standards for companies. 
 
Evans, Grimes, Wilkinson and Teece (1996) 
This is possibly the most influential review of New Zealand’s reform process to 
date, given its publication in the Journal of Economic Literature.  They describe 
the reforms and provide substantial analytical comment.  They also describe the 
background of New Zealand’s per capita GNP sinking relative to the United 
States from 92% of the United States level to about half by 1988. Meanwhile, 
overseas indebtedness climbed from 11 percent of GDP inn 1974 to 95% in 
1984, with high inflation, a high current account deficit, fiscal deficit and rising 
unemployment. 
 
Conclusions about New Zealand’s growth experience include: 
 
·  Adjustment costs during the reform process were higher than necessary 
due to sub-optimal sequencing.  A faster reduction in the fiscal deficit and 
earlier introduction of labour market flexibility could have reduced lower 
real interest rates, exchange rates and wage rates, assisting employment 
and traded goods output.  
·  Later favourable outcomes indicate reform should proceed anyway, even if 
fiscal and labour reform sequencing is not strictly optimal. Traditional 
sequencing need not dominate a policy of proceeding rapidly on all fronts. 
·  The economic recovery from 1991 provides some basis for an 
encouraging conclusion about the reform process, although with room for 
debate about how far it might be structural versus cyclical. 
·  The reforms have markedly improved New Zealand’s economic prospects, 
and represent a radical break from New Zealand’s heavy regulation, high 
inflation and large fiscal deficits.   150 
·  New Zealand appears to have finally diagnosed its predicament 
appropriately and is on a trajectory to maintain its economy as a consistent 
high performer among the OECD. 
 
The latter conclusion is considerably more optimistic than any other work 
reviewed, possibly reflecting an undue concentration on short term trends over 
the 1991 to 1996 recovery period.  Dalziel (1998) challenged it, as noted 
elsewhere in this Appendix. 
 
Silverstone, Bollard and Lattimore (1996) 
This volume was also a major review of the reforms.  The editors’ conclusions 
are noted here rather than individual contributions. 
 
·  The authors are cautiously optimistic that reforms have contributed to 
economic growth, although 1995 was too soon to tell long term impacts. 
·  Assessments of microeconomic reforms are generally more optimistic than 
macroeconomic assessments. 
·  The 1986 to 1991 period was overlaid by stabilisation policies and had an 
impact on unemployment.  The macroeconomic adjustment costs were 
generally underestimated. Reducing inflation from 13% to 1% took seven 
years and real per capita incomes were static from 1987 to1992. 
·  There was little focus in the reform process on the dynamics of the 
adjustment process.  The program itself was an exercise in comparative 
statics and little attention was paid to sequencing, where the normal view 
would have been stabilisation before structural reform; product and labour 
reform before financial reform and deregulation of domestic markets 
before external markets. 
·  Consumers may have done well from the reforms compared to producers, 
with prices, variety and quality of service improvements. 
 
Treasury (1996) 
In 1996, Treasury’s briefing to the incoming Government devoted a chapter to 
economic growth. Key messages included: 
 
·  The New Zealand economy is performing differently from the way it 
performed in the 1970’s and 1980’s, with changes in behaviour by 
individuals and firms leading to higher growth and employment. 
·  Sustaining growth requires a medium term Government focus on 
enhancing decision-making, especially business decisions. 
·  Macroeconomic stability is a key element for growth 
·  Enhancing skills and ensuring the education system works well are 
important, including through increased employment, education 
participation, on the job training and business strategies aimed at 
increasing performance.   151 
·  Producing an environment that fosters business innovation and efficient 
and effective resource allocation are important. 
·  Rapid growth has not lead to marked inflation and balance of payments 
pressures. 
·  Firm performance has improved, based on Campbell-Hunt and Corbett’s 
(1996) research. 
·  Higher savings would help growth, through simply accumulating savings; 
boosting overseas confidence in New Zealand; reducing tax distortions; 
and considering the effects of taxpayer funded retirement income. 
·  Improving competition levels could accelerate business growth, including 
through Producer Board reform and tariff reductions. 
 
OECD 
The OECD is the major international organisation producing regular analyses of 
the New Zealand economy as a whole.  Other organisations that produce 
analyses either do not publish their analysis widely, such as the IMF or ratings 
agencies, or have a short-term orientation, such as most financial institutions.   
 
This material draws primarily on the OECD Surveys of New Zealand for 1998 
and 1999 as the most recent views. 
 
The OECD (1998) took that view that: 
 
·  New Zealand economic performance has changed for the better.  Applying 
a Hodrick-Prescott filter to New Zealand’s growth performance from 1978 
to 1998 suggests a considerable steepening in the growth rate took place 
after 1991.  It is too early to say whether the trend decline in New 
Zealand’s per capita real GDP performance compared to OECD members 
has been definitely reversed. 
·  Better inflation, export and employment positions are positive factors and 
there are prospects for a rebound in growth. 
·  The current account deficit of 6 to 7% poses risks to New Zealand’s 
economic prospects, including shifts in investor sentiment and higher risk 
premium being sought by foreign investors. 
·  Structural reforms have lifted potential output, but more through increased 
factor inputs than productivity. 
·  Productivity growth may have been muted by reforms in key areas being 
relatively recent; the long time required for economic behaviour to change; 
transition costs and remaining impediments to better performance. 
·  Other factors which might explain part of the relatively poor growth 
performance include: 
·  Structural reforms may have rendered much of the capital stock 
obsolete 
·  Reserve Bank efforts in the early 1990’s to control inflation lead to an 
overvalued dollar, and losses in export market share.   152 
·  New Zealand has a high proportion of the workforce with less than an 
upper secondary education (41% in 1996). 
·  Further reforms could assist growth in a number of areas:  
·  Producer Board exports 
·  health care provision 
·  public sector delivery of goods and services, including accident 
compensation 
·  avoiding restrictions on foreign investment 
·  removing tax distortions on savings 
·  avoiding large increases in the minimum wage 
·  improving the quality and responsiveness of the education system  
·  reducing business compliance costs 
 
The OECD (1999) view is broadly consistent with its 1998 view: 
 
·  Despite the 1998 setback to growth, some indicators point to an 
underlying improvement, including higher investment and employment; 
increased trade openness; and reduced inflation. 
·  Average growth in the 1998 to 2004 period of 2.5% per annum would be 
better than in the 1980’s but probably insufficient to prevent a renewed 
decline of real per capita incomes relative to the OECD average 
·  Balance of payments pressures and poor TFP growth are still a concern. 
·  New factors suggested as reducing the pay-offs to reform include: 
·  Slippage in achieving long term fiscal objectives 
·  The lack of a growth promoting focus in spending and tax decisions 
·  Monetary policy has involved a long learning curve and been 
complicated by changes in the fiscal stance 
·  Microeconomic policy has sometimes been inconsistent, creating 
uncertainty, as in trade, taxation and superannuation 
·  Some policies have changed without evaluation, as in health 
·  Some policies have been slowly implemented as in education reform 
and Producer Board reform 
·  The lack of scope for economies of scale given the small domestic 
market 
·  High and continuing trade barriers in overseas markets 
 
·  The benefits of reform are likely to be slow to emerge and reforms require 
consistent application, despite impressive overall progress with structural 
reform.   153 
 
Vandersyp (1993) 
Vandersyp provided another independent view, noting that New Zealand’s poor 
growth record was longstanding and rooted in the past before 1973.  Much of 
the growth record is attributable to poor TFP growth rather than factor 
accumulation.  Significant points made include: 
 
·  Investment is significantly spurred by demand growth 
·  Profitability and cashflow are important to investment in research results 
·  Many growth models do not stand up to scrutiny, reflecting data difficulties 
and that there can be alternative paths to growth 
·  A sustained increase in savings will boost growth 
·  Population growth and high real interest rates have a negative impact on 
growth 
·  While growth theory does not provide a platform for unequivocal 
recommendations, helpful policies might include: 
·  Minimise business taxation to boost R&D and investment 
·  Provide a stable macroeconomic and political environment 
·  Acknowledge the limited ability of Government to affect economic 
and social development 
·  Have private firms recognise the importance of innovation to their 
own survival and enhance employee skills 
·  Encourage integration with Australia, to allow risks to be more evenly 
spread 
·  Expand trade openness 
·  Structure financial markets to allow a wide range of risk taking 
opportunities for saving  
·  Maintain realistic interest rates, at say 6% real   154 
Appendix B: Measurement Issues 
In examining why New Zealand’s recent economic performance appears to 
have been moderate, one possible explanation could be that performance has 
not been well measured.  Gross Domestic Product (GDP) measurement issues 
are discussed in more detail in two useful publications, Lawrence and Diewert 
(1999) and Statistics New Zealand (1996) which are drawn on here. 
Measurement issues are problematic globally.  Any given measures face 
limitations based on both conceptual difficulties and difficulties in accessing 
data.   
 
The key issue here is whether statistical issues are more of a problem for 
New Zealand than for other countries, thus accounting for some of the apparent 
New Zealand under-performance.  It is not possible to draw a strong conclusion, 
but it is possible that because of the extent of reforms since 19984, New 
Zealand is slightly more affected by these issues than other OECD countries.  
 
A number of possible contributing factors are briefly outlined below.  
 
Aspects of performance that are outside National Accounts concepts: 
·  Non-capture of welfare effects 
 
The New Zealand System of National Accounts captures the value added 
resulting from production (GDP) or the value of final uses or demands (Gross 
Domestic Expenditure or GDE).  It does not however capture consumer 
economic welfare, let alone more esoteric concepts such as happiness.
112  It is 
likely that welfare may move broadly in line with GDP or its more satisfactory 
relatives such as Gross National Income (GNI). However, it is possible that, 
say, consumer surplus may increase more than production if entry to a market 
is liberalised, resulting in more choice, more service or lower prices to 
consumers, particularly in imported goods and services.  Reforms may have 
generated more of these sorts of benefits.  With the high pace of reforms in 
New Zealand since 1984, it is possible that a period of “catch-up” may have 
occurred for consumer welfare.  With New Zealand’s border protection now 
being arguably the lowest in the OECD, these effects may be greater than 
elsewhere. 
 
                                            
112  Hamilton (1999) lists several shortcomings of GDP as a welfare measure.  These include: 
·  not taking into account changes in the distribution of output within the community 
·  failure to account for household work 
·  counting defensive expenditures (on matters such as pollution clean-ups and defence as 
contributions to GDP) 
·  ignoring changes in stocks of both built and natural capital 
 
He applies to Australia one measure which attempts to take account of these matters, the 
Genuine Progress Indicator and concludes that welfare on this measure has grown much less 
than GDP.     155 
·  Non-capture of non-market transactions 
 
Much household activity is not captured in National Accounts, through being 
non-market activity, as pointed out for example in Hazledine (1998).  However, 
this is a feature of National Accounts everywhere.  With New Zealand’s labour 
force participation having moved to above the OECD average and accordingly 
allowing relatively fewer opportunities for unrecorded production, it is possible 
that New Zealand’s growth performance would show a relative deterioration 
over the last two decades if this factor could be properly taken into account. 
 
Aspects of Performance which should be captured in National Accounts 
·  Output Measurement Problems 
 
New Zealand’s output is likely to be somewhat understated, particularly in 
growing service areas.  In New Zealand, output in some but not all services 
areas is measured by extrapolating base period value added by employment, 
resulting in labour productivity increases being missed from value added, and 
understating growth.   
 
Services sector output measurement is problematic in many countries 
(Lawrence and Diewert 1999). However, it is possible that the problem may be 
greater in New Zealand with a switch to services recently accompanying the 
major reforms. Services measurement may also be affected by introducing new 
dimensions to output or new services as regulatory restrictions are eased.
113  
For instance, longer shop trading hours may show up as increasing costs and 
therefore decreasing value added, even although effective output has 
significantly increased as Lowe (1995) suggested happened in Australia.   
Measured output and productivity should increase as these effects are left 
behind.  (They have done so since 1992 in New Zealand Trade, Restaurants 
and Hotels, in the Lawrence and Diewert (1999) data.) 
 
Further possible output understatement in the face of reforms, could arise 
through use of Laspeyres base period weights in GDP measurement.  This 
could give too much weight to industries that were scaling down in the face of 
industry assistance being phased out and insufficient weight to new activities.  It 
should be less of an issue as reform processes are completed and national 
accounts are rebased to more recent time periods or possibly moved to a 
chained Laspeyres index basis as is now being considered by Statistics 
New Zealand (1998b). 
 
Lawrence and Diewert (1999) also suggest use of a user cost approach to 
measuring services output in the finance sector, which acknowledges that the 
                                            
113  Easton (1998) suggests that a majority of households surveyed in 1993 considered service 
levels had improved, although higher income groups were more positive.  Silverstone, 
Bollard and Lattimore (1996) at page 22 also suggest that consumers may have done well 
relative to producers with improvements in prices, increased choice and quality of service.   156 
opportunity cost of capital is a real cost, although it is not taken into account in 
national accounts data. This is based on an approach used in the United States. 
It would be likely to find that finance sector output has been growing more 
strongly than is recorded in national accounts, possibly reflecting service quality 
improvements.  
 
·  Underground Economy 
 
The underground economy may be quite significant within New Zealand, with 
illegal and unrecorded activities possibly being over 10% of activity.  Giles 
(1999) estimated the effect to be as much as 11.3% in 1994.  This may have 
increased over time.  It is difficult to estimate how significant this is in New 
Zealand compared to overseas countries though. 
 
·  Input Measurement Problems 
  
Lawrence and Diewert (1997) discuss a number of national accounts input 
measurement problems, including non-use of double deflation, non-allowance 
for natural resource depletion or environmental effects and not taking account of 
inventories or land.  It is not clear that many of these would have any systematic 
effect on New Zealand output compared with results elsewhere.  One possibility 
is that capital write-offs as a result of restructuring may not always be fully 
reflected in New Zealand national accounts.  Again, if this is the case, the 
accuracy of measurement of growth and levels should improve over time as 
adjustments are made. 
 
·  Business Intermediate Expenditures versus Consumption Expenditures 
 
A move to self-employment may be associated with a move to treat items 
formerly treated as consumption as intermediate inputs, such as entertainment 
expenses or Internet connections.  This would decrease measured GDP levels. 
With a relatively large move to self-employment, this may be more significant for 
New Zealand.  Lawrence and Diewert note that self-employment as a proportion 
of total employment increased from 28% to 33% (an 18% rise) of the Australian 
labour force from 1985 to 1997.  In contrast, New Zealand self employment 
measured in the Household Labour Force Survey increased 26% over 1986 to 
1997, suggesting self employment may have increased slightly faster here, 
perhaps reducing relative measured growth. 
 
·  New Goods Problem and Bias in Consumption Components 
 
National Accounts have some difficulty in taking new goods and services, 
quality improvements, benefits from having new outlets available with better 
offers and changes in weights fully into account in developing the deflators to be 
used in preparing real national accounts estimates, as outlined by Lawrence 
and Diewert.  Lawrence and Diewert suggest that these biases may result in the 
New Zealand CPI being up to 0.65% to 1.0% too high per annum.  Moreover 
they suggest the effects of new goods and quality change biases may have   157 
accelerated with reforms in recent years, leading market sector TFP to be up to 
0.4% to 0.7% higher than their estimates.   
 
It seems likely that this effect is present to some extent, although how much is 
difficult to ascertain.  The same effects are likely to be present overseas, but 
perhaps to a lesser extent in the 1980s, given the pace of reforms in 
New Zealand.  The issue may now be less important, with fewer reforms being 
undertaken.  Statistics New Zealand tends to consider that its methodology is 
better than in some countries, the United States being one example. 
 
Conclusion 
It is likely that New Zealand’s output as measured by GDP is slightly greater 
than national accounts suggest. The same issue exists for other OECD 
countries too, but it is possible that New Zealand is more affected by these 
issues than most because of the extent of reforms since 1984.  If this is the 
case, some of the effects should reduce over time and New Zealand’s relative 
measured growth performance could begin to appear better as the pace of 
reform has eased.  More research would be required to obtain a more accurate 
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Figure 2: Real GDP and GDP per Capita 
Source: Spliced National Income series sourced from Statistics New Zealand, 
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Figure 3: GDP per head in Selected OECD Countries 
 
Source: Haines (1998) and OECD 
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Figure 5: Diewert & Lawrence Output Indexes 
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Figure 6: New Zealand Terms of Trade 
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Figure 7: New Zealand Real Exchange Rate 
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TABLES 
Table 1: Growth in Major Inputs in New Zealand 1972 - 1998 
 




Managers 531  1274 
Clerical 975  1304 
Production 1892  1654 
Total Labour  3398  4232 




Transport Equipment  251  436 
Electrical Machinery  78  997 
Plant & Other Machinery  298  814 
Total Physical Capital  1381  3799 
   




Total Inventories  2856  2885 
Source: Lawrence and Diewert (1999) Tables B41b and B41c   167 
 
Table 2: OECD Economic Outlook Average Annual Percentage Change in 
TFP 
Country  1960–73 1973–79 1979–97 
OECD Estimates  %  p.a. %  p.a. %  p.a. 
United  States 1.9  0.1  0.6 
Japan  5.6 1.1 1.2 
Germany 2.6 1.8 0.6 
France  3.7 1.6 1.3 
Italy 4.4  2.0  1.2 
United  Kingdom  2.8 0.7 1.2 
Canada 1.1  –0.1  –0.6 
Australia  2.2 1.2 0.9 
Austria  3.2 1.1 1.0 
Belgium  3.8 1.3 1.0 
Denmark 1.1 0.1 0.7 
Finland  4.0 1.9 2.6 
Greece  2.7 0.8 –0.2 
Ireland  4.6 3.9 3.6 
Korea  3.1  2.7 
Netherlands  3.5 1.7 1.0 
New  Zealand 1.6  –1.4  1.1 
Norway 2.2  1.3  0.6 
Portugal 4.1  –0.7  1.0 
Spain  3.3 0.7 1.7 
Sweden  1.9 0.0 1.2 
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Source: Lawrence and Diewert (1999)   168 
 
Table 3: New Zealand Living Standards Indicators 
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number 1995  19 
(29) 
7.2 
Source:OECD (1998)   169 
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